Hello everyone On Sat, Dec 3, 2011 at 5:41 PM, Matt Kundert <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Dan, > > Matt said: > Do you think dog dishes disappear, physically, when you physically > leave a room? > > Dan said: > No... I can't see any way of verifying that notion. At the same time > though, I cannot see any way of verifying the notion they exist. Like > you, I assume they do... just as I assume the world will continue to > exist long after I'm gone and that it has existed long before I > appeared. > > Matt: > You have a much stronger notion of "verification" than I do. I think > we can reconstruct a notion of verification from indirect experience > that supplies a form of verification for things we aren't directly > experiencing, such that we can verify the existence of dog dishes in > other rooms in a way that we cannot do, e.g., unicorns.
Dan: I'm not sure that's a fair comparison. Our discussion on verifying New York City despite no direct experience of it seems to offer a more favorable outcome than does talk about unicorns. > > Matt said: > I have, through my Dog Dish Thought-Experiment, been trying to > get you to supply some of your intuitions about how the world > works, but you have remained surprisingly reticent and closed-fisted. > > Dan said: > Really! I have been trying to be forthright and open on my thinking, > even to the point of risking ridicule. > > Matt: > I think you misunderstood me: there was a touch of irony on my > use of "reticence." You have been very forthcoming in opinions and > responses, it is just that I haven't been able to understand how they > are always relevant to the line of questioning and thought I've been > trying to pursue. I haven't been able to grasp the center of gravity > to your thoughts that gives them coherence with Pirsig's. (Such > that, for example, it avoids SOM.) Dan: I'm not sure there is a center of gravity to my thoughts other than a coherence with Robert Pirsig's work. If I am wrong, then perhaps I can learn something by it. And you are probably right... my responses are not always relevant to your questions though I do attempt to bend them in that direction as best I can. > > Dan said: > I would say in the common sense everyday world we all use the > notion of object permanence to great advantage... so much so that > we tend to overlook it and assume objects are real and independent > of our experience. And that's fine when it comes to common sense. > But I also believe the MOQ (philosophy) states that objects are not > independent of experience and there is no way to verify if they > continue to exist or not when we are gone. > > Matt: > I think Pirsig would say that "objects are not independent of > experience," but that he would not say the latter part of your claim. > If he did say something recognizably reconstructable as that claim, I > would likely part company with him at that point, as I don't see what > the worth of it is. Dan: I know you would... you've been doing so for most of this discussion. Yet I have a difficult time understanding how it is possible for objects to exist outside of experience if they are not independent of it. > > Matt said: > To make common sense have a stronger sense of permanency is to > attribute to it SOM-level philosophical potency. Common sense is just > common sense--it is not philosophy. > > Dan said: > Yes... and I have been questioning the common sense notion that > objects exist independent of experience. I've admitted I'm not > well-versed in philosophy but I assumed that's what we're up to with > this discussion. > > Matt: > You've not recapitulated successfully the point of the interaction of > my two claims that you are responding "yes" to, which means you're > responding at cross-purposes. Dan: I assumed I didn't have to recapitulate my response to your claims. To your first, I took it as your position that common sense instills in us the concept of object permanency... thus my "yes." To your second, I meant that I thought we were discussing philosophy, not common sense. Matt: > By saying that "what dog dish?" is a > method of "questioning the common sense notion that objects exist > independent of experience" you've construed common sense as SOM, > just in the way that my first sentence denies we should do. In fact, > you're formulation of what the common sense about object > permanency consists of, "independent of experience," gives you > license under Pirsigian lights to question it. But why formulate the > common sense that way? Why not as "objects exist when a person > isn't around directly experiencing it?" > > Your direction in the conversation has been to assume that SOM > assumptions are at work in common sense and that, therefore, we > should question them in order to extirpate them. My direction has > been the exact opposite: it has been to assume a successful > extirpation of SOM and that, therefore, it is our next step to give > non-SOM construals of how common sense works. Dan: But what if common sense rests on a foundation of subject/object interpretation? If one kicks out the rungs of that ladder then there is nothing left to build upon. I think that's what RMP is on about when he talks (in LILA'S CHILD) about how he came to see that it isn't necessary to do away with subject/object thinking as long as it is understood that subjects and objects are a short hand for patterns of value. You seem to be saying that by doing away with the notion of objects existing independently of an observing subject (a successful extirpation of SOM) we can better understand how common sense works. But at the same time, you want to allow that objects exist independently of observation. That (to me) seems contradictory but I'm sure I'm not following your argument properly. > > Dan said: > And if we are content with common sense answers, then I agree. But > I get the sense that some people are not content to stop there... the > way I read Robert Pirsig's work it seems to me that his MOQ goes > against common sense in many ways. Don may be fine with believing > his golden dog dish will exist in his kitchen long after he is gone and > that Fido will continue to be fed (since the dish is bottomless). I > guess I get a kick out of asking whether or not our common sense > attitude about the world is correct. I suppose if everyone believes > something it must be so but still it's fun to kick some sand in the > gears every once in a while... > > Matt: > I agree that Pirsig's philosophy cuts against common sense in some > specific ways. I would want to claim, however, that one of those > ways is not the way you are pressing. The sand you are kicking into > gears, as far as I can tell, is Cartesian sand, which means that > you're actually bogging us down with problems the MoQ is designed > to help us avoid. Questioning is great, but not all questions were > born equal. The trick in my confidence at thinking that your question > is badly posed is the trick of thinking I understand the moral we > should draw from the dialectical history of philosophy from Descartes > to Kant to Dewey. Dan: I see. It wasn't my intention to present problems the MOQ is designed to avoid. I suppose I could accuse you of doing the same by presenting the thought experiment in the first place but I don't see the value in doing so. I was merely attempting to answer your queries as best I could. And if we have to moralize by the history of philosophy then I am left out in the cold peering into the warm windows of knowledge I know nothing of. > > Dan said: > I intended to probe what he gave as the historical answer of the > idealists and how it pertains to the MOQ. Of course we are all talking > about the perception of everyday objects but I am suggesting RMP > says we should pull back the veil of presuppositions and examine > further the nature of what we take for granted... object permanence. > > Matt: > Indeed, but what you haven't done is reconstruct what those > presuppositions are in MoQ-terms, which is the step Dave was taking > in talking about Pirsig's passages about the baby and perceiving DQ. > It's also the step I was taking in talking about the epistemological > relationship of indirect experience to our common sense > understanding of life. Dan: If you say so, then I'll take your word for it. From my point of view, both you and Dave are throwing the discussion back into a world where objects exist when no one is around to observe them and trees make noise when they fall in forests even when no one is around. I think you're both missing the more important question that this discussion is meant to raise by insisting our common sense understanding of reality is paramount. I understand we all operate under the common sense notion of object permanence. On the other hand, to assume because that notion works well in the real world it represents a fundamental part of our reality seems at odds with the MOQ. >Matt: > The trick of discourse is that to say anything with meaning you have > to assume a whole bunch of things you _cannot presently say_. To > say any particular sentence is to assume implicitly a whole raft of > assumptions (about, say, the meanings of words). To "pull back the > veil" is to say: "Hey, don't forget this sentence has assumptions!" > Then you'll want to make them explicit. However, to make an > assumption explicit is to form a sentence, and just like the other > sentence, this one has assumptions. Which means you can, yet > again, pull back the veil: "Hey, don't forget this sentence has > assumptions!" But if the pulling back of the veil _only_ has the > effect of reminding people that assumptions are at work, then the > pulling loses its efficacy after the first two or three times. Then > everybody becomes very self-conscious about working on > assumptions. But what the veil pulling _doesn't_ do is actually give > you new assumptions. So when people start working on new > assumptions and you come along and keep pulling the veil, the > response is likely to be, "Yeah, yeah: got it. We know we're working > on assumptions. But what do you think about our new ones?" And if > your response _then_ is, "Hey, don't forget that your last question > has assumptions!" then you're going to cease to be taken seriously. > (And you should be thinking now of your later response to my > explanation of how a thought-experiment works: "ah...but are you > not presupposing that I can do that?" Indeed, I am. The question > still remains: can you put yourself in Don's shoes?) Dan: Well now... at the risk of not being taken seriously... no. How can I do that? I am not Don. This discussion is (after all) about presuppositions and how we use them constructively to live our lives and give meaning to our experience. On the subject of me being taken seriously... there is no reason why you or anyone else should do so. I understand just about everyone here in the discussion group is better qualified than I to answer these questions. It is just that no one else seems to be doing it. > > Dan said previously: > Matt introduced Don and his dog dish. Don is worried that when he > leaves the room the dog dish will disappear and Fido will go hungry. > I responded along the same lines as RMP by saying: what dog dish? > What did Robert Pirsig mean by giving the answer "what trees" and > how does it correspond to "what dog dish"? > > Matt said: > In this reconstruction of my thought-experiment, I wonder how > Pirsig's question eliminates Don's worry. The only way I see is if you > _get off the question_, and explain--as Dave has--how common > sense physical object permanency works. Dan: But we all know that... we've known it since we've been infants. Dave's explaining the concept of object permanency does nothing to address the real question... it merely tells us what we already know. That's why it is called common sense... right? RMP's question wasn't meant to alleviate Don's worry over his dog dish. It was meant as a historical answer from the Idealists when asked about trees falling in forests with no one around. I assume he was pointing out that If no one is around, all we have is imagination to tell us what is going on in forests or in kitchens. Matt: > Otherwise, how have you > responded to Don's worry in a fashion that doesn't only exacerbate > his worry (or confuse him)? > > Dan said: > Don has no worries unless he is suffering from some sort of mental > impairment and in that case no explanation will suffice to alleviate > his concern. That is what common sense tells me. > > Matt: > I'm not sure I follow how this is a response to the back-and-forth > that precedes it. This is the line of response: > > 1) Don is worried that when he leaves the room the dog dish will > disappear and Fido will go hungry. > 2) Pirsig would say, "What dog dish?" Dan: If the dog dish has been presupposed to exist, then it wouldn't vanish. It was never there in the first place. That is where the "what dog dish?" fits in. You seem to be insisting that the dog dish isn't presupposed... that there is a "real" dish that exists independently of anyone observing it. That may be so... or it may not. > 3) Matt wonders how Pirsig's question eliminates Don's worry. > 4) Dan says that Don has no worries unless he is suffering from > some sort of mental impairment. > > (4) seems like a non sequitor. It certainly isn't a direct response to > my wonderment (which is partly where I get my sense of your > "reticence"). But further, say "worry" is a sort of mental impairment, > which is the significance of (4). That's actually pretty close to > Wittgenstein's view of philosophical problems: they are neuroses > that one's need therapy for. But, why wouldn't explanations help > then? Dan: Have you ever tried to have a discussion with a drunk or an insane person? It doesn't work. Our ability to communicate effectively rests upon a foundation of social and intellectual patterns that break down when we are mentally impaired. Therefore, to try and explain a common sense notion like the concept of object permanency to a mentally impaired person would only fall on deaf ears. In my opinion... of course. >Matt: > However, maybe you misspoke, and meant that Don wouldn't have > _that specific_ worry of "if I leave the room, maybe the dog dish will > disappear!" unless he was mentally impaired, and that's what > common sense tells you. You'd probably be right then, but you'd > have also short-circuited the thought-experiment before it told you > anything interesting. The interesting part only appears when you > recognize Don's similarity to Descartes. Dan: So we have to entertain the Cartesian notion that the world of objects is independent of we as subjects doing the observing. Why is that interesting? It seems more like backsliding to me... > > Dan said: > I (on the other hand) am worried that the world will disappear when > I die and all my loved ones with it. Can you explain to me how the > concept of object permanency will help me get over my worries? In > other words, are my worries unfounded? Am I suffering from some > sort of mental impairment? > > Matt: > Are your worries unfounded? Probably, but this particular worry, a > kind of existential angst, is not that rare. The explanation, based on > a notion of object permanency, would go like this: "why would your > death be any different than all of the other people who have died > during your lifetime? Why should the world only rest on _your_ life?" > Will this lessen your worry? Maybe not, but then again, angst about > death, like sex, is special. Dan: But that isn't what I'm asking. When I worry that the world will disappear I don't mean the world of objects that we suppose exist independent of us. I mean I will no longer be able to experience the world and my loved ones. When that experience ends, I end. That is no different than any other person who has died during my lifetime. They are gone forever. The world doesn't rest on my life. It rests on experience. And when that experience ceases, so does the world... consciousness, awareness, experience... whatever we care to call it is inextricably linked to those objects of that awareness or experience. > > Dan said: > But is there any particular reason to think the dog dish still exists > when we leave the room? I understand we are preconditioned to > believe in the concept of object permanency but is that sufficient > reason to believe the dish will be there if and when we come back? > What if circumstances conspire to keep me from ever entering the > room again. Can I reasonably assume the dish is still there. > > Matt: > Why wouldn't the "concept of object permanency," all other things > being equal, be a sufficient reason? What if the dog dish was that > little robot boy in Spielberg's movie, AI? He didn't move, and all > humanity died, for like a thousand years until the aliens found him. > The notion of object permanency is to remind you that it isn't about > what circumstances conspire to do to _you_, it's about what > circumstances conspire to do to the _dog dish_. Dan: My question is meant to challenge that point of view. What I mean to say is, the introduction of the aliens (I thought they were a kind of hybrid of organic-robotic descendents of humanity but either way) is a way of moving the story to a new point of equilibrium after the gauntlet and visit to the death of humankind. Without the introduction of the aliens, the story would end with the little boy and his bear residing forever after at the bottom of the sea and he would never obtain his goal of finding his mother. It is a story technique that works very well but we can see that some kind of experiencing entity is needed in order for the story to continue. Dog dishes are part of that experience. And if they are no longer included in experience, they become like that little robot boy under the ocean, lost in limbo, neither existing or not existing, until some "thing" discovers him again. > > Dan said: > Even if Don's dog dish is taken as a real object, such objects don't > exist independently of experience, at least not in the framework of > the MOQ. > > Matt said: > You haven't specified yet what you mean by this. Why, after all, can > I not count Chris's experience of the dog dish to confirm that it is not, > actually, existing independently of experience? [Dan said: "How could > it exist independently of experience?"] Further, and a more > interesting question for you to answer, do physical objects not have, > in the MoQ, their own locus of experiencing? [Dan said: "I would say > that within the framework of the MOQ we are the objects we > perceive. Their locus of experience is ours."] Isn't this what it means > to be a inorganic static pattern? [Dan said: "We are a collection of > inorganic, biological, social, and intellectual patterns of Quality > capable of responding to Dynamic Quality."] Do only linguistic > humans experience? [Dan said: "No... the whole of reality is > experience."] > > Matt: > In the above, I've interpolated your broken up responses to my > individual questions, because I think by breaking them up, you got > lost in the trees and didn't see the forest of my line of reasoning. > > The only answer that strikes me as Pirsigian is the last. The others > only obscure the issue I was after with my questions. They, all four, > are perfectly coherent with each other, but they say nothing against > the view I have been elaborating because not one of them specifies > the thing I predicated the questions on you needing to specify: what > does it mean to "exist independently of experience"? Your "how > could it?" avoids with a Pirsigian platitude the need to actually define > what you mean by using the phrase, such that I might also mean the > same thing by the phrase. For example, I have introduced the > distinction between direct and indirect experience to specifically > begin to deal with the problems in this area of discourse. You have > consistently abandoned the distinction in your responses. The > trouble for rapprochement between our views that I have no idea > why you've done so. I suspect it's unconscious, and you haven't > meant anything particular by it, but how can I correctly grasp what > you mean if I don't know? This is what I mean by imprecision. You > aren't saying things from a center of gravity that I can then grasp > the essential movements of in order to understand your statements. > > The whole of reality is experience. Yes, Quality. "We are the > objects we perceive." Okay, a sort of panpsychistic monism, and > once "we" is also "objects," it makes a sort of sense to deny that an > inorganic pattern could be a locus of experience, for there is only > _one_ locus of experience: "we" or "reality" or "Quality" or > "experience." > > I'm not sure if you were self-conscious about adding "we" to the list > of Pirsig's synonymous terms reality=experience=Quality. It strikes > me as wonderfully Hegelian (forgive me Dave for my obscurantism). > However, in this web, in this formula, why on _earth_ should we > ever ask: what dog dish? > > If you _didn't_ mean to add "we" to Pirsig's list of synonyms, then > you'll have to explain to me again whether or not you think rocks are > a locus of experience. Because if they _are_ a locus of experience, > why isn't the existence of other trees in the forest enough to permit > that falling tree to make a noise? Dan: I did mean to add "we" as some kind of experiential entity must be present for the story to continue... whether it is the aliens in AI or cartoon characters. In the Imaginarium of Doctor Parnassus the devil (played wonderfully by Tom Waits) visits a Buddhist temple where the eternal story is being told to uphold the world. The monks believe if the story ends, the world stops. The devil tries to prove the fallacy of this notion by puckering the mouth of every monk in the temple so that the eternal story ceases. He says: see? the world continues. The monk leader has a revelation that the eternal story is being told somewhere else about the same time a bird craps on the devil's shoulder. God damn it, the devil says... not entirely because of the bird shit on his shoulder but because he has been found out. Experience, or Dynamic Quality, doesn't reside in the person telling the story. We are taught that it does... it is common sense to believe "I" experience the world but in effect "we" experience and uphold the world the same way those monks telling the eternal story uphold the world. The conundrum we seem to be arguing about appears (to me) to be that without this "I" that experiences there would be no experience. I am not sure there is an answer... a proper answer. Matt: Why is it only _your_ experience, > Dan, that gives things life? Dan: You misunderstand. It isn't my experience. It is experience. I am a byproduct of experience, not the progenitor of it. Matt: Why is everything dependent on your > experience? Why can't it be dependent on mine, too? Dan: It is. But not just your experience. It is dependent on experience. Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
