Yes Steve, but when people say "Compatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are compatible rather than mutually exclusive positions."
They are not (cannot be) using the SEP definition of determinism you cite in (2) They are using a less greedy definition - a la Dennett (who you also cite). You go on to say So, presumably, the reason dmb hasn't yet responded is because he now finally understands this and is very embarrassed. He has to deal with the fact that he has been berating me for months for asserting logically contradictory notions and not using terms properly, when his own beloved SEP contradicts his usage of the term "compatiblism." I say, Stop being a dick and stick to the point. I actually believe there is something you're trying to say - I just don't understand what it is yet. Ian On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 1:45 PM, Steven Peterson <[email protected]>wrote: > Hi Ron, > > > > Steve said to DmB: > > Sorry, but as I have been trying to tell you, you are quite wrong > > about what is meant by compatiblism as opposed to incompatiblism. You, > > my friend, are clearly an INcompatiblist. That is to say that you hold > > that in order to assert free will we must deny determinism--that free > > will and determinism are incompatible. > > > > Ron: > > Really Steve, all Daves post have been about nothing else but a > compatabilist > > stance against your persistant insistance that freewill is not a > possibility in a MoQ. > > That choices and values are not free at all. > > Steve: > Two things here. > > First of all, understand that dmb is taking the classical > INcompatiblist position as the SEP defines the issue: > > "For ease of reference and discussion throughout this entry, let us > simplify the above argument as follows: > > 1. If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done > otherwise (A-C). > 2. If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one > actually does (D-E). > 3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will > (F). > > Call this simplified argument the Classical Incompatibilist Argument." > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ > > Isn't that what dmb is saying? That we must REJECT determinism in > order to make sense of asserting free will? Well, that is > _in_compatiblism not compatiblism. Compatiblism is the position that > free will and determinism are compatible rather than mutually > exclusive positions. Some (like Dennett) even go so far as to say that > free will is predicated on determinism being true. > > So, presumably, the reason dmb hasn't yet responded is because he now > finally understands this and is very embarrassed. He has to deal with > the fact that he has been berating me for months for asserting > logically contradictory notions and not using terms properly, when his > own beloved SEP contradicts his usage of the term "compatiblism." In > fact, he recently accused me of poor reading of all the compatiblist > philosophers I have quoted while the SEP article on compatiblism is > something _he_ quoted to _me_ weeks ago without even realizing that it > defines compatiblism as the _opposite_ of what he has been arguing > for. Further, it cites those philosophers I have quoted as supporting > compatiblism as the compatibility of free will with determinism. > > > Secondly, let me explain my position on the MOQ and the free > will-determinism conundrum. I think that the terms "free will" and > "determinism" have strong associations with SOM, so it is best to let > them stay that way. Pirsig doesn't accept the premise of causality as > mechanistic laws governing the universe, and he doesn't accept the > premise of the Cartesian self. In their traditional SOM forms, the MOQ > says "mu" to the free will/determinism, and I would prefer to leave it > at that. Pirsig has given us plenty of tools to use to talk about > freedom without entering into the ancient arguments over these > particular terms where there is little agreement about what they even > mean. > > HOWEVER, if one wants to keep these terms and use them in an MOQ > context, then they must first be shed of their SOM appearance-reality > baggage. There is no Cartesian "I" sitting behind the scenes running > the show, and there is no illusion versus reality question with regard > to what is REALLY going on with regard to causality. Once we do that, > we have two intellectual patterns for talking about human experience > which can both be used (like polar and rectangular coordinates) for > whatever purposes they are good for without having to decide which one > describes the way things REALLY are despite all illusions to the > contrary. We have a view of freedom where this non-metaphysical > version of free will is compatible with a non-metaphysical version of > determinism. > > You apologized for butting in. No need! I hope this wasn't just a "hit > and run" and you will stay with it so we can try to understand one > another's positions better (as well as our own). > > Best, > Steve > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
