On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Matt Kundert <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > Hi Dan, > > Matt said: > You have a much stronger notion of "verification" than I do. I think > we can reconstruct a notion of verification from indirect experience > that supplies a form of verification for things we aren't directly > experiencing, such that we can verify the existence of dog dishes in > other rooms in a way that we cannot do, e.g., unicorns. > > Dan said: > I'm not sure that's a fair comparison. Our discussion on verifying > New York City despite no direct experience of it seems to offer a > more favorable outcome than does talk about unicorns. > > Matt: > This is what I mean by reticence, Dan: you say it's not fair, but you > don't say why. Also, why is it not fair for me to, at the very least, > establish the baseline of the notion of verification _I'm_ using? You > haven't exactly elaborated one, so I thought I might say what I think. > Also also, why isn't it fair to talk about unicorns in the context of your > notion of verification? You are the one who earlier stipulated that > you see no difference between hypothetical forests and dog dishes a > person is not currently in the presence of. Why not bring fictional > entities into the mix?
Dan: But I did say why... I didn't recapitulate our discussion on NYC as I assumed (perhaps wrongly) that we made a little headway there, whereas by bringing unicorns into the discussion we are lowering the quality. > > Dan said: > Yet I have a difficult time understanding how it is possible for objects > to exist outside of experience if they are not independent of it. > > Matt: > This sentence does not make sense from the Pirsigian position you > claim to otherwise be occupying. If experience is everything, who's > talking about objects existing outside "everything"? Neither Dave > nor I have put forward that philosophical claim. We are attempting > to reconstruct what object-permanence means from within the > confines of the notion that "everything is experience." Dan: Now who's being reticent? You claim my sentence makes no sense from the position of the MOQ and yet you continue to insist objects have a permanence even when no one is around. If I'm not mistaken, Dave has already explained what object-permanence means... it is common sense. If experience is everything, then how can objects have a permanence existing outside our imagination? > > Matt said: > Your direction in the conversation has been to assume that SOM > assumptions are at work in common sense and that, therefore, we > should question them in order to extirpate them. My direction has > been the exact opposite: it has been to assume a successful > extirpation of SOM and that, therefore, it is our next step to give > non-SOM construals of how common sense works. > > Dan said: > But what if common sense rests on a foundation of subject/object > interpretation? If one kicks out the rungs of that ladder then there is > nothing left to build upon. I think that's what RMP is on about when > he talks (in LILA'S CHILD) about how he came to see that it isn't > necessary to do away with subject/object thinking as long as it is > understood that subjects and objects are a short hand for patterns > of value. > > Matt: > I believe that Pirsig does not see the situation as you put it. You have > conflated "SOM" with "subject/object interpretation." I would not do > this. When Pirsig says the LC bit you speak of, I believe he's > suggesting that subjects and objects can be redescribed from within > the MoQ, which is what Dave and I have been after. I do not believe > he is saying that common sense rests irrevocably on SOM. I also > see no reason, irrespective of Pirsig, to think that common sense > rests irrevocably on particular philosophical interpretation. Dan: I assume we are all after staying within the framework of the MOQ. sdermn > > Dan said: > You seem to be saying that by doing away with the notion of objects > existing independently of an observing subject (a successful > extirpation of SOM) we can better understand how common sense > works. But at the same time, you want to allow that objects exist > independently of observation. That (to me) seems contradictory but > I'm sure I'm not following your argument properly. > > Matt: > When you reconstruct my claim as "objects exist independently of > observation" you have conflated "observation" with "experience" in > such a way that you're inconsistent with your later claim that "It isn't > my experience. It is experience." If "observation" is distinguished > from "experience," then why would their be a problem with allowing > objects to exist independently of observation? > > I've been, for quite a while, trying to figure out what you think the > relationship is between first-person experience and > Quality-experience, and additionally rock-experience. I haven't been > able to figure the consistency of your usage, and you also haven't > elaborated a theory of any kind. Dave has had this problem, too, as > we can tell from his last response and your brush-back in reply. > (This was his "oh, I think I see the problem." I had a similar light > bulb go off about your use of "imaginary" three weeks back, but I've > yet to figure out how you are consistently using that term, either.) > > If you want to continue this conversation, you will have to supply an > outline of how you will consistently use, for the sake of this > conversation, the following terms: "experience," "imaginary," "direct > experience," "indirect experience," "hypothetical," "presupposition," > "observation," "common sense," "philosophy," "thought-experiment," > and "independent of experience." We can start there. I'm sorry it > has come to this, but given the wheel-spinning, there's no reason to > converse if we can't consistently stay on the same page of the > conversation. > > Dan said: > It wasn't my intention to present problems the MOQ is designed to > avoid. I suppose I could accuse you of doing the same by presenting > the thought experiment in the first place but I don't see the value in > doing so. > > Matt: > I know you want to avoid SOM as much as I, Dan. But I deny that > my thought-experiment imports Cartesian-SOMism. It is your > responses to it that I believe re-inject it. > > Dan said: > From my point of view, both you and Dave are throwing the > discussion back into a world where objects exist when no one is > around to observe them and trees make noise when they fall in > forests even when no one is around. I think you're both missing the > more important question that this discussion is meant to raise by > insisting our common sense understanding of reality is paramount. I > understand we all operate under the common sense notion of object > permanence. On the other hand, to assume because that notion > works well in the real world it represents a fundamental part of our > reality seems at odds with the MOQ. > > Matt: > I think this again misunderstands what Dave and I thought we were > talking about. We are not insisting that "our common sense > understanding of reality is paramount." We are insisting that every > philosopher has to be able to reconstruct common sense platitudes > out of their philosophical vocabulary. We are not trying to "throwing > the discussion back into a world where objects exist when no one is > around," we are trying to work out of the MoQ's vocabulary how that > commonsensical attitude could be the case given the commonsensical > attitude's supreme, evolutionarily-tested value to how we function in > the world. To reconstruct common sense, and to insist that this a > task for every philosopher, is not to insist that it "represents a > fundamental part of our reality," if by "fundamental" you mean a > position that usurps Quality. > > Dan said before: > What throws me a bit is Matt's query concerning the difference > between knowing New York City exists without experiencing it and > knowing Don's dog dish exists without experiencing it. At first I took > the existence of Don's dog dish as hearsay evidence and therefore > not admissible in a court of law. But I'm not sure that's correct. Still, > the overwhelming weight of evidence seems in favor of the existence > of New York City as a higher quality idea than does the evidence for > the existence of Don's dog dish... unless I am Don. > > Matt said: > Exactly, unless you are Don. The notion of a thought-experiment is > that its characters are placeholders for you, the thinker. To think > through my thought-experiment properly, you need to put yourself in > Don's shoes. > > Dan then said: > Ah... but are you not presupposing I can do that? > > Matt then said (about Dan's procedure): > But what the veil pulling _doesn't_ do is actually give you new > assumptions. So when people start working on new assumptions and > you come along and keep pulling the veil, the response is likely to be, > "Yeah, yeah: got it. We know we're working on assumptions. But > what do you think about our new ones?" And if your response _then_ > is, "Hey, don't forget that your last question has assumptions!" then > you're going to cease to be taken seriously. (And you should be > thinking now of your later response to my explanation of how a > thought-experiment works: "ah...but are you not presupposing that I > can do that?" Indeed, I am. The question still remains: can you put > yourself in Don's shoes?) > > Dan finally said: > Well now... at the risk of not being taken seriously... no. How can I > do that? I am not Don. This discussion is (after all) about > presuppositions and how we use them constructively to live our lives > and give meaning to our experience. > > Matt: > How on earth is this not a Pickwickian answer? You've either 1) > construed "shoes" in the physical sense, and wondered how you > could get in Don's shoes (which is impossible either because (A) you > accept him as a figment of imagination, so how could you physically > get into imaginary shoes or (B) you don't own Don's shoes, so how > could you); or 2) you construed "shoes" as a metaphor for "point of > view" and denied that anyone can take anyone else's point of view > through the use of imagination; or 3) you understood that I was > asking whether you could use any thought-experiment whatsoever, > and said no (for some mysterious reason). > > Why on earth are we talking if there is nothing we can do to bridge > points of view? Since you pragmatically cannot believe this, what > are you intending to convey? You say this is all about how we use > presuppositions to "constructively live our lives," but when Dave or I > try and construct a useful presupposition for the living of our lives > (like "object permanence"), you think we're doing something wrong. > > Dan said: > RMP's question wasn't meant to alleviate Don's worry over his dog > dish. It was meant as a historical answer from the Idealists when > asked about trees falling in forests with no one around. I assume he > was pointing out that If no one is around, all we have is imagination > to tell us what is going on in forests or in kitchens. > > Matt: > Oh, now you can use your imagination, can you? (Do you see why I > cannot construct a consistency?) > > "If no one is around, all we have is imagination." Indeed, but does > that mean that New York, dog dish bowls in kitchens, and unicorns > all exist in the same way? > > Dan said: > Have you ever tried to have a discussion with a drunk or an insane > person? It doesn't work. Our ability to communicate effectively rests > upon a foundation of social and intellectual patterns that break down > when we are mentally impaired. Therefore, to try and explain a > common sense notion like the concept of object permanency to a > mentally impaired person would only fall on deaf ears. > > Matt: > Can you tell me why I find this so ironic at this moment, Dan? > > Matt said: > However, maybe you misspoke, and meant that Don wouldn't have > _that specific_ worry of "if I leave the room, maybe the dog dish will > disappear!" unless he was mentally impaired, and that's what > common sense tells you. You'd probably be right then, but you'd > have also short-circuited the thought-experiment before it told you > anything interesting. The interesting part only appears when you > recognize Don's similarity to Descartes. > > Dan said: > So we have to entertain the Cartesian notion that the world of > objects is independent of we as subjects doing the observing. Why > is that interesting? It seems more like backsliding to me... > > Matt: > No, Dan, it's about understanding what a successful defusing of > Cartesianism looks like. One has to understand what it means to > give a Cartesian response before one can understand how to avoid > giving a Cartesian response. (And note that you've conflated > "observation" with "experience" again here.) > > Dan said: > Experience, or Dynamic Quality, doesn't reside in the person telling > the story. > > Matt: > Don't tell me. Tell the Dan who denies that "the world of objects is > independent of we as subjects doing the observing" and thus sounds > like he's saying we need to directly observe objects to assure their > existence. Don't we have other forms of assurance? > > Matt > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
