Jon, List, JAS: I am not familiar enough with Spencer-Brown to say anything about his concept of "reentry" or its proposed application to semiosis, but I would like to offer some comments on other aspects of your post. GR: I read *Laws of Form* twice in two only slightly different editions, first in my 30's, when I couldn't make heads nor tails of it, and then many years later in my late 50's, perhaps early 60's, principally because references to it, and especially to the 'reentry' concept, had appeared in the work of Niklas Luhman on social systems theory (which didn't much interest me then, but which many of my colleagues were taken with) as as well as in Varela's and Maturana's work in developing the idea of *autopoiesis* (which very much interested me): the biosemiotic idea that living systems create and sustain themselves by continually *re-entering* (and sometimes reworking) their own patterns of distinction: that they are in some sense, self-producing and self-maintaining,
Spencer-Brown's basic idea seems to me to be that making a distinction is a fundamental creative act, and that once you have a distinction that the distinction can reenter into itself, the distinction becoming part of the system's operation. When Helmut introduced the concept, originally in the context of the nature of sign itself, I thought that the idea of reentry might have implications for Peircean semeiotics. Perhaps it does, but undoubtedly not in the sign/Sign context. GR: In footnote 22 of "Temporal Synechism" you note that Andre de Tienne asks the question "to what extent does the flow of time regulate the flow of signs, and to what extent does the flow of signs influence or determine the flow of time?" JAS: [. . .] My own starting point for answering it . . ."The close relationship between logical and temporal sequences suggests that the entire universe is a sign, specifically an argument. . . In short, the flow of time and the flow of signs are effectively one and the same--time is a true continuum because the entire universe is a true *semiosic *continuum. The latter is not only (like time) a *topical* continuum [. . .]; it is also a *hyperbolic *continuum, proceeding from an initial state in the infinite past toward a *different *final state in the infinite future, both of which are hypothetical limits that are never actually reached. GR: Yes, your -- being Peirce's -- position is quite clear. GR: Some argue, with considerable textual support from Peirce, that sign (representamen), object, and interpretant are but correlates within a triadic semiotic relation, others that the triadic relation itself *is *the Sign: that is, that one could argue that the Sign is not simply the representamen or the representamen plus its object, that the Sign is the whole triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant *ensemble* . JAS: As you and other List members are well aware, I am in the former camp and quite vociferously reject the latter position. As I see it, it is an even bigger terminological mistake than using "instant" colloquially instead of carefully distinguishing it from "moment," because it is even more conducive of conceptual confusion. The triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) "mediating," while "sign" designates its first corollate--*that which* represents the object for the interpretant, or (more generally) *that which* mediates between the object and the interpretant. GR: Yes, you've repeatedly argued in this manner, and I agree with you. GR: In this view [that the triadic relation itself *is *the Sign], these three elements together form an inseparable unity such that if any part were missing, the sign would be incomplete JAS: [. . . Rather] we should say. . . that *every *sign by definition *has *an object and (at least potentially) an interpretant, such that if either of these were missing, then *there would be no sign at all*. GR: Agreed. And although we've discussed it before, the idea that while most signs do tend to have an interpretent, some have one "at least potentially," is a topic which might be unpacked further, especially for those forum members who missed those discussion, since you continue "such that if either of these were missing, then there would be no sign at all." It seems to me that *all *signs have an immediate interpretant (the capacity to mean something), a sign *may* have a dynamical interpretent (if, say, someone actually finds and reads the message in a bottle), and that the final interpretant is it's meaning "in the long run" by an unlimited community over unlimited time (so only asymptotically approachable). Another way to say this is that *a sign must have the capacity to generate an interpretant to be a sign at all.* JAS: "[S]emiosis is no more built up of discrete signs--nor even discrete triadic relations--than time is built up of discrete instants, space is built up of discrete points, and motion is built up of discrete positions. GR: Agreed. GR: In this view, it is only as an analytical contrivance in speculative grammar that the distinction of object - sign - interpretant as correlates holds. JAS: With this, I happily agree. As you rightly noted, "the interpretant is itself most typically a new (or modified) sign," and Peirce also maintains that the object must likewise be of the nature of a sign. "Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought" (CP 1.538, 1903) GR: Thank you for the excellent group of quotations with which you concluded your message and which would seem to settle the matter. I have always found the last quote you offered, well, profound: "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable. ... This appears mystical and mysterious simply because we insist on remaining blind to what is plain, that there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol" (EP 2:324, NEM 4:262, 1901). And, as we've all learned, "Symbols grow." CP 2.302 Best, Gary R On Thu, Jul 17, 2025 at 6:13 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I am not familiar enough with Spencer-Brown to say anything about his > concept of "reentry" or its proposed application to semiosis, but I would > like to offer some comments on other aspects of your post. > > GR: In footnote 22 of "Temporal Synechism" you note that Andre de Tienne > asks the question "to what extent does the flow of time regulate the flow > of signs, and to what extent does the flow of signs influence or determine > the flow of time?" > > > As I also say in that footnote, De Tienne does not just pose this > question, he explores it in detail in a 2015 paper ( > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279513621_The_Flow_of_Time_and_the_Flow_of_Signs_A_Basis_for_Peirce's_Cosmosemiotics). > My own starting point for answering it is at the top of the next page > (260)--"The close relationship between logical and temporal sequences > suggests that the entire universe is a sign, specifically an argument: 'a > vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its > conclusions in living realities' (CP 5.119,EP 2:193, 1903)." In short, the > flow of time and the flow of signs are effectively one and the same--time > is a true continuum because the entire universe is a true *semiosic > *continuum. > The latter is not only (like time) a *topical* continuum, such that the > whole is ontologically prior to the parts, which are indefinite until > deliberately marked off for a purpose; it is also a *hyperbolic *continuum, > proceeding from an initial state in the infinite past toward a *different > *final state in the infinite future, both of which are hypothetical > limits that are never actually reached. > > GR: Some argue, with considerable textual support from Peirce, that sign > (representamen), object, and interpretant are but correlates within a > triadic semiotic relation, others that the triadic relation itself *is *the > Sign: that is, that one could argue that the Sign is not simply the > representamen or the representamen plus its object, that the Sign is the > whole triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant > *ensemble*. > > > As you and other List members are well aware, I am in the former camp and > quite vociferously reject the latter position. As I see it, it is an even > bigger terminological mistake than using "instant" colloquially instead of > carefully distinguishing it from "moment," because it is even more > conducive of conceptual confusion. The triadic relation is "representing" > or (more generally) "mediating," while "sign" designates its first > corollate--*that which* represents the object for the interpretant, or > (more generally) *that which* mediates between the object and the > interpretant. > > GR: In this view, these three elements together form an inseparable unity > such that if any part were missing, the sign would be incomplete > > > If this is the primary concern motivating the widespread misuse of "sign" > as referring to the triadic relation instead of its first correlate, then > there is a simple and much better alternative. Instead of saying > (incorrectly) that the absence of an object or interpretant renders the > sign "incomplete," we should say (correctly) that *every *sign by > definition *has *an object and (at least potentially) an interpretant, > such that if either of these were missing, then *there would be no sign > at all*. More specifically, I would say that every sign has a dynamical > object, an immediate object, an immediate interpretant, and a final > interpretant; the *only *correlate that (at least theoretically) could > *ever* be missing is a dynamical interpretant, i.e., an *actual *effect > of the sign (token). This is because the immediate object and immediate > interpretant are internal to the sign (type) itself, while the dynamical > object and final interpretant are the other two (external) correlates of > the *genuine *triadic relation of representing or (more generally) > mediating. > > GR: In Peirce’s semeiotic, the interpretant is itself most typically a new > (or modified) sign, so the triad continually regenerates itself in endless > semiosis. Seen this way, the Sign is not three static parts, but an active, > self-referential loop. > > > In my view, this description has it backwards (bottom-up)--again, I > maintain that the continuous whole is ontologically prior to its parts > (top-down), which are indefinite until deliberately marked off for a > purpose. The first step is *prescinding *an individual sign of interest > from the real and continuous process of semiosis, followed by identifying > the other correlates of its triadic relation. These are "static parts" of > semiosis only in the same hypothetical (but useful) sense that instants are > "static parts" of time, points are "static parts" of space, and positions > are "static parts" of motion--not real parts, but *entia rationis*. Put > another way, semiosis is no more built up of discrete signs--nor even > discrete triadic relations--than time is built up of discrete instants, > space is built up of discrete points, and motion is built up of discrete > positions. > > GR: Thus, from the standpoint of 'reentry', the sign is the living triadic > distinction continually folding back on itself--*not *a static correlate, > but a process. > > > This is another unfortunate conflation of two distinct concepts--as Ben U. > already pointed out, "semiosis" is the term for the real and continuous > *process*, while "sign" is the term for the first *correlate *prescinded > from it as an individual artifact of analysis. > > GR: In this view, it is only as an analytical contrivance in speculative > grammar that the distinction of object - sign - interpretant as correlates > holds. > > > With this, I happily agree. As you rightly noted, "the interpretant is > itself most typically a new (or modified) sign," and Peirce also maintains > that the object must likewise be of the nature a sign. "Every sign stands > for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that > object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or > thought" (CP 1.538, 1903). "Whatever is capable of being represented is > itself of a representative nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). "Thus, it is said to > be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented by the > sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, should > itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not > independent of *all *representation" (EP 2:328, 1904). In short, although > "*really being* and *being represented* are very different" (EP 2:303, > NEM 4:239, 1901), really being and being representable--and thus being of > the nature of a sign--are the same. "The very entelechy of being lies in > being representable. ... This appears mystical and mysterious simply > because we insist on remaining blind to what is plain, that there can be no > reality which has not the life of a symbol" (EP 2:324, NEM 4:262, 1901). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Jul 16, 2025 at 5:39 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> In footnote 22 of "Temporal Synechism" you note that Andre de Tienne >> asks the question "to what extent does the flow of time regulate the flow >> of signs, and to what extent does the flow of signs influence or determine >> the flow of time?" This post is meant to begin a discussion of that >> question. >> >> Several days ago I had an off List exchange with Helmut Ralien which >> included some comments of mine on an earlier Peirce-L post of his in which >> he introduced the Spencer-Brown concept of 'reentry' into a discussion of >> whether the sign (hereafter I'll use lowercase 'sign' to mean >> 'representamen') was a mere correlate within the object - sign - >> interpretant triad, or whether *the triad itself in toto* constituted >> the Sign (uppercase 'Sign' standing for that idea in this post). >> >> I thought his introduction of Spencer-Brown's notion into the discussion >> was brilliant, but I had some trouble following it. So, I made a few >> suggestions as to how it might otherwise be approached. Here, with some >> modifications related to the content of the recent thread on Time, is my >> suggestion of an approach to the Spencer-Brown 'reentry' idea. >> >> Some argue, with considerable textual support from Peirce, that sign >> (representamen), object, and interpretant are but correlates within a >> triadic semiotic relation, others that the triadic relation itself *is* the >> Sign: that is, that one could argue that the Sign is not simply the >> representamen or the representamen plus its object, that the Sign is the >> whole triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant >> *ensemble.* In this view, these three elements together form an >> inseparable unity such that if any part were missing, the sign would be >> incomplete -- just as, if it were possible (which it obviously is not), if >> any of the three 'parts' of a temporal "durée" were to be missing, >> there would be no Time. >> >> Spencer-Brown’s concept of 'reentry' might help clarify the matter by >> showing how a distinction can fold back into itself. In *Laws of Form*, >> 'reentry' means that a distinction reenters the space it marks, creating >> self-reference and recursion. In Peirce’s semeiotic, the interpretant is >> itself most typically a new (or modified) sign, so the triad continually >> regenerates itself in endless semiosis. >> >> Seen this way, the Sign is *no*t three static parts, but an active, >> self-referential loop. Reentry suggests that what makes a Sign is not the >> mere coexistence of sign, object, and interpretant, but *the dynamic >> process of the triadic relation reentering itself through the production of >> further interpretants. Thus, from the standpoint of 'reentry', the sign is >> the living triadic distinction continually folding back on itself -- not a >> static correlate, but a process.* >> >> In this view, it is only as an analytical contrivance in speculative >> grammar that the distinction of object - sign - interpretant as correlates >> holds. Rather, as it is in the *analysis *of Time, the central 'part' of >> the object - representamen - interpretant triad is 'more present'. That is >> all. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iu.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
