John, Aristotle says something similar in book alpha of metaphysics, that we seek to render the unintelligible intelligible. We impose limit on experience in order to better understand it. I think that is different than a will for Absolutes. I think that's where some disagree With Royce. Ron
> On May 25, 2015, at 5:00 PM, John Carl <[email protected]> wrote: > > dmb, all, > > > >> On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 11:27 AM, david <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Baggini wrote: >> >> "The clash of civilisations is happening not between Islam and the West, >> as we are often led to believe, but between pragmatic relativism and >> dogmatic certainty." >> >> >> >> >> dmb says: >> >> We don't need Truth to be Objective, Fixed, Absolute, or Eternal and we >> can't have that kind of truth anyway. But we do need truth to be vigorous >> enough and strong enough to kill lies, bullshit, fanaticism, propaganda, >> honest mistakes and good old fashioned stupidity. We need excellence in >> thought and speech and ideas that actually work when they're put into >> practice. > > "The contrast is not one between intellectualism and pragmatism. It is the > contrast between two well-known attitudes of will, — the will that is loyal > to truth as an universal ideal, and the will that is concerned with its own > passing caprices. > > And yet, despite all this, the modern assault upon mere intellectualism is > well founded. The truth of our assertions is indeed definable only by > taking account of the meaning of our own individual attitudes of will, and > the truth, whatever else it is, is at least instrumental in helping us > towards the goal of all human volition. The only question is whether the > will I really means to aim at doing something that has a final and eternal > meaning. > > All logic is the logic of the will. There is no pure intellect. Thought is > a mode of action, a mode of action distinguished from other modes mainly by > its internal clearness of self-consciousness, by its relatively free > control of its own procedure, and by the universality, the impersonal > fairness and obviousness of its aims and of its motives. An idea in the > consciousness of a thinker is simply a present consciousness of some > expression of purpose, — a plan of action. A judgment is an act of a > reflective and self-conscious character, an act whereby one accepts or > rejects an idea as a sufficient expression of the very purpose that is each > time in question. Our whole objective world is meanwhile defined for each > of us in terms of our ideas. General assertions about the meaning of our > ideas are reflective acts whereby we acknowledge and accept certain ruling > principles of action. > > And in respect of all these aspects of doctrine I find myself at one with > recent voluntarism, whether the latter takes the form of instrumentalism, > or insists upon some more individualistic theory of truth. But for my part, > in spite, or in fact because of this my voluntarism, I cannot rest in any > mere relativism. Individualism is right in saying, "I will to credit this > or that opinion." But individualism is wrong in supposing that I can ever > be content with my own will in as far as it is merely an individual will. > The will to my mind is to all of us nothing but a thirst for complete and > conscious self-possession, for fullness of life. And in terms of this its > central motive, the will defines the truth that it endlessly seeks as a > truth that possesses completeness, totality, self-possession, and there > fore absoluteness." > > J Royce - William James and other Essays on the Philosophy of Life > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
