Hi Paul,
On Jun 17, 2013, at 7:50 AM, Paul Turner wrote:
> Hi Marsha,
>
> Recognizing a mirage for what it is is not "relativism, a nihilism and an
>> anti-intellectualism." Chasing after some half-baked definition of truth
>> is clinging to the last shreds of one's need for certainty. Who needs it?
>>
>
> The first problem with referring to static quality as a "mirage" is that by
> its very definition it immediately elevates the appearance-reality
> distinction to the top of the hierarchy and drops static quality into the
> "appearance" category.
The use of the term 'mirage' is of course an analogy and doesn't elevate
anything. Perhaps you give the appearance-reality problem too much credence.
> Either Dynamic Quality or something else must then
> take its place in the "reality" category and we just join the long list of
> philosophers who have had a stab at assigning this or that to these
> supposedly fundamental categories.
You sound like there is a rejecting of static patterns in my statement, and
there is not.
> I really see the MOQ as an attempt to
> avoid that while still remaining a viable philosophy.
Viable? What would be your standard for viability?
> The second problem is that by dismissing one element of its key explanatory
> relationship as an illusion it makes the MOQ (particularly what I call
> context (2)) a bit of a waste of time.
There is no dismissal, no rejection. There is full embracing static patterns.
> However, recognising static quality (the mythos) for what it is is the
> value of context (1). I just wouldn't call it a mirage, for the reasons
> above if nothing else. Also, it just strikes me as a bit "Dummies Guide to
> Buddhism" which is odd given that I'm sure you've read some Nagarjuna?
The "Dummies Guide" reference is cute. - I've read a number of different
texts by Nagarjuna, and there should be nothing odd about my accepting a static
pattern as a mirage. I'm sure you probably read Jay Garfield's
translation/interpretation of the MMK. While he's not the Buddha or Nagarjuna,
he might illuminate the use of mirage:
"Among the many similes for conventional truth that litter Madhyamaka texts,
the most fruitful is that of the mirage. Conventional truth is false,
Candrakirti tells us, because it is deceptive. Candrakirti spells this out in
terms of a mirage. A mirage appears to be water, but is in fact empty of
water—it is deceptive, and in that sense, a false appearance. On the other
hand, a mirage is not nothing: it is a real mirage, just not real water.
"The analogy must be spelled out with care to avoid the extreme of nihilism. A
mirage appears to be water, but is only a mirage; the inexperienced highway
traveler mistakes it for water, and for him it is deceptive, a false appearance
of water; the experienced traveler sees it for what it is—a real mirage, empty
of water. Just so, conventional phenomena appear to ordinary, deluded beings to
be inherently existent, whereas in fact they are merely conventionally real,
empty of that inherent existence; to the åryas, on the other hand, they appear
to be merely conventionally true, hence to be empty. For us, they are
deceptive, false appearances; for them, they are simply real conventional
truths.
"We can update the analogy to make the point more plainly. Imagine three
travelers along a hot desert highway. Alice is an experienced desert traveler;
Bill is a neophyte; Charlie is wearing polarizing sunglasses. Bill points to a
mirage up ahead and warns against a puddle on the road; Alice sees the mirage
as a mirage and assures him that there is no danger. Charlie sees nothing at
all, and wonders what they are talking about. If the mirage were entirely
false—if there were no truth about it at all, Charlie would be the most
authoritative of the three (and Buddhas would know nothing of the real world).
But that is wrong. Just as Bill is deceived in believing that there is water on
the road, Charlie is incapable of seeing the mirage at all, and so fails to
know what Alice knows—that there is a real mirage on the road, which appears to
some to be water, but which is not. There is a truth about the mirage, despite
the fact that it is deceptive, and Alice is authoritative with respect to it
precisely because she sees it as it is, not as it appears to the uninitiated."
(Garfield, Jay L., 'MOONSHADOWS: Taking Conventional Truth Seriously',
pp. 29-30)
> I advocate a middle way between the extremes of such things as the
> "illusion" and "certainty" you dichotomise above and the two contexts I
> discern in the MOQ offer a practical way to implement the middle way
> philosophically.
I am not interested in truth, so there is no dichotomization. There is a full
embracing of static patterns as what they are.
Anyway, I enjoyed reading your paper and will read it again, I'm sure. I know
it represents a lot of care and work.
Marsha
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