Gary R., List: GR: It seems to me that *all *signs have an immediate interpretant (the capacity to mean something), a sign *may* have a dynamical interpretent (if, say, someone actually finds and reads the message in a bottle), and that the final interpretant is its meaning "in the long run" by an unlimited community over unlimited time (so only asymptotically approachable). Another way to say this is that *a sign must have the capacity to generate an interpretant to be a sign at all.*
Yes, this is very well said. My only mild reservation is that it again seems to be looking at semiosis from the bottom-up (not top-down) perspective, but it is mitigated by our agreement that doing so is merely "an analytical contrivance in speculative grammar." GR: I have always found the last quote you offered, well, profound: "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable. ... This appears mystical and mysterious simply because we insist on remaining blind to what is plain, that there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol" (EP 2:324, NEM 4:262, 1901). I have found it increasingly profound myself in recent years, because it expresses the fundamental *ontological* upshot of semiosic synechism. Quine famously stated, "To be is to be the value of a bound variable"; but I suggest instead that to be is to be the possible dynamical object of a sign--whatever is, in any of the three Universes of Experience, is capable of being represented, and therefore itself of the nature of a sign. As I see it, this is a refinement of Peirce's objective idealism--instead of a *substance *ontology in which "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293, 1891), it is a *process *ontology in which discrete things and their dyadic reactions are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis. I am still trying to work out the full implications in my own mind and would welcome further discussion accordingly, which is why I started another new thread. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jul 18, 2025 at 4:50 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > JAS: I am not familiar enough with Spencer-Brown to say anything about his > concept of "reentry" or its proposed application to semiosis, but I would > like to offer some comments on other aspects of your post. > GR: I read *Laws of Form* twice in two only slightly different editions, > first in my 30's, when I couldn't make heads nor tails of it, and then many > years later in my late 50's, perhaps early 60's, principally because > references to it, and especially to the 'reentry' concept, had appeared in > the work of Niklas Luhman on social systems theory (which didn't much > interest me then, but which many of my colleagues were taken with) as as > well as in Varela's and Maturana's work in developing the idea of > *autopoiesis* (which very much interested me): the biosemiotic idea that > living systems create and sustain themselves by continually *re-entering* (and > sometimes reworking) their own patterns of distinction: that they are in > some sense, self-producing and self-maintaining, > > Spencer-Brown's basic idea seems to me to be that making a distinction is > a fundamental creative act, and that once you have a distinction that the > distinction can reenter into itself, the distinction becoming part of the > system's operation. When Helmut introduced the concept, originally in the > context of the nature of sign itself, I thought that the idea of reentry > might have implications for Peircean semeiotics. Perhaps it does, but > undoubtedly not in the sign/Sign context. > > GR: In footnote 22 of "Temporal Synechism" you note that Andre de Tienne > asks the question "to what extent does the flow of time regulate the flow > of signs, and to what extent does the flow of signs influence or determine > the flow of time?" > > > JAS: [. . .] My own starting point for answering it . . ."The close > relationship between logical and temporal sequences suggests that the > entire universe is a sign, specifically an argument. . . In short, the flow > of time and the flow of signs are effectively one and the same--time is a > true continuum because the entire universe is a true *semiosic *continuum. > The latter is not only (like time) a *topical* continuum [. . .]; it is > also a *hyperbolic *continuum, proceeding from an initial state in the > infinite past toward a *different *final state in the infinite future, > both of which are hypothetical limits that are never actually reached. > > > GR: Yes, your -- being Peirce's -- position is quite clear. > > GR: Some argue, with considerable textual support from Peirce, that sign > (representamen), object, and interpretant are but correlates within a > triadic semiotic relation, others that the triadic relation itself *is *the > Sign: that is, that one could argue that the Sign is not simply the > representamen or the representamen plus its object, that the Sign is the > whole triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant > *ensemble*. > > > JAS: As you and other List members are well aware, I am in the former camp > and quite vociferously reject the latter position. As I see it, it is an > even bigger terminological mistake than using "instant" colloquially > instead of carefully distinguishing it from "moment," because it is even > more conducive of conceptual confusion. The triadic relation is > "representing" or (more generally) "mediating," while "sign" designates its > first corollate--*that which* represents the object for the interpretant, > or (more generally) *that which* mediates between the object and the > interpretant. > > > GR: Yes, you've repeatedly argued in this manner, and I agree with you. > > GR: In this view [that the triadic relation itself *is *the Sign], these > three elements together form an inseparable unity such that if any part > were missing, the sign would be incomplete > > > JAS: [. . . Rather] we should say. . . that *every *sign by definition > *has *an object and (at least potentially) an interpretant, such that if > either of these were missing, then *there would be no sign at all*. > > > GR: Agreed. And although we've discussed it before, the idea that while > most signs do tend to have an interpretent, some have one "at least > potentially," is a topic which might be unpacked further, especially for > those forum members who missed those discussion, since you continue "such > that if either of these were missing, then there would be no sign at all." > It seems to me that *all *signs have an immediate interpretant (the > capacity to mean something), a sign *may* have a dynamical interpretent > (if, say, someone actually finds and reads the message in a bottle), and > that the final interpretant is it's meaning "in the long run" by an > unlimited community over unlimited time (so only asymptotically > approachable). Another way to say this is that > *a sign must have the capacity to generate an interpretant to be a sign at > all.* > > > JAS: "[S]emiosis is no more built up of discrete signs--nor even discrete > triadic relations--than time is built up of discrete instants, space is > built up of discrete points, and motion is built up of discrete positions. > > > GR: Agreed. > > > GR: In this view, it is only as an analytical contrivance in speculative > grammar that the distinction of object - sign - interpretant as correlates > holds. > > > JAS: With this, I happily agree. As you rightly noted, "the interpretant > is itself most typically a new (or modified) sign," and Peirce also > maintains that the object must likewise be of the nature of a sign. "Every > sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign > of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign > or thought" (CP 1.538, 1903) > > > GR: Thank you for the excellent group of quotations with which you > concluded your message and which would seem to settle the matter. I have > always found the last quote you offered, well, profound: > > "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable. ... This appears > mystical and mysterious simply because we insist on remaining blind to what > is plain, that there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol" > (EP 2:324, NEM 4:262, 1901). > > And, as we've all learned, "Symbols grow." CP 2.302 > > Best, > > Gary R >
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