Jon, List, That's alright, Jon, I didn't think you were being harsh so much as as you were perhaps adhereing to a rather rigorous Peircean standard (which I ought expect here).
Your further reply is valuable and helps me clarify other replies. Thanks, Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2025 6:39 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Alan Watts, Henri Bergson, and Charles Peirce (ans St. Augustine) on Time Jack, List: I did not intend to be harsh, just precise about definitions from a Peircean standpoint--meaning corresponds to the interpretant of a sign, not its object; identifying the sign's dynamical object is the role of its immediate object. For an index, this is true regardless of whether its relation with its dynamical object is existential (genuine), like smoke pointing to fire, or referential (degenerate), like a relative pronoun (CP 2.310, 1901). I am guessing that the standard technical terminology of contemporary linguistics is different, especially where a Saussurean approach is being employed. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Sun, Jul 20, 2025 at 5:35 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, List, Just on indexical meaning. I understand your point, but I think you are overly harsh. What I mean here is that I think you can understand precisely what Silverstein is getting at without requiring a "purely" orthodox reference delimitation. However, within that delimitation I would argue the following. Peirce's "pure index" (CP 2.306), as you state, forces attention to its object through existential connection without description - like smoke pointing to fire. However, Silverstein's entire point is that "wine talk" operates similarly: the register doesn't describe class but indexically points to it through pure usage, becoming a near-Peircean "degenerate index" (CP 2.283) where the connection is mediated by ideology rather than physics. The key parallel: 1. Peircean pure index: Direct, non-representational pointing (weathervane → wind) 2. Silversteinian indexical order: Mediated social pointing (wine talk → class) 3. Both rely on the sign's ability to "force attention to the object without describing it" (Peirce 1977:36) The difference lies in Silverstein's dialectical layering - where Peirce's indices gain ideological baggage through metapragmatic recursion. What remains Peircean is the core semiotic mechanism: indexical meaning emerges from connection rather than representation. Best Jack
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