Greetings, Has anyone ever had direct conscious awareness of the upside-down data presented to the eyes, let alone any awareness to what the data might be before the visual apparatus transforms/translates it? We get the after-patterned product, and no direct access to the process. Percepts are as much a part of static (patterned) value as concepts. Dynamic Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable, it is undifferentiated; it is pre-concepts and pre-percepts and pre- any other attributes that might make up static patterns, an emotional component for example. Think about it, using 'pre-conceptual' as an indication of Dynamic Quality cannot be right. It's much too short-sighted an interpretation.
I do think dropping the narrative conceptual function, like in mindfulness, gives one a more immediate perceptual experience. Mindfulness is one of the practices that puts you on the road towards nirvana, or so I've heard. Marsha On Jul 9, 2012, at 3:19 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > dmb, > > Not the quote or the article even used the word 'undifferentiated' except the > Zen quote that you presented associating it with nirvana. I take > 'undifferentiate' to mean lacking difference or distinction. My statement > still stands that if Dynamic Quality is undifferentiated, it cannot be about > perceptions (smells, sounds, tastes, visions, and feelings) which are > differentiated; which require a spacial-temporal framework; and which are > dependent on human sense apparatus? Dynamic Quality is indivisible, > undefinable and unknowable; it is undifferentiated; it is not perceptions - > not smells, not sounds, not taste, not visions, and not feelings. > > > > Marsha > > > On Jul 8, 2012, at 5:20 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> Marsha said: >> I am saying if Dynamic Quality is undifferentiated, it cannot be about >> perceptions (smells, sounds, tastes, visions, and feelings) which are >> differentiated, which require a spacial-temporal framework; and which are >> dependent on human sense apparatus? Neither you nor the paper that you >> were unable to explain, addressed this issue. >> >> >> dmb says: >> Yea, I know what you're saying and I've already explained that you have >> misunderstood the scope and meaning of the term "undifferentiated". You're >> simply using a lot of conceptual descriptions from ordinary sensory >> empiricism, which are products of reflection and not phenomenal experience >> as such, and then projecting them back onto pre-conceptual experience. It's >> only after the fact, remember, that we can talk about stoves and heat and >> pain and the like. >> There are lots of articles and books about this stuff, much of which I've >> mentioned here. If you have further questions, please consult them. I was >> answering Ron's questions before you butted in and I just don't enjoy your >> company. >> >> >> >>> Marsha >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jul 8, 2012, at 11:57 AM, david buchanan wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> Marsh: >>>> 1) If you were genuinely interested answers, you'd take the time to >>>> CAREFULLY read the paper. >>>> >>>> 2) Since it is Pirsig's published work that tells us that James was saying >>>> the same thing as the MOQ, your objection to James's thought has no merit >>>> at all. >>>> >>>> 3) Your point (that direct perception can't be pure experience or DQ >>>> because perceptions are differentiated) seems to rest entirely on simply >>>> denying what the textual evidence repeatedly says. To add yet another, for >>>> example, how do you suppose that Northrop's "undifferentiated aesthetic >>>> continuum" could be aesthetic without some kind of perception? How could >>>> Pirsig's "primary empirical reality" be empirical without some kind of >>>> perception? Jumping off hot stoves is going to involve some kind of >>>> perception, some kind of phenomenal experience. I would have thought this >>>> was quite obviously derived from the meaning of the terms employed, terms >>>> like "aesthetic" and "experience" and "Quality" and "flux of life", etc.. >>>> I mean, "undifferentiated" does not mean experience is a blank void or >>>> black empty space. It just means that the situation has not been divided >>>> CONCEPTUALLY. "Unverbalized sensation" and "undivided experience" are both >>>> descriptive phrases that should give you a c > lear sense of what "undifferentiated" means. >>>> >>>> 4) This would be the third or fourth time in a row in which you asked a >>>> question that was just supplied in the quote to which you're supposedly >>>> responding. Do the explanations really demand further explanations? The >>>> section seems pretty clear to me and it was selected specifically to >>>> answer your question? Why is that not good enough? James and Pirsig are >>>> both denying that "all thinking and experience involves concepts". They >>>> are both insisting not only on the reality of pre-conceptual experience >>>> but also on its central importance. "James instead argues that the >>>> phenomenal content of embodied experience as experienced outstrips our >>>> capacity to conceptually or linguistically articulate it. In other words, >>>> James insists that many of our basic experiences harbor non-conceptual >>>> content." That is the sense in which DQ or pure experience is >>>> undifferentiated, is undivided. It's all about the difference between the >>>> conceptual and the non-conceptual. >>>> >>>> 5) I think good, solid answers have already been given - repeatedly. You >>>> asked. I answered. Take it or leave it. Take it from somebody else. Read >>>> Krueger's paper. Read Northrop, Kitaro, James or Dewey or any of the >>>> scholars who write about any of them. ...But I'm done answering every >>>> question two or three times in a row. Jeez. Don't you see how lazy and >>>> obnoxious that is? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> From: [email protected] >>>>> Date: Sun, 8 Jul 2012 10:08:51 -0400 >>>>> To: [email protected] >>>>> Subject: Re: [MD] pure experience (DQ) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> dmb, >>>>> >>>>> I agree that direct perceptual (the particular) experience is more >>>>> immediate than reflective conceptual (the generalized) experience, but >>>>> direct perceptions still cannot be Dynamic Quality or pure experience, >>>>> which is undifferentiated. That is my point. The paper you offer might >>>>> reflect what James thought, but I am interested in how these are best >>>>> handled in the MoQ, and if you cannot explain this I don't see the value >>>>> to be gained by reading it. I also acknowledged that static (patterned) >>>>> value represents all that human being's can know. But I still have a >>>>> problem with connecting direct perceptional experience with Dynamic >>>>> Quality as I explained. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Marsha >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
