Hey Dan, Matt said: The point, I think, of distinguishing "rejecting of past-evil" from "rejecting of now-good" is that the true Dynamic leap forward without a net--for the leap must produce its _own net_ (i.e. static latch)--is a rejection of something we perceive _rightly_ as a current good, a static latch that works, but it is rejected for as-yet not completely understood reasons and, more importantly, possibilities. Dimly perceiving Dynamic Quality, I think, must be at the same time a concession that the future of this perception is unsure, as it is by its nature the leaving-behind of the sure/static/stable/known.
Dan said: I am unsure where you're going by equating rejecting now-good with Dynamic Quality. I understand it is best to say Dynamic Quality is not this, not that, and the reason for that is to avoid pigeon-holing Dynamic Quality into compartments. Dynamic Quality isn't about rejection, however, though I can see how the static quality sense of negation does lend itself to that connotation. Matt: The first time I wrote the formulation I said that these were _implicit_ rejections, and this was lost in the later extrapolation, and that was regrettable. It's important to understand them as at minimum implicit rejections, and it's on the model of "every choice is implicitly a rejection of all the other possibilities you did not choose." Because I think you're right that DQ isn't really about rejection, but our static conceptual understanding of what is happening, I think, must include not just our individual perceptions of what we do, but their meaning when fit into a larger network. I'm not sure how that relates to your further connection of your point above to our earlier conversation about DQ being neither negative nor positive. I'm still not sure I understand how this is possible, without draining all the purpose out of Pirsig's original move of making Quality synonymous with Reality. Maybe it's that I still don't understand what difference that makes a difference there is between "negative" (which is a static term in your view) and "low" (which you approve for use in describing a DQ-perception). Matt said: The "human," in this case, stands in for a different set of patterns, one that _enables_ greater facility with problems. So: is it indeed the case that some intellectual patterns better _enable_ Dynamic Quality? I think we have to answer yes, despite my initial formulation of "no intellectual pattern could get in the way of your ability to be in touch with reality." For, is it not also a consequence of Pirsig's understanding of evolution that, e.g., _some_ biological patterns and _not others_ enabled the creation of an entirely new kind of static patterns (i.e., social)? Dan said: I would say Dynamic Quality enables intellectual patterns towards betterness, not the other way around. Matt: Well, that's true enough insofar as the whole train of static patterns follows in the wake of DQ. And I can see how it might be desirable to reverse my formulation, but what I'm after is how two sets of Pirsigian ideas hook up to each other. What I don't see in your wish to reverse my formulation is an attempt to tackle the problem that seems to lie in connecting (what we might call) evolutionary-DQ and experiential-DQ. (The former is just DQ in the context of evolution and history; the latter is DQ in the context of the first-person point of view.) For I don't find very convincing your response of "not exactly" to the point that some biological patterns and not others produced the social level. I can't cite Pirsig passages, but I can't imagine Pirsig denying the point that mammalian biological patterns enabled social patterns whereas (as of yet) reptilian patterns did not, let alone plant biological patterns. The problem I was attempting to elucidate is whether or not a _particular_ set of intellectual patterns can get in the way of Reality/DQ better or worse than another. For example, it might be thought that SOM is worse than the MoQ because the SOM gets in the way of DQ. (I have no idea if this _has_ been thought, or assumed or elaborated, but it still might be important to reveal why this may or may not be the case.) _All_ static patterns are, in the same way, _not_ DQ, and thus a distance from it, which is the point you pressed with "Intellectual patterns always get in the way of reality. That is the nature of ideas." (I won't take up the rhetoric of "getting in the way of" and distance that I usually avoid, but simply concede the point as you make it.) And thus Enlightenment is a waking up from static patterns. Sure. But doesn't Pirsig also elaborate an evolutionary understanding of DQ, such that history is a march toward betterness and freedom? Your point about intellectual patterns always getting in the way because of the nature of ideas flattens them out, and suggests that their worth is all equidistant from DQ, and thus there's no point in distinguishing between better and worse ideas. But this is the idea that Pirsig reacted to at Benares University, and caused him to storm out. His manner of correcting that approach to Enlightenment, I believe, is by the evolutionary stance in Lila, by clearing the conceptual way for us to be able to claim that, e.g., capitalism is better than communism _for DQ_. It is in _that_ sense that I say "some intellectual patterns better enable Dynamic Quality." Matt Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
