Howdy MOQers:
dmb said:
...Free will is just another way to say that you could have acted differently.
Free will is, as my dictionary puts it, "the ability to act one's own
discretion". As I have already said many times, that is all I mean by free
will. Every dictionary and encyclopedia backs this claim and I don't see any
reason why the MOQ would defy the english language. ...
Steve replied:
...I think dmb is asserting a conception of free will when he says that "could
have acted differently" is the same as Pirsig's formulation of freedom as the
extent to which we follow DQ. He is trying to slip the old "free will" in the
back door of the MOQ, but I could be wrong. I see "could have acted
differently" and following DQ as very different ideas. One is Pirsig's
description of freedom. The other is free will as it is usually defined. dmb
thinks these concepts cash out to the same thing, but I don't see how that
works. What I think would help me most would be to understand what the past
conditional "could" refers to in this context. "Could" if only _what_ were
true? ... I just can't make sense of "could have acted differently" without a
"could if _what_ were true?"
dmb says:
I think you've muddled and confused things quite badly here, Steve. There are
two basic ideas here, two basic questions. The first sticking point, sadly and
very frustratingly, is simply finding agreement as to the meaning of the
central term, namely "free will". This is why I keep quoting the dictionary.
Whatever position you might care to adopt with regard to free will, and there
have been many different positions in the history of the debate, you simply
can't get started unless and until there is agreement as to what you're even
talking about. To say that Pirsig's re-formulation of freedom is something
other than a re-formulation of free will is to confuse the basic meaning of the
term "free will" with some particular position with respect to the idea of free
will. In that sense, the dictionary definition (above) of free will and the
introductory descriptions of free will found in the encyclopedia are NEUTRAL.
To put this in terms of your question, Steve, this basic defini
tion does not include any conditions or qualifications because those will
narrow the basic concept in one direction or another. At that point you're no
longer talking about the basic meaning of the term, you're staking out a
position on the issue and otherwise making a case for a particular sort of free
will or denying free will with a particular kind of determinism.
If Parfit is asking about the conditions of "could have acted differently",
then he is asking for the conditions of "the ability to act at one's
discretion" (as my dictionary puts it) or the conditions that allow "one's
behavior" to be free (as Pirsig puts it.) I think it's abundantly obvious that
Parfit, Pirsig and the dictionary are all in agreement as to the basic meaning
of free will. One is neutral and the other two have very different views about
it but they are all talking about the same thing; a person's ability to act
freely, as opposed to not being able to act freely. It's like any other debate.
An empiricist doesn't have to be a rationalist in order to debate rationalism.
He simply has to understand the meaning of the term, regardless of the position
he takes toward it and regardless of the specific form of rationalism held by
his rival. The subtle details of the debate can come out only if they first
agree on the basic terms. Otherwise, they aren't really even on
the same topic and the result will be a steamy, hot mess.
Then it's simple. Free will is simply the ability to act without the
constraints of fate or necessity. In the MOQ, this freedom is construed as the
capacity to perceive and follow Dynamic Quality. You say this is not the same
as free will, Steve, and yet you also confess that you don't know what it means
to follow DQ, that you don't understand why the MOQ's freedom is a matter of
perception. How is it possible to conclude that I've slipped something
inappropriate into this formulation if you don't understand this formulation?
You could have acted differently if you weren't controlled by static patterns.
You have free will to the extent that you follow DQ, which means to the extent
that you're attuned to and engaged with the concrete particulars of your own
experience. That's the particular sort of free will you get in the MOQ. It is
some kind of capacity to act freely so that it agrees with the dictionaries and
encyclopedia and yet it doesn't destroy science or morality, as the traditional
dilemma construed it. That the problem solved by this compatabilist
reformulation. Pirsig gets rid of causality without doing any damage to science
and he saves science without destroying moral responsibility. And of course we
want both!
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