Gary R., Jack, List: Although Peirce carefully distinguishes a durationless "instant" from an infinitesimal "moment" and a finite "lapse" in many of his writings about time--I include quotations of various examples of this in my "Temporal Synechism" paper--I agree that he sometimes uses "instant" colloquially instead of scientifically/mathematically. Perhaps his simplest argument against the *reality *of instants, and for the "thickness" of experienced time, is this phaneroscopic one.
CSP: We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant. (NEM 3:126, c. 1893-5) About a decade later (NEM 3:1076-7, c. 1905), he identifies four classes of possible states of things based on when and how they are realized--momentary, prolonged, gradual, and relational--none of which are *instantaneous*, although each is defined analytically in terms of instants and their relations. I also agree that time *itself *is not an index, but our *measurement *of time is certainly indexical, involving comparison with arbitrary unit intervals--usually based on a convenient "cycle" for which we can detect regular recurrence, such as a year for one revolution of the earth around the sun or a day for one of its rotations about its axis. In that sense, as I said before, time is not *indivisible *at all--on the contrary, it is *infinitely divisible*. However, what I suspect that you both have in mind is the idea that time in itself is an *undivided *whole, not an assemblage of *distinct *parts. Consistent with Peirce's late topical conception of continuity, its parts are *indefinite *(moments) unless and until they are deliberately marked off (with instants as limits between lapses as portions) for some purpose. GR: Jon quoted Peirce: "Because time is continuous, it cannot be reduced to isolated instants--even the present is an indefinite stretch marked by constant change. The past keeps growing as future possibilities become actual in the present. (CP 7.653, 1903) Just for the record, these are not actually my words nor Peirce's, although I agree with them. As I say in my paper ... JAS: The upshot is that "[t]here is but one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906), which at the present is comprised of everything that is in the past ... There is a sense in which "the all of reality" is perpetually *growing *as indeterminate possibilities (1ns) and conditional necessities (3ns) of the future are constantly becoming determinate actualities (2ns) of the past ... The present is an *indefinitely *gradual state of change in its 1ns, an indefinitely gradual state of *change *in its 2ns, and an indefinitely *gradual *state of change in its 3ns. (pp. 253-6) I further agree that analysis of the present moment from the "outside" suggests the same categorial vector of *determination *as exhibited by time overall (and semiosis)--"the accomplished past (2ns) determines the nascent present (1ns) to determine the contingent future (3ns)" (p. 259). However, Peirce's analysis of the present moment from the "inside" in CP 7.653 (1903) suggests instead the categorial vector of *order*--its earlier parts are "a little vague" (1ns), its central part is "confrontitial" (2ns), and its later parts are "a little generalized" (3ns). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jul 16, 2025 at 1:46 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, List, > > Thank for that rather good post, Gary. I agree, that is, to drop the idea > of "index" qua "time". I suppose what I really meant is that the quality of > time is such that whenever it is measured it is indexical because we must > use some form of index (general) to measure it (symbolic standards). > Clumbsy phrasing, but not that time itself (whatever it is) is an index. > You call it a law (of some general necessary kind) and that seems fine with > me. > > I do agree, though, that it is indivisible — have also read each of Gary's > and Jon's work on the topic quite often though it has been some years and > is worth reading as each goes into detail. As for the second post — yes, > that won't happen again, was just eager to ask one question for sake of > list and was continued off-list. > > Thanks for the enlightening response. > > Jack > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Wednesday, July 16, 2025 12:50 AM > *To:* Peirce List <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Alan Watts, Henri Bergson, and Charles Peirce > (ans St. Augustine) on Time > > List, Gary F, Jack, Jon, > > I was gratified to see that there appears to be continued interest in the > topic of Time on the List. I am quite familiar with Gary Fuhrman's and Jon > Alan Schmidt's work in this area, both having made extenstive studies of > Time, Jon from a specifically Peircean perspective, Gary employing a > more general approach which includes Peirce's views. > > Gary's book, *Turning Signs*, https://gnusystems.ca/TS/index.html#cnt is, > in its 3rd and evidently final version, remarkable in many ways (including > its unique structure, fairly obvious when you look at its 'Table of > Contents'), and can be read as a whole (recommended -- I have read it twice > in its entirety, and looked at many revised chapters over the years) or, > for example, it's exciting to explore a topic, like Time, in it. > > And, as he remarked, Jon's paper, 'Temporal Synechism: A Peircean > Philosophy of Time' https://rdcu.be/b9xVm was worked out in part through > a long series of off List exchanges with Gary Furhman and myself. In my > view, in this paper Jon has shown rather convincingly that Time is central > to Peirce's analysis of continuity and, therefore, to his philosophy as a > whole, including his semeiotic. Jon's is a deep exploration of the theme of > Time in Peirce such that I do not expect another such exhaustive inquiry > into the topic to be made in the next decade or more. As is often the case > in his work, Jon supports his analysis with many pertinent Peirce quotes. > > So, in a word, I would highly recommend both works to members of this > forum. However, for now, and so that I don't exceed the daily limitation on > posts, I'd like to respond to just a very few of the several interesting > ideas expressed by Gary, Jack, and Jon. Hopefully, there will be much more > to discuss going forward. > > Gary F wrote: "But it is possible to use the word “instant” as one of > those “fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions” > that he mentions in R 295 <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#gnofic>. > Peirce does so in some places where it is not distinguished from a “moment” > (i.e. a “lapse of time” of indeterminate length). " > > My sense, Gary, is that when Peirce uses the term 'instant' when referring > to the 'moment' as a lapse of time -- which he certainly does on occasion > -- that his language reverts to the colloquial; and in those occasions his > seemingly conflating 'moment' and 'instant' does not represent scientific > terminology. In my understanding, Peirce's uses 'instant' as one of those > “fictions > recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions" when he is > referring to the mathematical instant and not to the moment. This > 'looseness' of language -- not distinguishing 'instant' from 'moment' -- > can, in the sense in which either is to be used within a scientific > context (say, mathematics or semeiotics) is unfortunate and can only lead > to confusion. So, for philosophical purposes, I try never to conflate the > two. > > Jack wrote: "Time . . is merely an "index" (in the general sense) and is > entirely a posteriori." Rather, I would tend to strongly agree with Jon > that "Time is not an existential subject. . . but rather a real law" -- > so cannot be an index. > > As for your second short post, I would agree with you that Time is > 'indivisible" in itself and as the epitome of continuity. Of course > its 'passage' can be* analyzed* in various ways for particular purposes. > (Btw, please keep to one post per thread each day; your 'lapse' was > harmless, but I do not want it to set a precedent. ) > > Jon quoted Peirce: "Because time is continuous, it cannot be reduced to > isolated instants — even the present is an indefinite stretch marked by > constant change. The past keeps growing as future possibilities become > actual in the present. . .(CP 7.653, 1903) > > In CP 7.653 one reads this passage which to my mind puts light on the > instant/moment matter in the context of continuity. > > "Of course, if there is no such thing as an absolute instant, there is > nothing absolutely present either temporarily or in the sense of > confrontation. In fact, we are thus brought close to the doctrine of > Synechism, which is that elements of Thirdness cannot entirely be escaped. > The present moment will be a lapse of time, highly confrontitial, when > looked at as a whole, seeming absolutely so, but when regarded closely, > seen not to be absolutely so, its earlier parts being somewhat of the > nature of memory, a little vague, and its later parts somewhat of the > nature of anticipation, a little generalized. It contains a central part > which is still more present, still more confrontitial, but which presents > the same features. There is nothing at all that is absolutely > confrontitial; although it is quite true that the confrontitial is > continually flowing in upon us." CP 7.653 > > The final sentence above, "There is nothing at all that is absolutely > confrontitial [in the present moment]; although it is quite true that the > confrontitial is continually flowing in upon us" This seems somewhat > puzzling at first, but a little tricategorial analysis begins to help make > sense of it (at least for me). > > Trikonically diagramming the 'parts' of the moment viewed as "a lapse of > time," one gets: > > *'Parts' of the Moment*: > 2nd, 1ns, The central part: "still more *present*. . .confrontitial" (*but > presenting "the same features"*) > |> 3rd, 3ns, The later parts: "a little generalized" (like anticipation > [like the future]) > 1st, 2ns The earlier parts: "a little vague" (like memory [like the past > GR]) > > So, it would appear from this analysis that the Moment follows the Vector > of Determination: 2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns, like semiosis; also, induction in > scientific experimentation. > > Does this seem right? > > I would like to take up the implications of continuity of time (and in the > moment) in relations to semiosis. But that would have to be introduced in > another thread. > > Best, > > Gary R >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
