Case -- You seem to be writing with greater clarity now, and I appreciate both your conciliatory tone and your willingness to "speak my language". In fact, I think I can honestly say that we are no longer adversaries, despite our different perspectives.
[Case]: > Yes, I understand the problem but I look at it this way: We as organisms > are > products of this environment. We arise from the stable conditions that > have > existed in this particular region of space and time for billions of years. > We are uniquely suited to this environment because we have been shaped by > it, to respond to it. Our senses provided us with reliable data because > without reliable information we could not survive. Existentially we are products of biological evolution. In the space/time persepective of finite experience, everything you say is true. Our orientation to the physical world is, indeed, necessary and practical for our active participation in this world. The brain and nervous system of a healthy person integrates experience to ensure that he or she is properly oriented to fintude. This is what makes metaphysics and ontological speculation such a difficult discipline. [Case]: > It is the task of each individual to subjectively take sensory input and > organize it internally into a model of "reality". These models are > constantly tested against the "other" and modified accordingly. Our models > are, as I said earlier, products of our biology and of our stored > experiences. > > Frequently there seems to be confusion over reality versus experience. We > as > beings-aware have access only to our internal models. As Pirsig points out > our senses necessarily are always of a reality that is in the past. We do > not directly experience reality. Rather we act as storage for sensory > representations of reality. > > One of the great tasks of humanity both individually and collectively is > to > sharpen our models and representations of the "other." We are not free to > construct arbitrary models that do not conform to the "other". Doing so > decreases the probability of survival radically. > > But we do have the capacity to use our internal models to reshape the > "other". This capacity has been increasing geometrically in the recent > past > so much so that most moderns live in worlds almost entirely constructed of > concretized ideas. > > So I would agree that each of us is the creator of our own internal worlds > but this construction is constrained by and aims to conform to the > mysterious "other". We are successful to the extent that our internal > representations are in harmony or at least not opposed to the "other". I assume you are referring to scientific and technological advances, or the application of intellectual constructs to improve the world materialistically. This isn't exactly what I meant by the individual's power to create the world. I'm not talking about building the Brooklyn bridge or solving Al Gore's global warming problem. As the measure of all things, man defines his representation of otherness in terms of the values he perceives. His psycho-emotional attitude toward these values literally determines his reality. [Case]; > Our internal representations are a product of our biology and our > stored experience. [Ham, previously]: > We remember what we experience. Experience is our awareness of other. > Horsepower is not "part of an automobile"; it is an intellectual construct > based upon physical principles of applied energy and force -- "manipulated > symbols" that constitute the objects of our thought. Likewise, red is not > part of an apple; it's the mental image that we see when light reflected > from an object is missing certain portions of the color spectrum. [Case]: > This notion of secondary attribute was recognized even by the early > empiricists like Locke if I am not mistaken. You are quite correct that > redness is not a property of apples as "other" but red is a property of > our > internal representation of apples. It is a property derived from or > perception of apples. My comments on redness and your response to them > illustrate the problem of confounding our internally accessible models of > "other" with the "other" itself. I am only saying that we have good reason > to have some level of confidence in our internal models as they usually > serve us quite well. When we fail to recognize that our models are not the > same as "other" we fall victim to what Dan refers to as illusion. But I > think it is equal mistaken to conclude that because we have access only to > the reflection of "other", "other" does not exist at all. You've misread me, Case. If anything can be said to exist it is "otherness". I defined existence as that which appears to occupy space or occur in time. I have problems with the common notion of the proprietary self as an "existent". I believe it is more akin to nothingness with an affinity for value, or to value itself. The primary attribute of proprietary awareness is its value sensibility. [Case]: > [Physiological testing devices] are measures of the physiological > processes > that generate our internal representation; just as red is not inherent in > apples > but points to something useful about apples. Such devices at best can only measure the "effects" of neuro-physiological activity; they can not project or plot the thinking process or our attitude with respect to specific ideas or thoughts. I suspect that the color red has very little "usefulness" as far as apples are concerned, unless it helps us choose the the ripe apples from the green or rotten ones in the grocer's bin. [Case]; > I have tried to use this terminology as best I can in the preceding. I > think > the distinction between 'other' on our illusion of 'other' is often hard > to > make and is seldom clear in our discussions. Yes, and it is most welcome. I must try to reciprocate. It makes communicating much more effective, avoiding time-consuming semantic arguments when it's the concept that we're trying to get across. [Ham, previously]: > ...Conventional explanations do not account for the subjective > factor whose origin is value sensibility. [Case]: > I guess I am just not convinced that it is missing from them either. > Experimental psychology and the neurosciences are specifically aimed at > it. Not sure I catch your drift here. Are you saying that the methodology of objective science may take into account the subjective factors of experience? Do you really think that is the aim of experimental psychology and neuroscience? Essentially, Ham moq_discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
