Ron,
Often when you say below what you see dmb as saying, it is opposite of what he has been saying. The important thing is that as far as I can tell you and I are in likely to be in agreement once I clarify my positions for you. I would just ask that you try to understand what I am saying about my views rather than what dmb is saying about my views. Steve, Ok, that is fair enough. I will try beginning again with a fresh perspective. > Ron: > Dmb is rejecting, more precisely, that there is a specific, general meaning > of the term "free will" " > "It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in > the philosophical work > devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it" Steve: That is a quote of SEP rather than dmb. dmb keeps insisting that free will has a basic definition that everyone making correct use of language uses. Ron: > A response to your position that the idea has definite metaphysical meaning > that > must be rejected in a MoQ. Steve: We can of course use old words in new ways and listen to the old hymns with new ears. My position is basically just advice that we ought not use the term "free will" to talk about freedom in the MOQ (e.g. "The MOQ asserts that we have free will"). We have lots of ways of doing that in terms of DQ and since we will be likely to be mistaken for taking a traditional version of free will if we assert that we have free will rather than talking about freedom in terms of dynamic quality. Ron: The first con that arises for me in this regard is that what I feel is worse than being mistaken for a traditional view, (which is a usefull rhetorical connecting point to begin an explanation of what we mean when we use the term) is losing someone in an esoteria of terms, as Ham often does in his own thesis. The important question to ask is what are the consequences of each point of view does it make a practicle difference in our lives, if not, and I side towards it does not, then there is no problem with however the terms are used. It's a moot point. Ron: > You then assert that there is no will because there is no agent and that > there is no > freedom because all choice is statically determined. >This leads one to believe that > your position rests on the notion that all freedom and choice are really > static prefferences. > You have based your entire dispute apon this. Steve: I think we have will and are agents. I have always said that we obviously make choices. But the age old question is, what are these choices based on if anything? Are they free or determined? When we drop the metaphysical baggage from "determinism" and not just from "free will" then determinism and free will are compatible ideas. As I said back in June, "Playing the causation game doesn't depend on any particular metaphysics. But once you start looking for explanations in terms of causes, the serpent of causation is found to run over everything." Engaging in the intellectual activity of coming up with causal explanations for choices doesn't negate the fact that we make choices. In fact, having the ability to predict the consequences of our choices is what makes our choices meaningful. Ron: What makes choices meaningful is their usefulness in experience often this comes from prediction other times pure "luck" or happenstance. Often prediction of consequences inhibits making meaningful choices choices which are useful in experience. The problem is "once you start looking for explanations in terms of causes" you begin to limit the possibilites of meaningful choices. Steve: As Matt K put it back in June, "... if determinism is the thesis that we are caught up in causal chains, then it is not destructive of moral reasoning because moral reasoning is something that occurs partly _because_ of causal chains. Moral reasoning _needs_ causal chains. And if that's the case, why on earth would determinism destroy moral reasoning?" Ron: Well, that is agreeable from a compatabilist point of view, but what I and I believe others understood you to be saying is that free choice is actually bound by causual chains thus you constantly seemed to be asserting that moral reasoning is something that occurs solely because of causual chains. The "partly" was illusional and if this is the case it most certainly closes off the possibility of making free choices therefore one follows the good because of the consequences not out of a love for betterness. This is a very imoprtant distinction in the morality issue. Is it better to good out of fear or out of love? Which one is truly a "moral" path? when we speak of following dynamic quality we seem to be speaking about change and change occurs when the good is followed DESPITE the consequences. Ron: > DmB is rejecting this as Determinism, which it is because it does not allow > for any > "real" freedom. Steve: When we getting into trying to figure out whether we REALLY make choices or only SEEM to make choices we are getting into the metaphysical appearance-reality stuff that I would prefer we drop from the issue. Ron: Oddly enough it holds a great deal of meaning, because it makes the distinction between the appearence of morality (following good out of consequence) and (following good out of love). It begins a dialog on which one is better to follow, which one is following freedom and DQ and which is following SQ. It's what the arguement seems to be about derriving meaning from Pirsigs Quote in relation to those concepts. ...thnx Steve ... .. 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