List, Gary F, Jack, Jon, I was gratified to see that there appears to be continued interest in the topic of Time on the List. I am quite familiar with Gary Fuhrman's and Jon Alan Schmidt's work in this area, both having made extenstive studies of Time, Jon from a specifically Peircean perspective, Gary employing a more general approach which includes Peirce's views.
Gary's book, *Turning Signs*, https://gnusystems.ca/TS/index.html#cnt is, in its 3rd and evidently final version, remarkable in many ways (including its unique structure, fairly obvious when you look at its 'Table of Contents'), and can be read as a whole (recommended -- I have read it twice in its entirety, and looked at many revised chapters over the years) or, for example, it's exciting to explore a topic, like Time, in it. And, as he remarked, Jon's paper, 'Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time' https://rdcu.be/b9xVm was worked out in part through a long series of off List exchanges with Gary Furhman and myself. In my view, in this paper Jon has shown rather convincingly that Time is central to Peirce's analysis of continuity and, therefore, to his philosophy as a whole, including his semeiotic. Jon's is a deep exploration of the theme of Time in Peirce such that I do not expect another such exhaustive inquiry into the topic to be made in the next decade or more. As is often the case in his work, Jon supports his analysis with many pertinent Peirce quotes. So, in a word, I would highly recommend both works to members of this forum. However, for now, and so that I don't exceed the daily limitation on posts, I'd like to respond to just a very few of the several interesting ideas expressed by Gary, Jack, and Jon. Hopefully, there will be much more to discuss going forward. Gary F wrote: "But it is possible to use the word “instant” as one of those “fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions” that he mentions in R 295 <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#gnofic>. Peirce does so in some places where it is not distinguished from a “moment” (i.e. a “lapse of time” of indeterminate length). " My sense, Gary, is that when Peirce uses the term 'instant' when referring to the 'moment' as a lapse of time -- which he certainly does on occasion -- that his language reverts to the colloquial; and in those occasions his seemingly conflating 'moment' and 'instant' does not represent scientific terminology. In my understanding, Peirce's uses 'instant' as one of those “fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions" when he is referring to the mathematical instant and not to the moment. This 'looseness' of language -- not distinguishing 'instant' from 'moment' -- can, in the sense in which either is to be used within a scientific context (say, mathematics or semeiotics) is unfortunate and can only lead to confusion. So, for philosophical purposes, I try never to conflate the two. Jack wrote: "Time . . is merely an "index" (in the general sense) and is entirely a posteriori." Rather, I would tend to strongly agree with Jon that "Time is not an existential subject. . . but rather a real law" -- so cannot be an index. As for your second short post, I would agree with you that Time is 'indivisible" in itself and as the epitome of continuity. Of course its 'passage' can be* analyzed* in various ways for particular purposes. (Btw, please keep to one post per thread each day; your 'lapse' was harmless, but I do not want it to set a precedent. ) Jon quoted Peirce: "Because time is continuous, it cannot be reduced to isolated instants — even the present is an indefinite stretch marked by constant change. The past keeps growing as future possibilities become actual in the present. . .(CP 7.653, 1903) In CP 7.653 one reads this passage which to my mind puts light on the instant/moment matter in the context of continuity. "Of course, if there is no such thing as an absolute instant, there is nothing absolutely present either temporarily or in the sense of confrontation. In fact, we are thus brought close to the doctrine of Synechism, which is that elements of Thirdness cannot entirely be escaped. The present moment will be a lapse of time, highly confrontitial, when looked at as a whole, seeming absolutely so, but when regarded closely, seen not to be absolutely so, its earlier parts being somewhat of the nature of memory, a little vague, and its later parts somewhat of the nature of anticipation, a little generalized. It contains a central part which is still more present, still more confrontitial, but which presents the same features. There is nothing at all that is absolutely confrontitial; although it is quite true that the confrontitial is continually flowing in upon us." CP 7.653 The final sentence above, "There is nothing at all that is absolutely confrontitial [in the present moment]; although it is quite true that the confrontitial is continually flowing in upon us" This seems somewhat puzzling at first, but a little tricategorial analysis begins to help make sense of it (at least for me). Trikonically diagramming the 'parts' of the moment viewed as "a lapse of time," one gets: *'Parts' of the Moment*: 2nd, 1ns, The central part: "still more *present*. . .confrontitial" (*but presenting "the same features"*) |> 3rd, 3ns, The later parts: "a little generalized" (like anticipation [like the future]) 1st, 2ns The earlier parts: "a little vague" (like memory [like the past GR]) So, it would appear from this analysis that the Moment follows the Vector of Determination: 2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns, like semiosis; also, induction in scientific experimentation. Does this seem right? I would like to take up the implications of continuity of time (and in the moment) in relations to semiosis. But that would have to be introduced in another thread. Best, Gary R On Mon, Jul 14, 2025 at 1:37 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., Gary F., Jack, List: > > I wrote an entire paper on a Peircean philosophy of time that might be of > interest (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm), much of it originally worked out in a > series of on- and off-List exchanges with both Garys. > > I agree with them that time does not *consist *of discrete instances, but > can be *marked off* with them as artificial limits between finite lapses > for purposes such as measurement. In that sense, time is *not *indivisible; > on the contrary, it is *infinitely *divisible--between any two > arbitrarily designated instants, no matter how small the interval between > them, *inexhaustibly many* additional instants could likewise be marked > off, at least in principle. In other words, time is *continuous *in > accordance with Peirce's late topical conception ( > https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPTC-2.pdf), resulting in the > "thickness" of the experienced present as an infinitesimal moment rather > than a durationless instant. In fact, time is the *paradigmatic *continuum, > such that the basis of synechism as a philosophical doctrine is in > phaneroscopy--simply observing the flow of time as it is constantly present > to the mind, as well as the phaneron itself as an undivided whole from > which we prescind predicates, hypostasize some of them into subjects, and > attribute others to those subjects in propositions. Attached are my slides > from a 10-minute presentation about this, which I gave for the Charles S. > Peirce Society a couple of years ago. > > I also agree with Gary F. that semiosis always takes time--as I have > suggested before, it is likewise a topical continuum from which we prescind > individual signs with their individual objects and interpretants as > artifacts of analysis; and just as time proceeds from the past through the > present toward the future, semiosis proceeds from the object through the > sign toward the interpretant. I further maintain that this is true not only > of those individual signs that we mark off, but also the entire universe as > one immense sign--it is proceeding from God the Creator as its dynamical > object in the infinite past, through every state of it at any measurable > point in time, toward God completely revealed as its final interpretant in > the infinite future (https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHSSA-42.pdf). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jul 14, 2025 at 11:26 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary F, List >> >> Gary would you agree that time, whatever it is, regarldess of symbolic >> standards, is likely what we call indivisible? >> >> Sorry for exceeding the one message per day quota. Will not reply again. >> Just think this short message relevant for list clarity. >> >> Best >> >> Jack >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on >> behalf of [email protected] <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Monday, July 14, 2025 5:10 PM >> *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]> >> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Alan Watts, Henri Bergson, and Charles Peirce >> (ans St. Augustine) on Time >> >> >> Gary R, list, >> >> I’m in full agreement with the idea that time as experienced or “lived” >> has “thickness,” i.e. that an “instant” conceived as a dimensionless >> mathematical point is a fiction; I explored some of the implications in the >> final >> chapter <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/crn.htm#tvbt> of *Turning Signs*. But >> it is possible to use the word “instant” as one of those “fictions >> recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions” that he mentions in R >> 295 <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#gnofic>. Peirce does so in some >> places where it is not distinguished from a “moment” (i.e. a “lapse of >> time” of indeterminate length). I included one of those quotes in a short >> text just recently refurbished in TS: Objecting and Realizing (TS ·12) >> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#sphnx>. >> >> The Peirce quotations there follow from the axiom that experiencing >> itself — like semiosis itself — always *takes time,* and that time is >> experienced as *continuous.* Coincidentally, Alan Watts’ remark about “*the >> idea of forgiving somebody*” is closely related to the whole point about >> “eyebeams” in which the Peirce texts are embedded … which begins here >> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#ybm>. >> >> Gary f. >> >> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >> >> https://substack.com/@gnox }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> >> >> >> >> *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On >> Behalf Of *Gary Richmond >> *Sent:* 13-Jul-25 21:27 >> *To:* Peirce List <[email protected]> >> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Alan Watts, Henri Bergson, and Charles Peirce (ans >> St. Augustine) on Time >> >> >> >> List, >> >> As I not infrequently have, I'm again thinking about 'lived' -- as >> opposed to 'mathematical' -- time. I've recently begun reviewing some of >> the writings of Alan Watts (I was once enamored of his thinking and, so, >> read all his books in my 20's) and came upon this snippet: >> >> “We must abandon completely the notion of blaming the past for any kind >> of situation we're in and reverse our thinking and see that the past always >> flows back from the present. That *now *is the creative point of life. >> So you see it's like the idea of forgiving somebody, you change the meaning >> of the past by doing that. . . Also watch the flow of music. The melody as >> it is expressed is changed by notes that come later. Just as the meaning of >> a sentence [is]. . . you wait till later to find out what the sentence >> means." Alan Watts >> >> This made me think that -- coming from very different philosophical >> traditions and positions -- Watts, Peirce, and Henri Bergson all challenge >> the idea that time is a chain of instants. Watts, drawing on Zen and Taoist >> ideas, argues that the present is centrally involved in a kind of living, >> flowing 'wave', the present not being a thin 'slice' of time, but the >> center of an unfolding process. Trying to pin it down, he holds, tends >> to kill its reality. >> >> Peirce agrees that the “instant” is but a mathematical fiction. For him, >> real time always has 'thickness' -- what he calls the triadic *moment* >> is for Peirce the 'minimum' of time, i.e., the smallest unit of *lived* >> time (and perhaps not only lived time) where the past flows into the >> present and reaches toward the future. This flow is vital to how signs and >> meaning unfold, every moment involving traces of what came before and, >> shall we say, 'hints' at what’s to come. >> >> Bergson’s famous idea of *durée* (duration) also holds that real time is >> an indivisible, qualitative flow — like a melody you hear as a whole, not >> as separate notes (both Peirce and Watts at times also use musical >> metaphors for time's flow). For Bergson, measurable clock-time is just a >> useful illusion that chops up something that can’t really be so chopped. In >> the end, all three argue that lived time, *real* time (in Peirce's sense >> of reality), is continuous, alive, and in many cases, felt, that it is >> never just a series of 'points on a line'. >> >> I'd be interested in forum members' thoughts on this idea of time. >> However, I always think of St. Augustine's comment on reflecting on time: >> "What is time then? If nobody asks me, I know; but if I were desirous to >> explain it to one that should ask me, plainly I do not know.” Best, >> >> Gary R >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
