> [Steve] > We can certainly understand ADD pragmatically in terms of the different > experiences we have of those with it versus without it, but how does the > same apply to free will? > > [Arlo] > I think we can understand "freedom" (or agency) pragmatically, although we > don't have a control group we can point to as "not having agency". In fact, > I think the MOQ tries to do just this. Remember that even with "ADD", the > fact we assign a "have" and "have not" group is a culturally pragmatic > distinction, and not one everyone agrees on. But what we do start to see > with the MOQ is varying levels of agency, so while we don't have a > "free-less" group, we do see varying degrees of potential, both between > levels in the MOQ and even within (e.g. on the biological level an amoeba > compared to an ferret).
Steve: That sounds good to me. I think of agency as having the ability to make choices. Certainly the Pirsig's evolutionary picture is one of increasing agency. Now, when I raised the issue of agency with dmb, he insisted that agency and choice equate to free will. For him the terms are mutually exclusive with determinism. How would you distinguish these terms? I see agency (that we make choices) as a fact that is what is to be explained as free will or determinism in the traditional debate. I see the old debate as taking choice for granted as a simple fact: "sure we make choices, but is the choice I make determined completely by causes external to the will, or is there room for an internal will to play a role in choice?" But I don't see that as a question that an MOQer ought to still find it important to ask. I see the old debate as dissolved rather than resolved. > [Steve] > What experiences could ever distinguish between a will that is determined > versus one that is free? > > [Arlo] > I'm going to point out that I think the question is flawed. Not that I have > much to say about "free will/determinism", but you've removed "will" in a > way that makes it an object (I think) which can either be "free" or > "determined"? And, given that I agree with Pirsig that our activity > evidences both freedom and constraint, I don't think a "will" (even as a > figure of speech) has much value as being Absolutely Free or Absolutely > Determined (wasn't one of the quotes Andre posted along these lines?). > > The question is, can we distinguish between ranges of potential (agency), > and I think we can. Steve: I think we are in agreement (which keeps making me wonder why dmb has such a problem with me but not with you and Horse when you say the same sorts of things). It was my intention to word the question in a way that makes it clear that "will" is the wrong thing to be wondering about with regard to freedom in the MOQ. It seems to me that calling Pirsig's conception of freedom in terms of DQ/sq a version of "free will" is very problematic because Pirsig's conception of freedom isn't about _will_ at all. The MOQ has a lot to say about freedom but not in terms of whether the explanation of human behavior is to be found at least somewhat internal to or otherwise completely external to the will. I see Pirsig as rejecting both horns of the traditional free will versus determinism debate in favor of an entirely new way of thinking about freedom. Where I see what Pirsig did on the question as a revolution, others seem to see it as a sort of marriage. I think there is great psychological attachment to the old idea of free will that is motivating certain people to try to rescue it as an MOQ endorsed concept even though it doesn't fit into Pirsig's picture. I agree with you that agency, the increasing repertoire of responses to quality as we move up the MOQ evolutionary hierarchy (And as we move up we find new sorts of constraints as well as new possibilities.), is the conception of freedom that the MOQ endorses. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
