Ian, What is this WE? How do WE get anything right or wrong?
Marsha On Sep 23, 2011, at 4:31 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: > Steve, > > Saying our free-will is "part random" is not the same as saying it's "by its > very nature unpredictable" is it ! By its very nature it's free will, ... > but ... > > It's just honest to recognise that our will is subject to chance too - and > it's beneficial two ways - we can take account of the unpredictability in > our willed choices and actions, through guesses, percentages, margins for > error, plan-B fallbacks, etc - AND - when we get it wrong we learn > something from what we didn't expect, and evolve our will. > > Not complicated. > Ian > > On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 5:02 PM, Steven Peterson > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Hi Ian, >> >> Ian: >>> For example Steve, >>> >>> You said here >>> I can't see why saying that the will is part determined and part random >> can >>> add up to a sort of freedom worth wanting. >>> >>> I however, can't see any other kind. >> >> >> Steve: >> What I am asking is what is gained as freedom by saying that the will >> is part random? What is gained by positing that our will by its very >> nature is unpredictable even to ourselves? Why would you see that as a >> good thing? I can see freedom in increasing our power to predict so we >> can make better and more meaningful choices. Why would >> _unpredictablity_ be something in which to take comfort? >> >> >> Ian: >>> It would be nice (but scary) if I was omnipotent, but a pretty >> unrealistic >>> expectation - It would be equally depressing if chance determined >>> everything, despite my will. >>> >>> ie I'm not particularly agreeing with you and disagreeing with dmb, I >> simply >>> can't see the point of your (your as in you) disagreement. >> >> Steve: >> The point in this thread I think is to discuss James's essay on >> indeterminism. My point is that I don't think his argument gets us >> anywhere. >> >> Personally, if the terms free will and determinism are worth keeping >> at all, then I would think of them as compatible intellectual >> patterns. >> >> I explained my position to Jan Anders recently. Unfortunely. I get the >> impression that you'll read it and then say "yeah, but what is your >> POINT?" But here it is anyway... >> >> I see determinism and free will as terms that have strong association >> with theories about the way things really are and are attempts to >> distinguish certain experiences as either real or illusory. In the MOQ >> experience is reality, so we ought not be worried about such questions >> as do people REALLY make choices or do they only SEEM to? >> >> If we drop the appearance/reality metaphysical baggage from both free >> will and determinism, we are left with free will as the fact that we >> make choices and an entirely compatible notion of determinism which >> just says that everything "depends." We can always look deeper and >> deeper for more and more patterns of dependency between actions, but >> whatever we learn about such relationships between experiences is no >> threat to the fact that choices are made all the time. >> >> That's "compatiblism." It is not the idea that we have SOME free will >> but we are also SOMEWHAT controlled. Compatiblism says that free will >> and determinism are both true. It says that the serpent of causation >> is thus over everything. By this I mean that if you go looking for >> explanations in terms of causes, there is no necessary point at which >> we must stop and say "this is or that, say, 'the will,' is the _final_ >> cause"). But at the same time, though everything can be thought of as >> having a cause, "everything" is a collection of value choices. (Notice >> that I did _not_ say that everything only ever pought to be thought of >> in terms of causes. This is analogous to the Matt K pragmatic version >> of materialism as "everything _can_ have a material description," as >> opposed to the metaphysical version, "everything only ever ought to be >> described in material terms because those are the terms the universe >> demands we use to talk about it.") >> >> Choices are part of experience, and so are intellectual explanations >> for choices in terms of causation (understood in the MOQ as patterns >> of preferences). Explaining a choice is not to explain it away. It is >> still a choice even if we can give reasons for it. In fact, if we >> can't give reasons for our choices, or even go so far as to say that >> there _are_ no reasons for them--if _that_ is what we mean by free >> will--then those choices would be just random. That wouldn't be the >> sort of freedom that anyone would want anyway. >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >> > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
