Gary F., Jack, Helmut, Ivar, List: Gary F. and Jack seem to have missed the point of my first two posts in this thread, so perhaps I was insufficiently clear in them. Again, what I am proposing is that the entire universe is a vast semiosic continuum, signs all the way down. After all, "There is a science of semeiotics whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion than do those of mathematics, and one of its theorems … is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign … and the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). However, I do not mean this in the *reductionist *sense, where the whole is an assemblage of discrete parts; on the contrary, in accordance with Peirce's late topical conception of continuity, the whole is ontologically primordial and "every part has itself parts of the same kind" (CP 6.168, c. 1903-4). As I said before, the upshot is that discrete things and their dyadic reactions are *degenerate *manifestations of continuous and triadic semiosis.
I am not sure that I agree about Peirce not being "a systems thinker," but in any case, I doubt that he would accept the substitution of "system" for "person" as that upon which "a Sign ... determines an effect" (EP 2:478, 1908 Dec 23). Instead, as Helmut noted, he sometimes substitutes "quasi-mind" for "person," presumably in an effort toward "making [his] own broader conception understood." For example ... CSP: [E]very sign,--or, at any rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general nature of a mind, which we may call the 'quasi-mind.'" ... A sign ... is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. ... It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding that determination as the sign. (EP 2:389-92, 1906) CSP: Now as every thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a determination of a quasi-mind. This quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign. (SS 195, 1906 Mar 9) CSP: [A] Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. ... For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. (CP 4.536&551, 1906) Some signs are external to all *individual *minds, but every sign and its interpretant are determinations of quasi-minds. Accordingly, I maintain that the entire universe satisfies Peirce's definition of a "perfect sign," and is thus itself a "quasi-mind." CSP: Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself. ... Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. ... This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. (EP 2:545n25, 1906) As a quasi-mind, the entire universe *involves *possible qualities (1ns), actual events (2ns), and real laws (3ns). While I agree that my billiard ball example is "a case of purely dyadic efficient causality," again, Peirce himself says that "the dyadic action is not the whole action; and the whole action is, in a way, triadic" (CP 6.331, 1907)--it is *governed *by a real law as a *final *cause, i.e., a final interpretant. "[I]nstead of being a purely negative critic, like Hume, seeking to annul a fundamental conception generally admitted, I am a positive critic, pleading for the admission to a place in our scheme of the universe for an idea generally rejected. ... All that Hume attacked I defend, namely, law as a reality" (CP 6.605, 1893). Peirce thus *denies *that "final causality is [only] about needs of an organism"; on the contrary, "It is ... a widespread error to think that a 'final cause' is necessarily a purpose. A purpose is merely that form of final cause which is most familiar to our experience" (CP 1.211, EP 2:120, 1902). Instead, "Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final causation is that kind of causation whereby the whole calls out its parts. Final causation without efficient causation is helpless ... Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than helpless, by far; ... it is blank nothing" (CP 1.220, 1902). Ivar has posed some specific questions that I would prefer to address in a separate post, but I will comply with the moderator's current limit of one per day per thread. I will also not effectively circumvent that rule by making this post even longer than it already is, especially since I hope that what I have written above can at least serve as a start toward providing my answers. Please let me know what (if anything) remains unclear or otherwise warrants further discussion. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jul 21, 2025 at 10:43 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., Jon, List, > > I think, in every semiosis there is always a person. Efficient causality > is due to universal laws, so the person is the universe (plus the other, > higher aspects of God´s, I´d say, as a panentheist, which I maybe am, but > my outline works with theism too, then God is the person, and the universe > His creation with a quasi-mind, not a mind, instead of being a part of > His). Final causality is about needs of an organism, these needs are the > same throughout the organism´s species, so the person in this case is the > organism´s species. The species turns habits into (kinda) laws via the > evolution of DNA. The (e.g. plant-) species is a CAS capable of > representation, but the individual (e.g. plant) isn´t. Voluntary or > exemplaric causality is about wishes of an animal with a brain, so the > person is the individual, whose brain is able of representation. There is > the universe, the species, and the individual. Efficient causation is > genuine in the universe as system of interpretance, and degenerate in the > other two. Final causality is genuine in the species, and voluntary > causation is genuine in the individual`s nervous system. Final causation is > degenerate in the universe (indexical), voluntary (example-) causation is > doubly degenerate in the universe (iconical: depicting brain-cortex). When > the brain is capable not only of iconical representation, but of indexical > or even symbolical thought too, degeneracy within the universe partially > decreases somehow, call this some kind of secularized religion, but > universal degeneracy of the individual will never end, because humans > cannot become God, but all becomes more complex and complicated, perhaps to > be elaborated later on. This is my pansemiotic work-hypothesis. > > Best regards, Helmut > On Mon, Jul 21, 2025 at 8:30 AM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F, Jon, List, > > "Your billiard-ball example strikes me as a case of purely dyadic > efficient causality, missing the other aspects of causality that Peirce > (following Aristotle) recognized, and I think those other aspects of > causality are essential to semiosic determination." > > I'm not as advanced in Peircean studies as some of you here are — that is, > I have spent a long time analyzing and reading (also writing about) Peirce, > but I recognize ten years in my case might be a fraction of the 30 or 20 or > however many years others have spent and at varying intensities. > > But I did want to point out that the most famous billiard ball example > comes from David Hume (in philosophy and regarding what is or is not > necessary and causal). > > *He uses the example of one billiard ball striking another to illustrate > that we do not observe necessary connection — we only see constant > conjunction (one event regularly following another) and come to expect the > outcome, but we do not perceive a power or force that links them.* > > *Here is the relevant passage in full from the 1748 version of the > Enquiry:* > > * "When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the > operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover > any power or necessary connexion; any quality which binds the effect to the > cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only > find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of > one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole > that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward > impression from this succession of objects: consequently, there is not, in > any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can > suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion."* > > *And a further elaboration:* > > * "Suppose a body struck, such as a billiard-ball, lies before us: > suppose also we have never seen any motion or communication of motion > between bodies. We apply our hand to it, and it moves. This is a new > experience. We try another body of like shape and size; it also moves upon > impulse. Repeating this experiment a hundred times, we find, that in > proportion as the impulse is stronger, the motion is more rapid. From all > this, we conclude that there is a connexion between the impulse and motion. > But still it is only after having observed the constant conjunction of > similar events, that we form the idea of causation."* > > Hume, David. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. 1748. > > I've merely quoted a quick "grab" from an AI thing because I couldn't > remember the page (the citation from that is in Blue/Bold). > > Best > > Jack > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of [email protected] <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, July 21, 2025 12:45 PM > *To:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Ontology (was Spencer-Brown's concept > of 'reentry') > > > Jon, list, > > CSP (EP2:478, 1908): “I define a Sign as anything which is so determined > by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a > person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby > mediately determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a > sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception > understood.” > > Jon, your “working hypothesis” “that any dyadic reaction between discrete > things can be conceived as an occurrence of such an event of semiosis” > (with its billiard-ball example) seems to go as far as possible — and maybe > farther — in eliminating the last vestige of “personhood” from semiosic > ontology. > > I think Peirce was definitely a process philosopher, but he was not a > *systems* thinker. His sop to Cerberus would have been unnecessary if he > had just written that the Sign determines an effect *upon a system* which > is the Interpretant (or triad of interpretants, if you like). Personally I > think it would have to be a *self-organizing system* (or *complex > adaptive system*) in order for the Sign to *mean* anything. Stan Salthe > used to call it a “system of interpretance.” Your billiard-ball example > strikes me as a case of purely dyadic efficient causality, missing the > other aspects of causality that Peirce (following Aristotle) recognized, > and I think those other aspects of causality are essential to semiosic > determination. > > Love, gary f. > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > } To seek Buddhahood apart from living beings is like seeking echoes by > silencing sounds. [Layman Hsiang] { > > substack.com/@gnox }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> >
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