List:

JAS: As I see it, this is a refinement of Peirce's objective
idealism--instead of a *substance *ontology in which "matter is effete
mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293, 1891),
it is a *process *ontology in which discrete things and their dyadic
reactions are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.


To elaborate on this a bit more, every triadic relation *involves *dyadic
relations between different pairs of its three correlates; a *genuine *triadic
relation is not reducible to those dyadic relations, while a
*degenerate *triadic
relation is so reducible. The three correlates of the *genuine *triadic
relation of representing or (more generally) mediating are the sign (S),
its *dynamical *object (Od), and its *final *interpretant (If); and it
involves, but is not reducible to, the dyadic S-Od and S-If relations. That
is why there are trichotomies for classifying signs according to them in
Peirce's various taxonomies--icon/index/symbol for S-Od, and
rheme/dicisign/argument (or seme/pheme/delome) for S-If.

On the other hand, an individual *event *of semiosis happens when a
dynamical object determines a sign *token *to determine a *dynamical
*interpretant
(Id)--an *actual *sign produces an *actual *effect. This is a
*degenerate *triadic
relation, reducible to those two dyadic relations. Peirce's later
taxonomies include another trichotomy for classifying signs according to
the S-Id relation--presented/urged/submitted (or
suggestive/imperative/indicative), corresponding to the sign's "manner of
appeal" (CP 8.338, SS 34-5, 1904 Oct 12; EP 2:490, 1908 Dec 25). My working
hypothesis is that any dyadic reaction between discrete things can be
conceived as an occurrence of such an event of semiosis.

For example, when a moving billiard ball collides with a stationary
billiard ball, that impact is a sign token, the previous momentum of the
first ball is its dynamical object, and the subsequent momentum of the two
balls is its dynamical interpretant. The sign token is an index because the
S-Od relation is an existential connection, and an urged imperative because
the S-Id relation is compulsive. It is also a dicisign or pheme because the
S-If relation is isomorphic to that of a conditional proposition with
antecedent and consequent--the collision is *governed *by a physical law.
In Peirce's words ...

CSP: Any dynamic action--say, the attraction by one particle of another--is
in itself *dyadic*. ... However, the dyadic action is not the whole action;
and the whole action is, in a way, triadic. ... That whatever action is
brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned with the result of it is purely
dyadic is either demonstrable or is too evident to be demonstrable. But in
case that dyadic action is merely a member of a triadic action, then so far
from its furnishing the least shade of presumption that all the action in
the physical universe is dyadic, on the contrary, the entire and triadic
action justifies a guess that there may be other and more marked examples
in the universe of the triadic pattern. (CP 6.330-2, 1907)


Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Jul 18, 2025 at 9:04 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR: It seems to me that *all *signs have an immediate interpretant (the
> capacity to mean something), a sign *may* have a dynamical interpretent
> (if, say, someone actually finds and reads the message in a bottle), and
> that the final interpretant is its meaning "in the long run" by an
> unlimited community over unlimited time (so only asymptotically
> approachable).  Another way to say this is that *a sign must have the
> capacity to generate an interpretant to be a sign at all.*
>
>
> Yes, this is very well said. My only mild reservation is that it again
> seems to be looking at semiosis from the bottom-up (not top-down)
> perspective, but it is mitigated by our agreement that doing so is merely "an
> analytical contrivance in speculative grammar."
>
> GR: I have always found the last quote you offered, well, profound: "The
> very entelechy of being lies in being representable. ... This appears
> mystical and mysterious simply because we insist on remaining blind to what
> is plain, that there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol"
> (EP 2:324, NEM 4:262, 1901).
>
>
> I have found it increasingly profound myself in recent years, because it
> expresses the fundamental *ontological* upshot of semiosic synechism.
> Quine famously stated, "To be is to be the value of a bound variable"; but
> I suggest instead that to be is to be the possible dynamical object of a
> sign--whatever is, in any of the three Universes of Experience, is capable
> of being represented, and therefore itself of the nature of a sign. As I
> see it, this is a refinement of Peirce's objective idealism--instead of a 
> *substance
> *ontology in which "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
> physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293, 1891), it is a *process *ontology in
> which discrete things and their dyadic reactions are degenerate outcomes of
> continuous and triadic semiosis.
>
> I am still trying to work out the full implications in my own mind and
> would welcome further discussion accordingly, which is why I started
> another new thread.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>>
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