Hi Marsha, > Perhaps I do but a mirage is defined as something which appears to be one > > thing but is really something else, right? So you are saying that static > > quality is like something which appears to be one thing but is really > > something else. So I have to ask - in what respect does it appear to be > > something while being really something else. And as far as that analogy > > goes, what is it that it appears to be and what is it really? > > It is not that the mirage does not exist. A mirage appears to have > substance, but upon close inspection it does not. >
On close inspection a mirage is "really" refracted light, right. So by analogy, upon close inspection, what are static patterns "really"? >>> I really see the MOQ as an attempt to > >>> avoid that while still remaining a viable philosophy. > >> > >> Viable? What would be your standard for viability? > > > > It's difficult to be very precise and exhaustive about, Marsha, but I'm > > thinking something like - providing explanations of sufficient clarity, > > credibility, applicability, precision, elegance etc. (in other words, > > intellectual quality) to support widespread acceptance and use. First of > > all in academic communities and eventually into wider society. > > Have you presented your paper to the academy? Are you planning to? > It's not good enough as it stands, I just wanted to get the thoughts down mainly and then saw that it may help resolve some of the disputes I had read on here (though I'm doubting that now). Plus I think it's too abstract, on its own. I think the better approach is incorporating the MOQ into other areas of study, as Patrick Doorly and others are doing. Also, there are other philosophers who see that value is real, or at least argue that it has a "phenomenal reality" (McDowell and Oddie, if I recall correctly) and I tend to think that elements of the MOQ will become common sense over time. I see things like the "model-dependent realism" being advocated by Hawking (which I think Adrie mentioned) and the two-stage model of free will as theories moving closer to agreement with the MOQ. This gradual reweaving of MOQ-like ideas into the mythos is more likely, in my opinion, than the wholesale adoption of a whole metaphysics. But I love the broad, ambitious strokes of Pirsig's work. > Are you genuinely interested in my answer, though, or just setting me > > up for a trap? > > ? > See below. > > > > I feel like if we were in a room you would hit me with a stick to "snap > me > > out of it!" > > I could play with this sentence. > Ha > >> "We can update the analogy to make the point more plainly. Imagine three > >> travelers along a hot desert highway. Alice is an experienced desert > >> traveler; Bill is a neophyte; Charlie is wearing polarizing sunglasses. > >> Bill points to a mirage up ahead and warns against a puddle on the road; > >> Alice sees the mirage as a mirage and assures him that there is no > danger. > >> Charlie sees nothing at all, and wonders what they are talking about. If > >> the mirage were entirely false—if there were no truth about it at all, > >> Charlie would be the most authoritative of the three (and Buddhas would > >> know nothing of the real world). But that is wrong. Just as Bill is > >> deceived in believing that there is water on the road, Charlie is > incapable > >> of seeing the mirage at all, and so fails to know what Alice knows—that > >> there is a real mirage on the road, which appears to some to be water, > but > >> which is not. There is a truth about the mirage, despite the fact that > it > >> is deceptive, and Alice is authoritative with respect to it precisely > >> because she sees it as it is, not as it appears to the uninitiated." > >> > >> (Garfield, Jay L., 'MOONSHADOWS: Taking Conventional Truth > >> Seriously', pp. 29-30) > > > > I'd need to read this a few times to try out different interpretations > with > > respect to the MOQ. My initial reading is that Alice is seen as > > authoritative because she sees "static patterns" as "real illusions." I > > don't know, the language just seems so unnecessarily tricksy. How would > > you translate that last paragraph into MOQ terms? > > Up to a point, dmb seemed to make sense of it. > I saw Dave's interpretation but, seeing as you want to push this analogy, what's your MOQ translation? >> I advocate a middle way between the extremes of such things as the > >>> "illusion" and "certainty" you dichotomise above and the two contexts I > >>> discern in the MOQ offer a practical way to implement the middle way > >>> philosophically. > >> > >> I am not interested in truth, so there is no dichotomization. > > > > > > You suggested that the alternative to your mirage analogy was clinging to > > certainty but now seem to say that.....well, I don't know actually, that > > you didn't mean it? > > That was my poor presentation. I didn't mean to juxtapose the two > statements as extremes. I should have left it at stating that recognizing > a mirage for what it is is not "relativism, a nihilism and an > anti-intellectualism." > > > Should I ignore anything you say because you have no > > interest in whether it is true (by any definition) or not? > > That's not for me to decide. > > > > I'm being genuine here. > > Me too. Ignore me if you like. > > > > You will know from your reading that Pirsig translates true > > as "having high intellectual quality" so are you not interested in > whether > > your words are of high intellectual quality? > > "... the good to which truth is subordinate is intellectual and Dynamic > Quality ..." > > The good is good enough for me. I can be concerned with presenting the > best explanation I can without worrying about truth. > OK, it's just that you seemed to be saying that because static pattern = mirage is just an analogy I shouldn't take it too seriously or read anything into it. But if we start from the premise that everything we say, think, conceptualise etc is an analogy there is no "just" about it. Either we mean what we say or we don't and some analogies are better than others. To me a mirage means something which rests on an appearance-reality distinction by definition so when we apply that analogy to something in a philosophical discussion it has consequences whether you meant them or not. We should remember not to confuse fingers with moons but taking someone's words seriously and inferring from them doesn't mean we are hopelessly deluded. > I'm sure you are, I'm just trying to get a feel for how to talk to you > without getting hit by a stick. > > I have a cane with a raven handle. Would I hit you with it? I don't know. > You mean you don't know the severity of my delusion? 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