Hello everyone On Thu, Nov 3, 2011 at 8:06 PM, Matt Kundert <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hey Dan, > > I think what we've seen especially in this last series of exchanges > between us is what we might call a "trust building exercise." You > wanted to make sure I was using old terms (like "nature") in the > new ways (without SOM assumptions). This, I think, is perfectly > normal occurrence in philosophy, a kind of "getting to know you" > exercise. Below is just the final coming to terms:
Hi Matt Yes I agree... thank you for your patience. > > Matt said: > I'm not sure why you thought my parenthetical statement implied > that it needed a Cartesian-like certainty as opposed to high value... > > Dan said: > It was how you phrased your statements: [Matt from earlier] "Not > all intellectual patterns have this flavor, but a lot of the one's out of > the natural sciences do. (Principally, I think, because a lot of the > stuff in "nature" was around before we personally were.)" > > You seemed to be saying that certain intellectual patterns pertaining > to natural sciences hold a higher value on account of "stuff in nature" > being around before we personally were. That is what got a rise out > of my intellectual hackles, but I see better now what you were > saying... thank you. > > Matt: > Oh, I see. I used "flavor" to try and suggest the idea that there > wasn't anything better about intellectual patterns that extend in this > way, because like you I don't want to suggest that the natural > sciences have better patterns or something. It's just a different > taste, like people who like chocolate on their pancakes, but > butterscotch on their ice cream. Dan: I take it then we agree that the idea reality existed before we personally did is a high quality idea. Like dmb says, we could hardly function without such ideas, such as the idea that objects exist independently from our subjective self. The way I read it, since the MOQ states reality begins with Dynamic Quality experience, it is the idea that reality exists that comes before the existence of reality. What this suggests is that our shared reality is filled with high quality assumptions that we've all come to agree are true, like gravity existing billions of years ago. By questioning those deeply-held beliefs, the MOQ points out how a value-centered metaphysics better explains a reality composed of value rather than one of objects existing before subjects. > > Dan said: > I believe the MOQ says that the relationship exists in our heads > though, not out there in the world apart from us. So I am unsure > there is a right way of distinguishing between them. > > Matt said: > I no longer believe that "correctness" needs a notion of "out there in > the world apart from us." > > Dan said: > Well then I am not sure what we are disagreeing about either. Your > formulation of personal evolutionary history vs. longitudinal > evolutionary history led me to the conclusion that you believe there > exists a world apart from us. If this isn't correct then why are you > attempting to distinguish between them? Isn't the idea itself a > distinction? > > Matt: > I think that we believe, as a high-valued intellectual pattern, that > "there exists a world apart from us" is true. Dan: How does reality exist apart from experience? Matt: > The reason I'm trying > to distinguish between personal evolutionary history and longitudinal > evolutionary history is to distinguish between the history of an > individual and the history of a community (and this as another > intellectual pattern of high value). Not holding this distinction is how > one flirts with solipsism, I think. Pirsig's discourse on Western > ghosts can be read as flirting with a kind of solipsistic idealism (as I > think I've seen aggressive critics of Pirsig pursue in the past), Dan: That could well be... I always kind of thought that's where Bodvar Skutvik was going with his SOM as intellect... he (and other critics using solipsism against the MOQ) never seemed to grasp that the MOQ marries scientific materialism and philosophic idealism in ways that expands upon both. I think that is one of the major changes that occurs between ZMM and LILA... in ZMM, Robert Pirsig seems to more fully embrace idealism while in LILA he makes it clear that a metaphysics needs to address the fundamentals of both materialism and idealism. Matt: > but > Pirsig is more like a Hegelian idealist, whose root idea is the > primacy of the community in understanding where ideas come from > (rather than an individual's confrontation with the world, which is > rooted in the pre-Kantian empiricist tradition). A beginning > formulation of understanding Pirsig's relationship to the classical > empiricists is to say that he is a post-Kantian, quasi-Hegelian > empiricist (which is pretty close to just saying he's a Deweyan > pragmatist). Dan: I have only a passing familiarity with Hegel, Kant, or Dewey but I might offer a conjecture that RMP brings them together under the rubric of Quality while at the same time expanding on their thinking. Philosophy has never held my interest to the point where I've been compelled to make a serious investigation of it. These days I prefer books like John Truby's The Anatomy of Story... that's something I can really sink my teeth into. Most philosophy (to me) is so dull and dry that it puts me to sleep. I think that's why I enjoy Robert Pirsig's work... he takes philosophy and puts it into a story. He makes it interesting. In past moments I've made a real effort at reading James, Kant, Hegel, Royce, Sartre, Rand, etc., but to no avail. I cannot seem to get past the first few pages. So my debating any of them is rather pointless. I leave that to others... Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
