Ron, Often when you say below what you see dmb as saying, it is opposite of what he has been saying. The important thing is that as far as I can tell you and I are in likely to be in agreement once I clarify my positions for you. I would just ask that you try to understand what I am saying about my views rather than what dmb is saying about my views.
> Ron: > Dmb is rejecting, more precisely, that there is a specific, general meaning > of the term "free will" " > "It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in > the philosophical work > devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it" Steve: That is a quote of SEP rather than dmb. dmb keeps insisting that free will has a basic definition that everyone making correct use of language uses. Ron: > A response to your position that the idea has definite metaphysical meaning > that > must be rejected in a MoQ. Steve: We can of course use old words in new ways and listen to the old hymns with new ears. My position is basically just advice that we ought not use the term "free will" to talk about freedom in the MOQ (e.g. "The MOQ asserts that we have free will"). We have lots of ways of doing that in terms of DQ and since we will be likely to be mistaken for taking a traditional version of free will if we assert that we have free will rather than talking about freedom in terms of dynamic quality. Ron: > You then assert that there is no will because there is no agent and that > there is no > freedom because all choice is statically determined. >This leads one to believe that > your position rests on the notion that all freedom and choice are really > static prefferences. > You have based your entire dispute apon this. Steve: I think we have will and are agents. I have always said that we obviously make choices. But the age old question is, what are these choices based on if anything? Are they free or determined? When we drop the metaphysical baggage from "determinism" and not just from "free will" then determinism and free will are compatible ideas. As I said back in June, "Playing the causation game doesn't depend on any particular metaphysics. But once you start looking for explanations in terms of causes, the serpent of causation is found to run over everything." Engaging in the intellectual activity of coming up with causal explanations for choices doesn't negate the fact that we make choices. In fact, having the ability to predict the consequences of our choices is what makes our choices meaningful. As Matt K put it back in June, "... if determinism is the thesis that we are caught up in causal chains, then it is not destructive of moral reasoning because moral reasoning is something that occurs partly _because_ of causal chains. Moral reasoning _needs_ causal chains. And if that's the case, why on earth would determinism destroy moral reasoning?" Ron: > DmB is rejecting this as Determinism, which it is because it does not allow > for any > "real" freedom. Steve: When we getting into trying to figure out whether we REALLY make choices or only SEEM to make choices we are getting into the metaphysical appearance-reality stuff that I would prefer we drop from the issue. What I don't think makes sense is what dmb has been insisting... (1) determinism is a metaphysical notion (mechanic cause and effect governance of the universe) (2) free will is not a metaphysical notion (3) free will is the denial of the truth of determinism The problem is that denying a particular metaphysical position is taking a metaphysical position. If you are going to drop the metaphysical baggage from free will, you ought to be willing to drop it from determinism as well. I have always emphasized that desires, intentions, preferences, and moods are all appropriate ways of explaining behavior. The anti-metaphysical pragmatic approach is to hold all descriptions of experience on a par (metaphysically). We don't ask which is the description that the universe demands of us. Instead of thinking of our descriptions either correctly or incorrectly _capturing_ reality, we see them as some of our tools we use to _cope_ with reality. We don't have to settle whether causal chains or human choices are fundamental to the way things really are (e.g., which is real and which is illusory). That's a game we pragmatists are opting not to play. A physicist's descriptions of the universe in terms of causes and effects and probabilities is a valid way to look at things. It is also valid to explain why I acted in a certain way to say "because I chose to and for these good reasons..." But which one is really TRUE? Is it the poet's or the physicist's description that is The Way Things Really Are? This is a question the Western philosophical tradition has taught us to ask, but it is itself not a question the universe demands that we ask. We ask it only because we have the needs and interests we do, and we can certainly stop asking it if it no longer serves our purposes. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
