List, Jerry,Jack, Again, I need to define terms.- the External Object and the Dynamic Object:
The Dynamic Object is, in my understanding, the 2nd correlate of the Peircean triad [ DO-R-I] . The triadic process begins within the sign-unit or sign-vehicle which holds the Representamen or knowledge base of ‘mediation. The Representamen picks up data from the External Object which data then becomes known as the Dynamic Object. See Peirce’s well known outline of the weather 8.314, where he writes; “This is a sign, whose Object, as expressed is the weather at the that time, but whose dynamical Object is the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window curtains. “ [Note; In this example, the sign unit or sign-vehicle is either Peirce or Mrs. Peirce and my emphasis points out the External Object ]. And “By the way, the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception, but including more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual experience” EPII, p 478 Note – the External Object is ‘the weather at the time’, while the DO is the 2nd correlate of the semiosic triad, the ‘impression of that External ‘weather at the time’. There” are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those reals affect our senses according to regular laws, ….5.384. This is a definition of the External Object. Now- as to Ethics – I’m not sure how it fits in with my comparative outline of Thirdness as ’genuine’ [pure] or degenerate[ affiliated with Secondness and/or Firstness]. I would say only that Ethics is as pointed out in 5.34 is a ‘normative science’ that differentiates between good and bad- and, in particular, uses ” efforts of will’ – which obviously has to mean that it involves Secondness or indexicality. Or- one could conclude that analysis based on ethics is Thirdness-as-Secondness, because it considers the pragmatic effects of the semiosic interaction. Edwina > On Sep 15, 2025, at 2:56 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Jack, Edwina, list, other people, > > Where do you stand with respect to the bold assertion by Peirce in CP 5.36? > He seems to indicate that your problem is an old problem. > What is it you admire of Ethics? What is its secret (ART 57, or do I mean > ART 37)? > I mean, is esthetics only for imbeciles or the useless- merely a matter we > desire to forget? > > But we cannot get any clue to the secret of Ethics > -- a most entrancing field of thought but soon broadcast with pitfalls - > until we have first made up our formula for what it is that we are prepared > to admire. > I do not care what doctrine of ethics be embraced, it will always be so. > (CP 5.36). > > Best, > Jerry Rhee > > “It was this turn in which I thought the poets had preceded him, > for it had always been a puzzle to me how the principle of telling lies like > the truth, > upon which all of Greek poetry rests, could precede the telling of the truth, > for it seemed obvious to me, as it had to Socrates, > that one cannot lie knowingly unless one knows the truth.” > > On Mon, Sep 15, 2025 at 1:26 PM Jack Cody <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Edwina, List, >> >> ME: "I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an "ethical >> understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to ourselves and among >> each other, is the only practical constant that remains regardless of one's >> view of the universe or particular physical/metaphysical understanding. >> That's where I locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby ideal is not >> idealism but necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of the term." >> >> ----------------------------------- >> >> I'd like to press the above in the context of "dynamic object(s)". If one >> assumes "convergence" within Peirce's system, it seems evident to me that >> one has to pay the price, small or large, of the dynamic(al) object insofar >> as I understand that (almost as static, if not quite, or literally, static). >> >> Which leads to me to reject for the moment the idea of positivist knowledge >> with respect to things which may or may not be known, ever, and rather >> pragmatically relocate the debate within the most fundamental dialectic we >> have: "ethics". >> >> Though many books have been written on ethics, I do not believe a thousand >> years makes much of a difference (or an infinite period at that) with >> respect to the idea that "Murder is false/entirely wrong" (that harm >> inflicted, generally, is almost always, if not always, false/wrong). With >> that in mind, one must surely conclude that the Dynamic Object of that >> "moral judgement" is already "known" and is scarcely possible that we could >> know "why" any more in an infinite period than we already do? >> >> That is, we can argue catechism until the cows come home but we all surely >> know, innately (I sense arguments?), that these things are just "wrong". I >> see no value in infinite inquiry here —that is, no one is coming along with >> a "...and to murder was wrong because..." revelation which overrides basic >> innate moral instinct (or judgement) as we already have it. >> >> And thus, no matter what, I really do think ethics, as the most truthful way >> in which to treat one's self and lifeforms around one, is always "constant" >> —all ideas regarding the make-up of the universe or the atom (much the >> same?) do nothing to the idea (not really an idea, for surely this must >> emerge from pure firstness which, though technically "possible" in Peirce, >> may, in prohibition terms be said to be a "resource" which when required, >> one can draw on, and thus always actual and possible without contradiction) >> —do nothing to the idea that, practically, we already have a constant, which >> in global terms, we treat as if it scarcely existed (ETHICS). >> >> I've long since assumed that literalist versions of Plato's Cave aside, the >> only actual question in such situations, (an actually genuine "solution"), >> is ethics. It can be nothing else. And so, from >> firstness-soundness-thirdness, DO/Inf Inq, all to/through ethics. >> >> There is a better response in what I've said there —even the germs of a >> paper, but I wanted to make a brief contribution and I think a truthful one >> (I would like to hear people's opinions on the idea that truthful ethics is >> always universal, that is, not nominalist, and already, in so many respects, >> decided/determined, if not actualized —which is where one might cite >> "inquiry"? Though I maintain that 99% of all ethical principles one needs >> are basically innate and stem from the idea, never selfish, that none ought >> be able to do "one" harm ("learned" as a child...). We merely extend that to >> other people —though as a global society, despite everyone knowing these >> things, and knowing them insofar as they ever will, we seem rather crap at >> enforcing it consistently (we are antediluvian in this respect). >> >> Best, >> Jack >> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on >> behalf of Jack Cody <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2025 6:21 PM >> To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>>; Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function >> >> Edwina, List, >> >> I think that post is very well done. Precise epistemological location and >> also a clearly articulated view of what thirdness is with respect to >> nominalism and realism, respectively. >> >> I'll have a think over that but I consider it a potentially very interesting >> start from which to hear other people's views. I think the >> descriptions/definitions are important as otherwise we're talking around >> each other. >> >> I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an "ethical >> understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to ourselves and among >> each other, is the only practical constant that remains regardless of one's >> view of the universe or particular physical/metaphysical understanding. >> That's where I locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby ideal is not >> idealism but necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of the term. >> >> Best >> Jack >> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on >> behalf of Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2025 3:33 PM >> To: Gary Richmond <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Cc: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; edwina >> taborsky <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function >> >> Thirdness and its Function >> >> 1] I think a discussion of whether or not someone is a ‘nominalist’ vs a >> ‘scholastic realist’ can be empty – particularly when neither term is >> defined. >> >> 2] I think the nature of and role of Thirdness is vital – and ask whether or >> not it can appear in either nominalism or scholastic realism or in both? >> First – a brief definition. >> >> Nominalism, in my view refers to a belief that generals or universals >> [Thirdness] are concepts created by man and only individual entities >> ‘exist’. Scholastic realism refers to the view that generals or universals, >> understood as the rule of law governing individual instantiations of these >> laws -are real in themselves and not creations of man. >> >> 3] I don’t think either view can be removed from its societal connections >> and implications. The scholastic realism view fits into a societal view >> where the laws of life, so to speak, are predetermined [ by god?] and fixed; >> they can’t be changed by man’s whim. The nominalist view arose twice, in the >> 13th c and in the 18th c – when the rise of individual freedom of thought >> emerged, and the individual was seen as capable of not merely acceptance but >> of generating new laws, new rules. These are monumentally different world >> views and have of course, social and political implications. >> >> 4] Thirdness according to Peirce is, as developed by Nature, “ a mode of >> being which consists in the Secondness that it determines” 1903. 1.536. And >> “Thirdness cannot be understood without Secondness.” 1904. 8.331. Thirdness >> mediates between input and output, between “the causal act and the effect’ >> 1894.1.328 and Thirdness emerges ‘in nature’ 1887 1.366. – creating an >> ‘intelligible law. >> >> Obviously these definitions of Thirdness are aspects of scholastic realism >> not nominalism – but it is important to note both ultimate agency – Nature >> vs god and correlations. >> >> 4] I note – and I think this is vital - Peirce emphasizes the role of >> Secondness in actualizing Thirdness, ie, Thirdness does not function alone >> but as correlated with Secondness and Firstness enabling it to existentially >> function as that rule of law, to function as a predictive force of >> morphological formation. Where, Thirdness in the ‘first degree of >> degeneracy’ 1903. 5.70, in ‘irrational plurality, where the rule of law >> enables multiple individuals all aspects of that rule of law”… >> >> The key connective triadic sign is the Symbolic Indexical, [Thirdness as >> Secondness] which has been recently discussed and is one of the key Signs >> in Peircean semiosis. >> >> 5] I note that this insistence on the indexical actuality of Thridness moves >> Peirce into an analysis where these rules can change! Because of that >> connection with Secondness! These changing rules are not as concepts >> articulated by man but, in themselves. This is not nominalism but moves into >> the self-organized realm of CAS [ complex adaptive systems] which are a >> later development in the scientific world – and is most certainly a concept >> rejected by those who subscribed to the invincibility of these rules - ie- >> that Secondness or actuality had no effect on them. . >> >> Most certainly Peirce rejected predetermined Thirdness, with his support >> of the ‘symbols grow’ ; the fact that Thirdness rules evolve, adapt and >> change – due both to chance [ Firstness] Tychasm] and Agapasm or a feeling >> of connectness to the data. >> >> But he also rejected the vagaries of nominalism which sees a world without >> the realities of non-human Thirdness, ie, without the reality of rules and >> laws which are objectively real and not ‘figments of the mind’. Nominalism >> can move into pure idealism, where the rules can be considered human ideas - >> and these can lead to totalitarianism. >> >> 6] If we continue with the societal context – we can then ask – why does one >> or the other theory become dominant? The theory of nominalism, which >> empowers man to make-and-change-the rules of life; vs the theory of realism >> which inserts a non-human agency as the source of the laws {Nature,god]. And >> – furthermore – an additional concept that these laws are immutable and >> cannot change or be changed vs that the laws can self-organize and change. I >> think these are two basic mindsets which will always be with us – and we >> cannot ignore the societal modes in which they operate. >> >> >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>?subject=SIG%20peirce-l">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]?subject=SIG%20peirce-l";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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