Ron said to dmb:

...Right, they all oppose "vicious intellectualism". But my comments rest on 
HOW they oppose it. Fred (to me) tends to express that relativistic anti 
intellectual claim that to think, to understand, to conceptualize is to reify. 
The assertion of those that insist that intellect = SOM. Fred, in that quote is 
lumping together nouns and abstract nouns and rendering them as equivalent. 
Which begins to diverge from the meaning and aim of Bob and Will. 



dmb says:
You think that Nietzsche tends to express that relativistic anti-intellectual 
claim that to conceptualize is to reify? I don't think so. As I read the quote, 
Fred is making a distinction between conceptualization and reification. The 
latter is not just conceptualization, of course, but a certain kind of 
conceptual error. Here is the moment wherein Fred makes this distinction, I 
think:  He says, "the concept 'leaf' is formed by arbitrarily discarding these 
individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects". (This 
part distinguishes the clear and clean concept of a "leaf" from the all the 
concrete and particular leaves of actual experience - distinguishes between 
concepts and reality or between concepts and 'nature,' as Fred is puts it). So 
far, so good, but the very next sentence from Nietzsche says, "This awakens the 
idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the 'leaf': the 
original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, 
measured, colored, curled, and painted—but by incompetent hands, so that no 
specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of 
the original model." Right there; that's the difference between concepts and 
reified concepts. The concept of a leaf, he says, "awakens the idea that 
..there exists in nature the 'leaf': the original model" and that's the reified 
concept. When "leaf" is taken to be more real than all actual leaves, when it 
becomes the "original model" which all actual leaves are supposed to 
instantiate or copy, we are no longer talking about words, concepts or 
definitions but Essences, Forms, primary ontological realities, 
things-in-themselves beyond the phenomenal realm. These "original models" 
aren't just taken as abstractions, words, concepts or generalizations but as a 
primary realities, more primary than the actual experience from which they were 
abstracted in the first. That's what Plato did to concepts like Truth, Justice, 
Beauty and the Good. These were taken as fixed and eternal realities and were 
held to be more real than phenomenal reality, than empirical reality, as in the 
allegory of cave.

To believe, as Nietzsche puts it, "that the leaf is the cause of the leaves" is 
Platonism. To believe that "honesty" is an essence existing behind each 
instance of actual honesty is just another case of this Platonic reification. 
"We know nothing whatsoever about an essential quality called 'honesty,'" 
Nietzsche says, "but we do know of countless individualized and consequently 
unequal actions which we equate by omitting the aspects in which they are 
unequal and which we now designate as "honest" actions." It is we who formulate 
the name "honesty," Nietzsche says, "whereas nature is acquainted with no forms 
and no concepts" and "even our contrast between individual and species is 
something anthropomorphic and does not originate in the essence of things". 


While Nietzsche is certainly darker and more bombastic in his style, I think we 
can see that James is saying very much the same thing.

"...Both theoretically and practically this power of framing abstract concepts 
is one of the sublimest of our human prerogatives. We come back into the 
concrete form our journey into these abstractions, with an increase both of 
vision and of power. It is no wonder that earlier thinkers, forgetting that 
concepts are only man-made extracts from the temporal flux, should have ended 
by treating them as a superior type of being, bright, changeless, true, divine, 
and utterly opposed in nature to the turbid, restless lower world. The latter 
then appears as but their corruption and falsification.    Intellectualism in 
the vicious sense began when Socrates and Plato taught that what a thing really 
is, is told us by its defintion. Ever since Socrates we have been taught that 
reality consists of essences, not of appearances, and that the essences of 
things are known whenever we know their defintions. So first we identify the 
thing with a concept and then we identify the concept with a definition, and 
only then, inasmuch as the thing IS whatever the definition expresses, are we 
sure of apprehending the real essence of it or the full truth about it. S far 
no harm is done. The misuse of concepts begins with the habit of employing them 
privatively [to negate or exclude] as well as positively, using them not merely 
to assign properties to things, but to deny the very properties with which the 
things sensible present themselves. ...It is but the old story, of a useful 
practice first becoming a method, then a habit, and finally a tyranny that 
defeats the end it was used for. Concepts, first employed to make things 
intelligible, are clung to even when they make them unintelligible. Thus it 
comes that when once you have conceived things as 'independent,' you must 
proceed to deny the possibility of any connection whatever among them, because 
the notion of connection is not contained in the definition." (As if the 
definition of "horseman" could be invoked to prove that the man never goes on 
foot.) 


I have some disagreements with some of your "asides" about Socrates and the 
Sophists but I'll leave them alone for now, just for the sake of focus and 
clarity. Instead, I'll leave you with some additional thoughts from Pirsig 
about this thing called vicious intellectualism...

“His mind races on and on, through the permutations of the dialectic, on and 
on, hitting things, finding new branches and sub-branches, exploding with anger 
at each new discovery of the viciousness and meanness and lowness of this ‘art’ 
called dialectic. ... Phædrus’ mind races on and on and then on further, seeing 
now at last a kind of evil thing, an evil deeply entrenched in himself, which 
pretends to try and understand love and beauty and truth and wisdom but whose 
real purpose is never to understand them, whose real purpose is always to usurp 
them and enthrone itself. Dialectic - the usurper. That is what he sees. The 
parvenu, muscling in on all that is Good and seeking to contain it and control 
it."
"How are you going to teach virtue if you teach the relativity of all ethical 
ideas? Virtue, if it implies anything at all, implies an ethical absolute. A 
person whose idea of what is proper varies from day to day can be admired for 
his broadmindedness, but not for his virtue. Lightning hits! Quality! Virtue! 
Dharma! That is what the Sophists were teaching! Not ethical relativism. Not 
pristine 'virtue.' But areté. Excellence. Dharma! Before the Church of Reason. 
Before substance. Before form. Before mind and matter. Before dialectic itself. 
Quality had been absolute. Those first teachers of the Western world were 
teaching Quality, and the medium they had chosen was that of rhetoric."







                                          
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