Jon, List, JAS: I hope that your medical procedure this morning went well. GR: Thank you. It went well enough, so I'm hoping for the best results. We'll see. . .
JAS: (Quoting CSP and me): CSP: We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant. (NEM 3:126, c. 1893-5) GR: Here Peirce is seemingly combining colloquial language with scientific terminology--either that or the passage would be self-contradictory (which undoubtedly it is not). JAS: On the contrary, Peirce's terminology here is entirely scientific, and the passage is still not at all self-contradictory. GR: You are entirely correct. While no excuse, my error came in the context of Gary F's, your, and my noting that Peirce sometimes (but not here) *does* use 'instant' where the tripartite moment is meant (Gary F gave a good example of that, but there are a few). I rather rushed out a response to you when further thought would have avoided that error. Your 'deductive argumentation' was excellent. JAS: "GR: Jon quoted Peirce: "Because time is continuous, it cannot be reduced to isolated instants--even the present is an indefinite stretch marked by constant change. The past keeps growing as future possibilities become actual in the present." (CP 7.653, 1903)" .. . . JAS: Again, the statement that you quoted here is not in my paper, nor in any of Peirce's writings as far as I can tell, so I do not know your source for it. Is it perhaps your own brief summary of the portion of my paper that I subsequently quoted (pp. 253-6)? GR: As I mentioned above, I too rapidly/flippantly shot off my response to you having spent quite a bit of time on the Spencer-Brown post and wanting to get something posted in response to your post before my procedure was upon me. I do not recall consulting anything but your paper and the CP. It is, of course, not CP 7.653 which takes up the earlier/middle/later parts of the moment. It is unlikely that it is a summary of a portion of your paper as I don't recall doing that at all (it is a nice, concise thought on the past "growing as future possibilities become actual in the present," however). Perhaps it was something I drew from my Spencer-Brown post drafting (which process I haven't reviewed yet). For now, for me it remains a mystery. JAS: "GR: . . . "I have occasionally suggested that several vectors may be in effect at once in any given analysis." JAS: I heartily agree. Your vectors highlight the *relational *nature of Peirce's three categories--within each analysis, we associate one concept with 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns in accordance with how it relates to two *other *concepts--which facilitates characterizing phenomena from multiple perspectives. For example, I apply all six of them to time in my paper. - aspiration (2ns→3ns→1ns) - Our experience (2ns) of the past provides our knowledge (3ns) at the present, which is our basis for making conjectures (1ns) about the future. (p. 248) - process (1ns→3ns→2ns) - At any assignable date, the universe is constantly evolving (3ns) from being utterly indeterminate (1ns) in the infinite past toward being utterly determinate (2ns) in the infinite future. (p. 256) - analysis (3ns→2ns→1ns) - The continuity of time (3ns as reality) involves the continuity of reacting things (2ns as persistence) and the continuity of possible qualities (1ns as diversity). (p. 258) - determination (2ns →1ns→3ns) - The accomplished past (2ns) determines the nascent present (1ns) to determine the contingent future (3ns). (p. 259) - representation (3ns→1ns→2ns) - The constitution of being is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of real but indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). (p. 266) - order (1ns→2ns→3ns) - The temporal sequence of such "events of creation" consists of spontaneity (1ns) followed by reaction (2ns) and then habit-taking (3ns). (p. 266) GR: This is quite an extraordinary analysis, very much appreciated. It's clear that it's time for me to reread your "Temporal Synchism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm) as it's been several years since I last did so. Clearly, I've forgotten a lot! Best, Gary R On Thu, Jul 17, 2025 at 1:03 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I hope that your medical procedure this morning went well. I anticipate > replying to your post in the new thread later today. > > CSP: We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if > there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious > of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is > not an instant. (NEM 3:126, c. 1893-5) > > > GR: Here Peirce is seemingly combining colloquial language with scientific > terminology--either that or the passage would be self-contradictory (which > undoubtedly it is not). > > > On the contrary, Peirce's terminology here is entirely scientific, and the > passage is still not at all self-contradictory. This might be clearer if we > rearrange his statements into an obviously valid deductive argumentation > with three premisses and two conclusions that follow necessarily from them. > > - P1. If there be any such thing as an instant, then the present is an > instant. > - P2. In the present, we are conscious of the flow of time. > - P3. There is no flow in an instant. > - C1. Therefore (from P2 and P3), the present is not an instant. > - C2. Therefore (from P1 and C1 by *modus tollens*), there is no such > thing as an instant. > > The minimum of real/experienced/lived time, including the present, is an > indefinite *moment *of infinitesimal duration, not a discrete *instant *of > zero duration. Instants are *entia rationis* that we invented for > arbitrarily marking off lapses of time, not real parts of time itself. > > GR: Jon quoted Peirce: "Because time is continuous, it cannot be reduced > to isolated instants--even the present is an indefinite stretch marked by > constant change. The past keeps growing as future possibilities become > actual in the present." (CP 7.653, 1903) > > > JAS: Just for the record, these are not actually my words nor Peirce's, > although I agree with them. > > > GR: Am I missing something here? I offered not your words but the quote > from Peirce which you offered. > > > Again, the statement that you quoted here is not in my paper, nor in any > of Peirce's writings as far as I can tell, so I do not know your source for > it. Is it perhaps your own brief summary of the portion of my paper that I > subsequently quoted (pp. 253-6)? > > GR: There's more to be said here, but for now I would simply note that I > have occasionally suggested that several vectors may be in effect at once > in any given analysis. > > > I heartily agree. Your vectors highlight the *relational *nature of > Peirce's three categories--within each analysis, we associate one concept > with 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns in accordance with how it relates to two *other > *concepts--which > facilitates characterizing phenomena from multiple perspectives. For > example, I apply all six of them to time in my paper. > > - aspiration (2ns→3ns→1ns) - Our experience (2ns) of the past provides > our knowledge (3ns) at the present, which is our basis for making > conjectures (1ns) about the future. (p. 248) > - process (1ns→3ns→2ns) - At any assignable date, the universe is > constantly evolving (3ns) from being utterly indeterminate (1ns) in the > infinite past toward being utterly determinate (2ns) in the infinite > future. (p. 256) > - analysis (3ns→2ns→1ns) - The continuity of time (3ns as reality) > involves the continuity of reacting things (2ns as persistence) and the > continuity of possible qualities (1ns as diversity). (p. 258) > - determination (2ns →1ns→3ns) - The accomplished past (2ns) > determines the nascent present (1ns) to determine the contingent future > (3ns). (p. 259) > - representation (3ns→1ns→2ns) - The constitution of being is an > inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of real but indefinite possibilities (1ns), > some of which are actualized (2ns). (p. 266) > - order (1ns→2ns→3ns) - The temporal sequence of such "events of > creation" consists of spontaneity (1ns) followed by reaction (2ns) and then > habit-taking (3ns). (p. 266) > > Of course, I also note (p. 259) that the vector of determination likewise > applies to semiosis, where the object (2ns) determines the sign (1ns) to > determine the interpretant (3ns). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Jul 16, 2025 at 6:47 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> Just a few comments for now as I am preparing for a heart ablation >> tomorrow morning (6 a.m.) and spent much of my intellectual energy on my >> post today introducing a new -- albeit related -- thread. >> >> Jon wrote: "Perhaps his simplest argument against the *reality *of >> instants, and for the "thickness" of experienced time, is this >> phaneroscopic one." >> >> CSP: We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if >> there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious >> of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is >> not an instant. (NEM 3:126, c. 1893-5) >> >> >> Here Peirce is seemingly combining colloquial language with scientific >> terminology -- either that or the passage would be self-contradictory >> (which undoubtedly it is not). >> >> Jon: "I also agree that time *itself *is not an index, but our >> *measurement *of time is certainly indexical, involving comparison with >> arbitrary unit intervals--usually based on a convenient "cycle". . . In >> that sense, as I said before, time is not *indivisible *at all--on the >> contrary, it is *infinitely divisible*." >> >> So, again, time itself is not divisible, it is not an index -- *only* >> the measurement of it. I think there is a tendency of some to confuse the >> one with the other. Peirce's analysis of Time as the paradigmatic type of >> continuity as considered in your "Temporal Synechism" paper, ought to put >> an end to that confusion, at least for Peirceans. >> >> JAS quoting me quoting Jon quoting Peirce: "GR: Jon quoted Peirce: >> "Because time is continuous, it cannot be reduced to isolated >> instants--even the present is an indefinite stretch marked by constant >> change. The past keeps growing as future possibilities become actual in the >> present. (CP 7.653, 1903)" >> >> >> JAS: "Just for the record, these are not actually my words nor Peirce's, >> although I agree with them.' >> >> Am I missing something here? I offered not your words but the quote from >> Peirce which you offered. >> >> JAS: I further agree that analysis of the present moment from the >> "outside" suggests the same categorial vector of *determination *as >> exhibited by time overall (and semiosis)--"the accomplished past (2ns) >> determines the nascent present (1ns) to determine the contingent future >> (3ns)" (p. 259). However, Peirce's analysis of the present moment from the >> "inside" in CP 7.653 (1903) suggests instead the categorial vector of >> *order*--its earlier parts are "a little vague" (1ns), its central part >> is "confrontitial" (2ns), and its later parts are "a little generalized" >> (3ns).J >> >> There's more to be said here, but for now I would simply note that I have >> occasionally suggested that several vectors may be in effect at once in any >> given analysis. Thus, here, Peirce also associates the part that is "a >> little vague" with memory, and memory references the past (2ns) The >> interpenetration of different vectors in a given analysis may be worth some >> further research (I've only recently taken up that inquiry myself.) >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
