Matt had said: I perceive Dan's response, what I take to be a dialectically produced attempt to avoid the problem Steve wanted to highlight in the face of Ron's formulation, as further highlighting what Steve sees as the problem in holding that DQ is both a placeholder/je-ne-sais-quoi "AND" the Good. The problem might be best put in terms of the indeterminacy of DQ/degeneracy thesis: if I want to always be following DQ as much as possible, how do I know whether I'm dimly apprehending Dynamic Quality or apprehending dimly with static patterns?
The thesis suggests there's going to be no answer, but what does it mean to say, then, that DQ is the Good? Well, I guess just that it is a placeholder necessary to fully explain the evolutionary paradigm of Deweyan evaluative experience. So that, sometimes our experience of good is an implicit rejecting of past-evil, but sometimes it's an implicit rejecting of now-good. And we won't know the difference in our own experience until much later, for the experience of dimness, we might say, is a necessary condition, but definitely not sufficient. After all, some people are just dim. Ron: What I took away from my exchanges with Steve in regard to MoQ as a compatabilist theory in the context of freewill and determinism is the question "if we ARE our values, to what extent do we follow DQ? which seems to be the question which emerges out of the DQ/degeneracy thesis . This is the sort of discussion I was hoping would eventually emerge out of the thread. I see the two being linked in terms of freedom or the expansion of the compatabilist freewill as a dim apprehension of an undefined better-ness . But as you so wisely add, is a necessary condition, but definitly not sufficient. Good post, lots to chew on. .. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
