Hi dmb,
> Steve countered: > You seem to have missed where it [Stanford] said "for the most part" and > "maybe not exclusively." ... And as above [dictionary definition], pay > attention to the qualifier "SOME philosophers." What that means is that your > own dictionary says that moral responsibility is not always tied up with the > whole free will determinism debate. It actually contradicts what you cited it > to support. > And note that you are speaking out of both sides of your mouth. You are > complaining that I have a too narrow a notion of free will in mind while > simultaneously insisting that any reasonable definition of free will includes > the narrow idea that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. (The > meta-argument: So much for your overwhelming evidence which I just utterly > demolished point by point. ... > > > dmb says: > Demolished the evidence point by point? Steve: As I said, I don't expect you to see it that way, and obviously you missed the intended irony which I explicated in the part you snipped. dmb: As I see it, you have missed the point. It appears to me that you do not even understand the argument that you've supposedly demolished. My point does not depend on this linkage being universally held. So what if Pirsig, the dictionary and the SEP allow some wiggle room? When has there ever been 100% agreement on anything in philosophy? > > The point you keep side stepping is a logical one, and that logical > connection is so central that all three sources identify it as part of the > most basic description of the issue. All three sources are describing the > meaning of free will and in all three cases they think that connection is > worth mentioning. You don't find that compelling? To see the same point being > made in three very different sources should be telling you something about > the importance of that point? And these three sources reflect common usage > (dictionary), philosophical usage (SEP), and SEP supports Pirsig's own > description of the traditional dilemma. How much more of a consensus can > there be about anything? That is some very strong evidence and it supports > the logical point I'm making. This is the part you are side-stepping and yet > its the main part. How do you get around the LOGIC? That's what these sources > are referring to. They all make the same point because the moral implications > of determinism are > so obvious. Steve: I have always granted that most philosophers have traditionally linked the concepts of free will and moral responsibility. I am saying that that link is not necessary. It is not a logical necessity. The fact that you cited sources who say that philosophers have made that link doesn't help your case, since I've already granted that people usually make that link. But these sources help my case because they all point out that not _all_ philosophers make that link from which I think you ought to conclude that it is _not_ a simple logical necessity to make that link. What you need to do to make _your_ case is explain why it is logically necessary (I doubt it is) to make that link. You haven't even begun to make that case. All you've done is shown that the link wins the popularity contest. Oh, yeah, and you said it is "obvious" and that it is a matter of "LOGIC." But again if not all philosophers have made that link as your sources point out, then it may not be as obvious and logically necessary as you think. Also, you have a problem here in making this link since I would bet that none of the philosophers in the "most philosophers" who have made that link would make it in the way you must if you take Pirsig's "to the extent to which" formulation of human freedom as "free will." Since rocks, trees, and amoebas can follow DQ, then we would have to hold such things as morally responsible for their actions based on your equating that capacity with having free will and linking free will with moral responsibility. > dmb said to Steve: > You are answering criticism that says you are compartmentalizing DQ and sq > and your reply is to say they are distinct aspects? Saying they are distinct > is just another way to say they are in separate compartments. You've not > replied to the criticism, Steve. All you did was re-assert the objectionable > assertion using a slightly different term. Sorry, but that does not count as > a argument even by the loosest standards. > > > Steve replied: > What I was saying is that I don't see that as a valid criticism that I need > to defend against. Of course I'm distinguishing DQ and sq. Why wouldn't I? > This debate is about a line from Lila where Pirsig does just that as well. > > > dmb says: > > I already explained why in many different ways but, as is the case right > here, it seems you don't want to acknowledge the case I'm making. To put it > simply the consequences of your reading - compartmentalizing DQ and sq the > way you have - results in a kind of determinism. The result of your > interpretation is to deny any meaningful sense of human freedom or agency. > And that means morality goes out the window. > > If the extent to which we are controlled by static patterns is 100% and > following DQ does not entail making choices, then no one is responsible for > any of their actions. Steve: Where did I ever say that the extent to which we follow static patterns is 100%? Look, you have to deal with the fact that if you want to equate free will with the capacity to follow DQ, you have to reconcile some things that Pirsig has said about following DQ with what is meant by the word "will." Pirsig said that to the extent we follow DQ our behavior is free which you take to be a sort of free will. But if we want to know what Pirsig means by "follow DQ" in order to see if that equation makes any sense we have to consider some of the paradigmatic examples he offered for following DQ such as jumping off a hot stove and an amoeba moving away from acid. It is just absurd to talk about these things as any sort of will let alone _free_ will. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
