Hello everyone On Mon, Nov 28, 2011 at 5:23 PM, Matt Kundert <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hey Dan, > > I don't understand what we're talking about, and we're moving about > in circles, and I don't know why that either. Below are just a few > more confessions about why it is probably better to let this > conversation drop.
Hi Matt I appreciate that. I don't understand either and I also sense we're moving in circles. I suspect it is my limited understanding of the substance pertaining to the discussion. Thank you for your patience. > > Matt said: > What it seems like you are suggesting is that by not taking "what > dog dish/tree/X?" seriously, we are thereby eliminating our ability to > question specific things about dog dishes, trees, any particular X. > That, by saying "what dog dish?" is usually a bad question, we are > saying, "Shut your mouth and don't question reality!" > > Dan said: > Not at all! In fact, this discussion we're engaged in is all about > questioning reality. If I believed we should shut our respective > mouths, I wouldn't be struggling here attempting to answer your > posts. I'd just go away. I might first make some derogatory > statements about how silly this is, however. > > Matt: > Yeah, okay, but I'm saying that the question you keep pressing, > "what dog dish?" _doesn't_ question reality in an interesting way for > someone who already agrees with the point of the question, which > is to call attention to the presuppositional nature of objects that you > call the idealism of the MoQ. Further, by pressing this claim, the > only thing you are doing is either calling into question the person's > commitment to that idealism or suggesting an additional claim, that > until a person commits themselves to idealism, they will not > question specific components of their reality. In the above passage, > I was trying to suss out your commitment to this latter, additional > claim, a claim I find implausible. If you are not committed to this > additional claim, then I wonder what I can do to assure you that I > am a committed Pirsigian idealist. Dan: >From what I understand, philosophical idealism is only part of the MOQ. I think RMP used an analogy of idealists and materialists as blind people touching an elephant... was it in LILA'S CHILD? I think so... If "what dog dish?" doesn't question reality in an interesting way we should drop it. From what I gather I think you and I do agree on presuppositions about objects... not too sure about anyone else though... > > Matt said: > I think thinking of "what dog dish?" as an emblem for the Socratic > spirit is a bad idea. And partly because of how this conversation > has rollicked forward. Neither Dave nor I has ever wanted to stop > questioning specific presuppositions, but your question applies to > _all_ presuppositions, and so is about the process of > presuppositioning. > > Dan said: > Yes. I am questioning our perception of reality. It is a common-sense > notion that conceptual objects have permanency... that they're there > whether we can empirically verify them or not. You and Dave seem > to be defending this notion though of course I might be reading you > both wrongly. > > Matt: > I can't tell whether I would defend that notion or not--I can't tell > what you hang on it as a consequence. Do you think dog dishes > disappear, physically, when you physically leave a room? Dan: No... I can't see any way of verifying that notion. At the same time though, I cannot see any way of verifying the notion they exist. Like you, I assume they do... just as I assume the world will continue to exist long after I'm gone and that it has existed long before I appeared. Matt: > Maybe you > do. I have, through my Dog Dish Thought-Experiment, been trying > to get you to supply some of your intuitions about how the world > works, but you have remained surprisingly reticent and closed-fisted. Dan: Really! I have been trying to be forthright and open on my thinking, even to the point of risking ridicule. Matt: > If you _do not_ think that dog dishes physically disappear when you > physically disappear, then we all three agree to the same level of > permanency, the only kind of common sense that I believe we have. Dan: I would say in the common sense everyday world we all use the notion of object permanence to great advantage... so much so that we tend to overlook it and assume objects are real and independent of our experience. And that's fine when it comes to common sense. But I also believe the MOQ (philosophy) states that objects are not independent of experience and there is no way to verify if they continue to exist or not when we are gone. Matt: > To make common sense have a stronger sense of permanency is to > attribute to it SOM-level philosophical potency. Common sense is just > common sense--it is not philosophy. Dan: Yes... and I have been questioning the common sense notion that objects exist independent of experience. I've admitted I'm not well-versed in philosophy but I assumed that's what we're up to with this discussion. > > DMB said: > I don't follow your reasoning and I wonder where you got the > impression that that I'm sweeping away questions or taking answers > for granted. > > Dan said: > I got that impression on account of your insistence on that common > sense reality tells us objects have a permanence and that should be > the end of the inquiry. My question to Matt was: What did Robert > Pirsig mean when he said the historical defense of philosophical > idealism is, what tree? in You seem to be saying trees are > hypothetical but dog dishes are not... that we all share a common > sense notion of object permanence instilled in us since infancy and > that is enough. End of inquiry. > > Matt: > Dave was saying that common sense tells us that physical objects > don't disappear when we leave rooms _because we left the room_. > That is the extent of the claim I think we've both been defending. Dan: I understand. Matt: > The _reason_ specified, which follows the "because," is terribly > important for it specifies just when inquiry should be ended: if you > hear break glass from the kitchen, and the dog starts barking, you > should feel free to begin to doubt that the dog dish is still in the > kitchen. (I neglected to mention that Don's dog dish is made of > pure gold, and so is likely target of theft.) Inquiry should fire up > again. Dave is not saying, at all, that trees and dog dishes have > different statuses when it comes to their hypotheticalness. He's > saying that the common sense notion of physical object > permanence instilled in us since infancy is enough for Don to think > he can leave the dog dish in the kitchen and the dog will still get > fed, for New York to still be there even after we've left work for > Connecticut, or that trees do makes noises when they fall in > forests even when mammals are not present. Dan: And if we are content with common sense answers, then I agree. But I get the sense that some people are not content to stop there... the way I read Robert Pirsig's work it seems to me that his MOQ goes against common sense in many ways. Don may be fine with believing his golden dog dish will exist in his kitchen long after he is gone and that Fido will continue to be fed (since the dish is bottomless). I guess I get a kick out of asking whether or not our common sense attitude about the world is correct. I suppose if everyone believes something it must be so but still it's fun to kick some sand in the gears every once in a while... > > Dan said: > I don't see any difference between forming presuppositions about > hypothetical trees falling in forests when no one is around and > hypothetical dog dishes that exist when no one is around. The claim > that Don is a friend of Matt's and that Don has a dog dish is hearsay > evidence. It wouldn't hold up in a court of law. And it is certainly > hypothetical that the dog dish exists when no one is around. > > Matt: > You're creating confusion again by imprecision. I am not talking > about "hypothetical dog dishes," unless by "hypothetical" you mean > simply to point out that Pirsig's idealism means that all physical > objects can have "hypothetical" precede their occurrence in > discourse to point out their presuppositional nature. I am talking > about what happens to physical objects in a person's actual life, > and whether they actually physically disappear when a person > physically leaves a room. The claim has _never_ been that "Don is > a friend of Matt's," because that confuses the borders of where the > thought-experiment ends and my life begins. It doesn't matter > _at all_ whether Don is a real person in my life or not: his only > utility is to get _the reader_, you or any other thinking person > reading the thought-experiment, to think about what they would > think if they were in Don's position. Dan: I took it that Don wasn't around the same way no one is around when a tree falls in a forest. I'm sorry if I was imprecise. > > Dan said: > And we're not talking about perception of everyday objects here... > this is a metaphysical inquiry into how presuppositions inform our > perception of everyday reality... we are (or at least I am) attempting > to look behind the curtain, so to speak, to reveal a metaphysical > impossibility that is taken for granted in the "real world." > > Matt: > What you seem to be neglecting, by your commitment to only asking > "what dog dish?", is that a metaphysics that works properly should > be able to state within its confines and with its vocabulary how > everyday reality works. That is what my attention to direct > experience, in the form of Chris yelling out from the other room, > was designed to elicit thought about. So, Dave and I are talking > about perception of everyday objects here, and we thought you > should also do so. I've been suggesting that we, all three of us, > have got the metaphysical inquiry part down, pretty much (in > accepting Pirsig's idealism), so lets go from there and connect it > back with how we perceive reality. Dan: I didn't intend to end my inquiry with only asking "what dog dish?" I asked what did RMP mean by that. I intended to probe what he gave as the historical answer of the idealists and how it pertains to the MOQ. Of course we are all talking about the perception of everyday objects but I am suggesting RMP says we should pull back the veil of presuppositions and examine further the nature of what we take for granted... object permanence. > > Dan said: > What evidence do you [Dave] have to support your hypothesis that > the dog dish was actually known by an actual person? The only > evidence I've seen is that Matt says so. > > Matt: > This says explicitly that you have not understood by > "thought-experiment" the same thing as I understand by > "thought-experiment." Because if you did, this would be a very > complete misunderstanding of what the parameters of Don and > Chris's existence is. Dan: So are you saying we just take for granted that trees make noise when they fall in forests with no one around? I mean... it seems obvious they would. I've heard trees falling when I am in the forest and they make noise. So common sense tells me they would still make noise even if I wasn't there. But is that really what we're asking? What I mean to say is: perhaps I am not understanding "thought-experiment" in the sense you understand it... perhaps we are making different underlying assumptions concerning not only Don and Chris's existence but our own and those assumptions are leading us to understand the nature of the thought experiment in multiple ways. > > Dan said: > Matt introduced Don and his dog dish. Don is worried that when he > leaves the room the dog dish will disappear and Fido will go hungry. > I responded along the same lines as RMP by saying: what dog dish? > What did Robert Pirsig mean by giving the answer "what trees" and > how does it correspond to "what dog dish"? > > Matt: > In this reconstruction of my thought-experiment, I wonder how > Pirsig's question eliminates Don's worry. The only way I see is if you > _get off the question_, and explain--as Dave has--how common > sense physical object permanency works. Otherwise, how have you > responded to Don's worry in a fashion that doesn't only exacerbate > his worry (or confuse him)? Dan: Don has no worries unless he is suffering from some sort of mental impairment and in that case no explanation will suffice to alleviate his concern. That is what common sense tells me. I (on the other hand) am worried that the world will disappear when I die and all my loved ones with it. Can you explain to me how the concept of object permanency will help me get over my worries? In other words, are my worries unfounded? Am I suffering from some sort of mental impairment? > > Dan said: > Matt insists the dog dish is really there...that he has it on Don's > authority. > > Matt: > No, I insist that there is no particular reason to think that the dog > dish physically disappears when we physically leave the room. Dan: I stand corrected. I assumed your claim that the dog dish has a physicality meant it was a "real" dog dish. But is there any particular reason to think the dog dish still exists when we leave the room? I understand we are preconditioned to believe in the concept of object permanency but is that sufficient reason to believe the dish will be there if and when we come back? What if circumstances conspire to keep me from ever entering the room again. Can I reasonably assume the dish is still there. > Don > only exists in the parameters of my thought-experiment. At best, I > have it on Chris's authority that the dog dish _didn't_ disappear > (because, in a later stage of the thought-experiment, Chris is in the > kitchen looking at it). Chris in the kitchen does _two things_, > however: it both gives Don evidence for thinking that his dog dish > is actually in the kitchen _and_ it reinforces the common sense > notion physical object permanency because Don's original worry > was based on _nothing more_ than a general, diffuse doubt in the > notion of physical object permanency. (I'm repeating all of these > snipits of the conversation that has moved on without me only to > clarify what I actually think is going on in the conversation.) > > Dan said: > Even if Don's dog dish is taken as a real object, such objects don't > exist independently of experience, at least not in the framework of > the MOQ. > > Matt: > You haven't specified yet what you mean by this. Why, after all, can > I not count Chris's experience of the dog dish to confirm that it is not, > actually, existing independently of experience? Dan: How could it exist independently of experience? Matt: > Further, and a more > interesting question for you to answer, do physical objects not have, > in the MoQ, their own locus of experiencing? Dan: I would say that within the framework of the MOQ we are the objects we perceive. Their locus of experience is ours. Matt: > Isn't this what it means > to be a inorganic static pattern? Dan: We are a collection of inorganic, biological, social, and intellectual patterns of Quality capable of responding to Dynamic Quality. Matt: > Do only linguistic humans > experience? Dan: No... the whole of reality is experience. > > Dan said: > What throws me a bit is Matt's query concerning the difference > between knowing New York City exists without experiencing it and > knowing Don's dog dish exists without experiencing it. At first I took > the existence of Don's dog dish as hearsay evidence and therefore > not admissible in a court of law. But I'm not sure that's correct. Still, > the overwhelming weight of evidence seems in favor of the > existence of New York City as a higher quality idea than does the > evidence for the existence of Don's dog dish... unless I am Don. > > Matt: > Exactly, unless you are Don. The notion of a thought-experiment is > that its characters are placeholders for you, the thinker. To think > through my thought-experiment properly, you need to put yourself > in Don's shoes. Dan: Ah... but are you not presupposing I can do that? > > Dan said: > You have misunderstood the discussion, Ron. I didn't say that trees > don't make sounds and dog dishes disappear. I asked what did > Robert Pirsig mean by: what trees? I asked how to empirically verify > the existence of trees or dog dishes when we don't experience > them... when they are imaginary. > > Matt: > Don't blame Ron, for apparently I have misunderstood what we are > talking about, too. Dan: I am not blaming Ron... only attempting to set him straight. Still, I am unsure what we're talking about too. >Matt: > Also, I find another imprecision here. For I can't tell whether you > believe "indirect experience" is a kind of evidence in your sense of > Pirsig's epistemology. My sense is that Dave and I both think that > the only way for common sense to function is that it is. (And then > we must reconstruct how that works.) Because as you have it > above, if I'm not experiencing my dog's dish, which is in the > kitchen, I must treat it as imaginary. But the imprecision lies > exactly in what is meant by "experiencing"--direct, or does it > include indirect, too? Dan: I would say the MOQ subscribes to the notion of indirect experience in that social and intellectual patterns of quality are forms of indirect experience... they are subjective. And I think RMP uses the court of law analogy to illustrate how we can determine a high quality pattern from a low quality pattern. Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
