Sam Harris said:
...The great worry is that any honest discussion of the underlying causes of
human behavior seems to erode the notion of moral responsibility. If we view
people as neuronal weather patterns, how can we coherently speak about
morality? And if we remain committed to seeing people as people, some who can
be reasoned with and some who cannot, it seems that we must find some notion of
personal responsibility that fits the facts. ...Happily, we can. What does it
really mean to take responsibility for an action? ...To say that I was
responsible for my behavior is simply to say that what I did was sufficiently
in keeping with my thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and desires to be considered
an extension of them. ... Judgments of responsibility, therefore, depend upon
the overall complexion of one’s mind, not on the metaphysics of mental cause
and effect."
Steve said to dmb:
Since the quoted text is from his article "Morality Without Free Will," I think
you'd have a hard time convincing Sam that he is actually arguing that free
will is required for morality.
dmb says:
That is specious reasoning. Like I already pointed out, Sam does not deny that
we are responsible for our actions. The "Free Will" that he does deny is a
metaphysical notion. Like I said in the post just sent, the practical,
empirical "will" only refers to the this extension of our intentions, goals and
desires into the realm of action. That's all it means to have a will. And the
classic dilemma is gone but we are still asking if that will is free or
determined. But look at the way you've framed the question...
Steve said to dmb:
...Harris denies that we are free to choose our actions. He of course does not
deny that obvious fact that we make choices and have intentions and desires. I
have emphasized that point many times over the past few months.
dmb says:
I don't get it. Harris denies that we are free to choose but of course he does
not deny that we make choices? How is that not just a contradiction? We are not
free to choose but obviously we make choices? Perhaps I failed to address this
point out of kindness. Does the first claim a denial of metaphysical freedom of
the "Free Will" and the second one is an affirmation of plain, practical free
will? As it stands, I can't make any sense of that. Though you do emphasize it
a lot...
Steve said to dmb:
...The question was never about agency as the mere fact that we make choices or
have will or intentions or moods and desires. It was about _free_ agency. I
have always said that we obviously do make choices. The issue is about whether
we make _free_ choices.
dmb says:
The question was never about agency as the mere fact, it was about _free_
agency? Huh? Aren't you just inserting that metaphysical nonsense that nobody
is talking about again? How many times do I have to tell you that NOBODY is
talking about that kind of entity except you. You projecting that concept into
the conversation and it is worse than useless. It has become an obstacle of
epic proportions. I really don't understand why you insist on doing this.
And isn't it just redundant to say we make choices freely? If we make choices,
that's it. That's the freedom. If you can't choose, then you're not free. Same
with agency. The meaning of term already contains the notion of freedom. I
mean, phrases like "determined agent" and "caused choice" are nonsense for that
reason.
Steve said:
Anyway, if you agree with Harris's view that we can have moral responsibility
while denying free will then we have no argument this at point, so I guess you
can stop saying that my view defies logic, and I hope you'll retract your many
insistences that it would be simply illogical to hold such a view. The link
between free will and moral responsibility is not a logical necessity as you
have been insisting. I'll take your response above as your humble admission
that you were wrong and that you now agree with me that we _can_ make sense of
moral responsibility while denying free will.
dmb says:
No, sorry. I'm not ready to retract anything just yet. And no, I certainly
think Sam's neurological determinism is just an updated version of classic horn
of determinism and your attempt to grapple with the MOQ's reformulation by way
of his medical materialism and reductionism has created a pretty awesome mess.
It was a good try to get Sam to do the work for you, but all of this is about a
simple logical connection. I mean, if Sam denies that we are free to choose, in
what sense are we responsible for those choices? Isn't he saying people are as
morally culpable as a tornado, which is to say not at all? No agency, no
responsibility. If Sam thinks he has found a plausible way around this, you're
definitely going to have to explain it to me. I honestly don't see it.
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