Hi Dan,
Matt said:
You have a much stronger notion of "verification" than I do. I think
we can reconstruct a notion of verification from indirect experience
that supplies a form of verification for things we aren't directly
experiencing, such that we can verify the existence of dog dishes in
other rooms in a way that we cannot do, e.g., unicorns.
Dan said:
I'm not sure that's a fair comparison. Our discussion on verifying
New York City despite no direct experience of it seems to offer a
more favorable outcome than does talk about unicorns.
Matt:
This is what I mean by reticence, Dan: you say it's not fair, but you
don't say why. Also, why is it not fair for me to, at the very least,
establish the baseline of the notion of verification _I'm_ using? You
haven't exactly elaborated one, so I thought I might say what I think.
Also also, why isn't it fair to talk about unicorns in the context of your
notion of verification? You are the one who earlier stipulated that
you see no difference between hypothetical forests and dog dishes a
person is not currently in the presence of. Why not bring fictional
entities into the mix?
Dan said:
Yet I have a difficult time understanding how it is possible for objects
to exist outside of experience if they are not independent of it.
Matt:
This sentence does not make sense from the Pirsigian position you
claim to otherwise be occupying. If experience is everything, who's
talking about objects existing outside "everything"? Neither Dave
nor I have put forward that philosophical claim. We are attempting
to reconstruct what object-permanence means from within the
confines of the notion that "everything is experience."
Matt said:
Your direction in the conversation has been to assume that SOM
assumptions are at work in common sense and that, therefore, we
should question them in order to extirpate them. My direction has
been the exact opposite: it has been to assume a successful
extirpation of SOM and that, therefore, it is our next step to give
non-SOM construals of how common sense works.
Dan said:
But what if common sense rests on a foundation of subject/object
interpretation? If one kicks out the rungs of that ladder then there is
nothing left to build upon. I think that's what RMP is on about when
he talks (in LILA'S CHILD) about how he came to see that it isn't
necessary to do away with subject/object thinking as long as it is
understood that subjects and objects are a short hand for patterns
of value.
Matt:
I believe that Pirsig does not see the situation as you put it. You have
conflated "SOM" with "subject/object interpretation." I would not do
this. When Pirsig says the LC bit you speak of, I believe he's
suggesting that subjects and objects can be redescribed from within
the MoQ, which is what Dave and I have been after. I do not believe
he is saying that common sense rests irrevocably on SOM. I also
see no reason, irrespective of Pirsig, to think that common sense
rests irrevocably on particular philosophical interpretation.
Dan said:
You seem to be saying that by doing away with the notion of objects
existing independently of an observing subject (a successful
extirpation of SOM) we can better understand how common sense
works. But at the same time, you want to allow that objects exist
independently of observation. That (to me) seems contradictory but
I'm sure I'm not following your argument properly.
Matt:
When you reconstruct my claim as "objects exist independently of
observation" you have conflated "observation" with "experience" in
such a way that you're inconsistent with your later claim that "It isn't
my experience. It is experience." If "observation" is distinguished
from "experience," then why would their be a problem with allowing
objects to exist independently of observation?
I've been, for quite a while, trying to figure out what you think the
relationship is between first-person experience and
Quality-experience, and additionally rock-experience. I haven't been
able to figure the consistency of your usage, and you also haven't
elaborated a theory of any kind. Dave has had this problem, too, as
we can tell from his last response and your brush-back in reply.
(This was his "oh, I think I see the problem." I had a similar light
bulb go off about your use of "imaginary" three weeks back, but I've
yet to figure out how you are consistently using that term, either.)
If you want to continue this conversation, you will have to supply an
outline of how you will consistently use, for the sake of this
conversation, the following terms: "experience," "imaginary," "direct
experience," "indirect experience," "hypothetical," "presupposition,"
"observation," "common sense," "philosophy," "thought-experiment,"
and "independent of experience." We can start there. I'm sorry it
has come to this, but given the wheel-spinning, there's no reason to
converse if we can't consistently stay on the same page of the
conversation.
Dan said:
It wasn't my intention to present problems the MOQ is designed to
avoid. I suppose I could accuse you of doing the same by presenting
the thought experiment in the first place but I don't see the value in
doing so.
Matt:
I know you want to avoid SOM as much as I, Dan. But I deny that
my thought-experiment imports Cartesian-SOMism. It is your
responses to it that I believe re-inject it.
Dan said:
>From my point of view, both you and Dave are throwing the
discussion back into a world where objects exist when no one is
around to observe them and trees make noise when they fall in
forests even when no one is around. I think you're both missing the
more important question that this discussion is meant to raise by
insisting our common sense understanding of reality is paramount. I
understand we all operate under the common sense notion of object
permanence. On the other hand, to assume because that notion
works well in the real world it represents a fundamental part of our
reality seems at odds with the MOQ.
Matt:
I think this again misunderstands what Dave and I thought we were
talking about. We are not insisting that "our common sense
understanding of reality is paramount." We are insisting that every
philosopher has to be able to reconstruct common sense platitudes
out of their philosophical vocabulary. We are not trying to "throwing
the discussion back into a world where objects exist when no one is
around," we are trying to work out of the MoQ's vocabulary how that
commonsensical attitude could be the case given the commonsensical
attitude's supreme, evolutionarily-tested value to how we function in
the world. To reconstruct common sense, and to insist that this a
task for every philosopher, is not to insist that it "represents a
fundamental part of our reality," if by "fundamental" you mean a
position that usurps Quality.
Dan said before:
What throws me a bit is Matt's query concerning the difference
between knowing New York City exists without experiencing it and
knowing Don's dog dish exists without experiencing it. At first I took
the existence of Don's dog dish as hearsay evidence and therefore
not admissible in a court of law. But I'm not sure that's correct. Still,
the overwhelming weight of evidence seems in favor of the existence
of New York City as a higher quality idea than does the evidence for
the existence of Don's dog dish... unless I am Don.
Matt said:
Exactly, unless you are Don. The notion of a thought-experiment is
that its characters are placeholders for you, the thinker. To think
through my thought-experiment properly, you need to put yourself in
Don's shoes.
Dan then said:
Ah... but are you not presupposing I can do that?
Matt then said (about Dan's procedure):
But what the veil pulling _doesn't_ do is actually give you new
assumptions. So when people start working on new assumptions and
you come along and keep pulling the veil, the response is likely to be,
"Yeah, yeah: got it. We know we're working on assumptions. But
what do you think about our new ones?" And if your response _then_
is, "Hey, don't forget that your last question has assumptions!" then
you're going to cease to be taken seriously. (And you should be
thinking now of your later response to my explanation of how a
thought-experiment works: "ah...but are you not presupposing that I
can do that?" Indeed, I am. The question still remains: can you put
yourself in Don's shoes?)
Dan finally said:
Well now... at the risk of not being taken seriously... no. How can I
do that? I am not Don. This discussion is (after all) about
presuppositions and how we use them constructively to live our lives
and give meaning to our experience.
Matt:
How on earth is this not a Pickwickian answer? You've either 1)
construed "shoes" in the physical sense, and wondered how you
could get in Don's shoes (which is impossible either because (A) you
accept him as a figment of imagination, so how could you physically
get into imaginary shoes or (B) you don't own Don's shoes, so how
could you); or 2) you construed "shoes" as a metaphor for "point of
view" and denied that anyone can take anyone else's point of view
through the use of imagination; or 3) you understood that I was
asking whether you could use any thought-experiment whatsoever,
and said no (for some mysterious reason).
Why on earth are we talking if there is nothing we can do to bridge
points of view? Since you pragmatically cannot believe this, what
are you intending to convey? You say this is all about how we use
presuppositions to "constructively live our lives," but when Dave or I
try and construct a useful presupposition for the living of our lives
(like "object permanence"), you think we're doing something wrong.
Dan said:
RMP's question wasn't meant to alleviate Don's worry over his dog
dish. It was meant as a historical answer from the Idealists when
asked about trees falling in forests with no one around. I assume he
was pointing out that If no one is around, all we have is imagination
to tell us what is going on in forests or in kitchens.
Matt:
Oh, now you can use your imagination, can you? (Do you see why I
cannot construct a consistency?)
"If no one is around, all we have is imagination." Indeed, but does
that mean that New York, dog dish bowls in kitchens, and unicorns
all exist in the same way?
Dan said:
Have you ever tried to have a discussion with a drunk or an insane
person? It doesn't work. Our ability to communicate effectively rests
upon a foundation of social and intellectual patterns that break down
when we are mentally impaired. Therefore, to try and explain a
common sense notion like the concept of object permanency to a
mentally impaired person would only fall on deaf ears.
Matt:
Can you tell me why I find this so ironic at this moment, Dan?
Matt said:
However, maybe you misspoke, and meant that Don wouldn't have
_that specific_ worry of "if I leave the room, maybe the dog dish will
disappear!" unless he was mentally impaired, and that's what
common sense tells you. You'd probably be right then, but you'd
have also short-circuited the thought-experiment before it told you
anything interesting. The interesting part only appears when you
recognize Don's similarity to Descartes.
Dan said:
So we have to entertain the Cartesian notion that the world of
objects is independent of we as subjects doing the observing. Why
is that interesting? It seems more like backsliding to me...
Matt:
No, Dan, it's about understanding what a successful defusing of
Cartesianism looks like. One has to understand what it means to
give a Cartesian response before one can understand how to avoid
giving a Cartesian response. (And note that you've conflated
"observation" with "experience" again here.)
Dan said:
Experience, or Dynamic Quality, doesn't reside in the person telling
the story.
Matt:
Don't tell me. Tell the Dan who denies that "the world of objects is
independent of we as subjects doing the observing" and thus sounds
like he's saying we need to directly observe objects to assure their
existence. Don't we have other forms of assurance?
Matt
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