Steve, Saying our free-will is "part random" is not the same as saying it's "by its very nature unpredictable" is it ! By its very nature it's free will, ... but ...
It's just honest to recognise that our will is subject to chance too - and it's beneficial two ways - we can take account of the unpredictability in our willed choices and actions, through guesses, percentages, margins for error, plan-B fallbacks, etc - AND - when we get it wrong we learn something from what we didn't expect, and evolve our will. Not complicated. Ian On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 5:02 PM, Steven Peterson <[email protected]>wrote: > Hi Ian, > > Ian: > > For example Steve, > > > > You said here > > I can't see why saying that the will is part determined and part random > can > > add up to a sort of freedom worth wanting. > > > > I however, can't see any other kind. > > > Steve: > What I am asking is what is gained as freedom by saying that the will > is part random? What is gained by positing that our will by its very > nature is unpredictable even to ourselves? Why would you see that as a > good thing? I can see freedom in increasing our power to predict so we > can make better and more meaningful choices. Why would > _unpredictablity_ be something in which to take comfort? > > > Ian: > > It would be nice (but scary) if I was omnipotent, but a pretty > unrealistic > > expectation - It would be equally depressing if chance determined > > everything, despite my will. > > > > ie I'm not particularly agreeing with you and disagreeing with dmb, I > simply > > can't see the point of your (your as in you) disagreement. > > Steve: > The point in this thread I think is to discuss James's essay on > indeterminism. My point is that I don't think his argument gets us > anywhere. > > Personally, if the terms free will and determinism are worth keeping > at all, then I would think of them as compatible intellectual > patterns. > > I explained my position to Jan Anders recently. Unfortunely. I get the > impression that you'll read it and then say "yeah, but what is your > POINT?" But here it is anyway... > > I see determinism and free will as terms that have strong association > with theories about the way things really are and are attempts to > distinguish certain experiences as either real or illusory. In the MOQ > experience is reality, so we ought not be worried about such questions > as do people REALLY make choices or do they only SEEM to? > > If we drop the appearance/reality metaphysical baggage from both free > will and determinism, we are left with free will as the fact that we > make choices and an entirely compatible notion of determinism which > just says that everything "depends." We can always look deeper and > deeper for more and more patterns of dependency between actions, but > whatever we learn about such relationships between experiences is no > threat to the fact that choices are made all the time. > > That's "compatiblism." It is not the idea that we have SOME free will > but we are also SOMEWHAT controlled. Compatiblism says that free will > and determinism are both true. It says that the serpent of causation > is thus over everything. By this I mean that if you go looking for > explanations in terms of causes, there is no necessary point at which > we must stop and say "this is or that, say, 'the will,' is the _final_ > cause"). But at the same time, though everything can be thought of as > having a cause, "everything" is a collection of value choices. (Notice > that I did _not_ say that everything only ever pought to be thought of > in terms of causes. This is analogous to the Matt K pragmatic version > of materialism as "everything _can_ have a material description," as > opposed to the metaphysical version, "everything only ever ought to be > described in material terms because those are the terms the universe > demands we use to talk about it.") > > Choices are part of experience, and so are intellectual explanations > for choices in terms of causation (understood in the MOQ as patterns > of preferences). Explaining a choice is not to explain it away. It is > still a choice even if we can give reasons for it. In fact, if we > can't give reasons for our choices, or even go so far as to say that > there _are_ no reasons for them--if _that_ is what we mean by free > will--then those choices would be just random. That wouldn't be the > sort of freedom that anyone would want anyway. > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
