Hi David, On Aug 28, 2012, at 7:03 PM, David Harding <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Marsha, > >>> No, but the MOQ is fundamentally mystic and one of it's main opponents are >>> mystics. The way this issue is solved is by breaking up mysticism in two. >>> One type it supports, the other it does not. The type it supports is that >>> which recognises the value of clear, fixed, metaphysical distinctions. >> >> This explanation may work for you, but it does nothing for me. > > It does nothing, because you do not care for it - If you did care you'd see > that it speaks to the issue I have with your brand of mysticism.. Until you > care though, you won't see… And you won't care unless you think that what > I'm saying has value. Right now you seem to think very little of what I > say.. I do not have a brand of mysticism. > >>>>> "The only person who doesn't pollute the mystic reality of the world with >>>>> fixed metaphysical meanings is a person who hasn't yet been born — and to >>>>> whose birth no thought has been given. The rest of us have to settle for >>>>> being something less pure. Getting drunk and picking up bar-ladies and >>>>> writing metaphysics is a part of life." >>>> >>>> I agree with RMP's comment. >>> >>> That's fascinating. You agree with this comment? Notice how he said >>> "fixed metaphysical meanings"? Not "supposed but not necessarily real or >>> true" or "hypothetical" but "fixed metaphysical meanings"? >> >> Please note that RMP uses the plural form "meanings". He also wrote "Unlike >> subject-object metaphysics the Metaphysics of Quality does not insist on a >> single exclusive truth." I prefer to use the word 'patterns', and prefer to >> consider patterns as 'hypothetical'. I think to consider patterns >> hypothetical is to broaden one's intellectual understanding. It also is >> less likely to lead to intellectual arrogance. It helps one become >> "unfixed", or better yet "unstuck". I do understand, though, some people, >> even philosophers, may be uncomfortable if they lose sight of certainty. > > Yes. You are fighting a straw man here as no one on here seems to support an > idea of an absolute 'certain' truth or have any issues with multiple > 'meanings'.. > > Where's this bogey man you're so afraid of on here who claims that truth is > absolute? He must be pretty scary for you to feel the need to ensure that > truth is only best seen as 'hypothetical'. There is no straw or bogey man. I prefer to use the term 'patterns', which was RMP's choice and I prefer to think of patterns as 'hypothetical'. I do not insist, or even suggest, that you take my position. >>>> And I consider observation to be of two types: seeing and knowing. >>> >>> Why break it up? >> >> Maybe sight and insight, or perception and conception. I don't really have >> this worked out yet. ' > > What's to work out? There's no ultimate 'truth' to the matter. There are only > good useful ideas. If you've got no good use for splitting them up then > splitting them up is no good. > > I think you fear that in others that which you fear most in yourself. It > seems like you still think there is some ultimate 'truth' out there to > discover. I have no idea what you are talking about. Where did the subject of ultimate 'truth' come from? >>>> Yes, the intellectual pattern labeled 'truth' is one of many intellectual >>>> patterns. >>> >>> Agreed. And truth is a label for the best intellectual patterns. >> >> No, the intellectual pattern labeled 'truth' is ONE of many intellectual >> patterns. You might want to define 'truth' as "a label for the best >> intellectual patterns."? So now your definition has gone from "an idea >> which represents experience beautifully" to "a label for the best >> intellectual patterns". Any more? It's wack-a-mole! No wonder you avoid >> offering a definition when I ask. For your particular reasoning, in this >> case, should we totally ignore the dictionary? > > To be clear if you disagree with these definitions then you disagree with > Pirsig: > > "In the MOQ, and in William James’ pragmatism, truth is described as high > quality intellectual patterns." If the topic was concerning truth, I do not disagree with RMP's quote, but I prefer to use his term 'pattern' and I prefer to think of patterns as hypothetical (supposed but not neccesarily real or true). > And if you can't see that "a label for the best intellectual patterns" is > "An idea which represents experience beautifully" then that's quite > surprising to me... This is bits and pieces of commentary and not a definition. >>> Yes. Value which is experienced. Pure empiricism. >> >> What is you definition or explanation of "pure experience"? How "pure" is >> it? > > Once again - if you disagree with the term 'pure empiricism' then you > disagree with Pirsig: > > "So in the MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes later. This is > pure empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism, which, with its > pre-existing subjects and objects, is not really so pure." Sorry, my mistake, I thought you wrote 'pure experience'. I do not disagree with this quote. . > Anyway - as the quote indicates it is pure in the sense that it is free of > subjects and objects. Okay. > However your constant demand for definitions seems to indicate that you are > trying to be an anti-intellectual. Requesting a definition is anti-intellectual??? > That is - you seem to despise that I claim to use words which describe > reality truthfully. Despise??? > You're trying to use this against me, by demanding definitions - thinking I'm > some kind of Platonist who claims that there are ideal absolute truths. The > best way, you figure, to respond to such a person is to constantly demand > definitions thus pointing out, in your mind, that the definitions could never > actually capture reality. You are being a bit of a drama queen. > Could you be any more of a spooked out mystic?! I am not a mystic. Marsha Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
