Edwina, List,
ME: "I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an "ethical
understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to ourselves and among
each other, is the only practical constant that remains regardless of one's
view of the universe or particular physical/metaphysical understanding. That's
where I locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby ideal is not idealism but
necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of the term."
-----------------------------------
I'd like to press the above in the context of "dynamic object(s)". If one
assumes "convergence" within Peirce's system, it seems evident to me that one
has to pay the price, small or large, of the dynamic(al) object insofar as I
understand that (almost as static, if not quite, or literally, static).
Which leads to me to reject for the moment the idea of positivist knowledge
with respect to things which may or may not be known, ever, and rather
pragmatically relocate the debate within the most fundamental dialectic we
have: "ethics".
Though many books have been written on ethics, I do not believe a thousand
years makes much of a difference (or an infinite period at that) with respect
to the idea that "Murder is false/entirely wrong" (that harm inflicted,
generally, is almost always, if not always, false/wrong). With that in mind,
one must surely conclude that the Dynamic Object of that "moral judgement" is
already "known" and is scarcely possible that we could know "why" any more in
an infinite period than we already do?
That is, we can argue catechism until the cows come home but we all surely
know, innately (I sense arguments?), that these things are just "wrong". I see
no value in infinite inquiry here —that is, no one is coming along with a
"...and to murder was wrong because..." revelation which overrides basic innate
moral instinct (or judgement) as we already have it.
And thus, no matter what, I really do think ethics, as the most truthful way in
which to treat one's self and lifeforms around one, is always "constant" —all
ideas regarding the make-up of the universe or the atom (much the same?) do
nothing to the idea (not really an idea, for surely this must emerge from pure
firstness which, though technically "possible" in Peirce, may, in prohibition
terms be said to be a "resource" which when required, one can draw on, and thus
always actual and possible without contradiction) —do nothing to the idea that,
practically, we already have a constant, which in global terms, we treat as if
it scarcely existed (ETHICS).
I've long since assumed that literalist versions of Plato's Cave aside, the
only actual question in such situations, (an actually genuine "solution"), is
ethics. It can be nothing else. And so, from firstness-soundness-thirdness,
DO/Inf Inq, all to/through ethics.
There is a better response in what I've said there —even the germs of a paper,
but I wanted to make a brief contribution and I think a truthful one (I would
like to hear people's opinions on the idea that truthful ethics is always
universal, that is, not nominalist, and already, in so many respects,
decided/determined, if not actualized —which is where one might cite "inquiry"?
Though I maintain that 99% of all ethical principles one needs are basically
innate and stem from the idea, never selfish, that none ought be able to do
"one" harm ("learned" as a child...). We merely extend that to other people
—though as a global society, despite everyone knowing these things, and knowing
them insofar as they ever will, we seem rather crap at enforcing it
consistently (we are antediluvian in this respect).
Best,
Jack
________________________________
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of
Jack Cody <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2025 6:21 PM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Edwina Taborsky
<[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function
Edwina, List,
I think that post is very well done. Precise epistemological location and also
a clearly articulated view of what thirdness is with respect to nominalism and
realism, respectively.
I'll have a think over that but I consider it a potentially very interesting
start from which to hear other people's views. I think the
descriptions/definitions are important as otherwise we're talking around each
other.
I have but one note to add: The Real, for me, can only be an "ethical
understanding" for this, how we practice with respect to ourselves and among
each other, is the only practical constant that remains regardless of one's
view of the universe or particular physical/metaphysical understanding. That's
where I locate "truth" —in ethical practice whereby ideal is not idealism but
necessarily true in the most pragmatic sense of the term.
Best
Jack
________________________________
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of
Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2025 3:33 PM
To: Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
Cc: Peirce List <[email protected]>; edwina taborsky <[email protected]>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness and Its Function
Thirdness and its Function
1] I think a discussion of whether or not someone is a ‘nominalist’ vs a
‘scholastic realist’ can be empty – particularly when neither term is defined.
2] I think the nature of and role of Thirdness is vital – and ask whether or
not it can appear in either nominalism or scholastic realism or in both? First
– a brief definition.
Nominalism, in my view refers to a belief that generals or universals
[Thirdness] are concepts created by man and only individual entities ‘exist’.
Scholastic realism refers to the view that generals or universals, understood
as the rule of law governing individual instantiations of these laws -are real
in themselves and not creations of man.
3] I don’t think either view can be removed from its societal connections and
implications. The scholastic realism view fits into a societal view where the
laws of life, so to speak, are predetermined [ by god?] and fixed; they can’t
be changed by man’s whim. The nominalist view arose twice, in the 13th c and in
the 18th c – when the rise of individual freedom of thought emerged, and the
individual was seen as capable of not merely acceptance but of generating new
laws, new rules. These are monumentally different world views and have of
course, social and political implications.
4] Thirdness according to Peirce is, as developed by Nature, “ a mode of being
which consists in the Secondness that it determines” 1903. 1.536. And
“Thirdness cannot be understood without Secondness.” 1904. 8.331. Thirdness
mediates between input and output, between “the causal act and the effect’
1894.1.328 and Thirdness emerges ‘in nature’ 1887 1.366. – creating an
‘intelligible law.
Obviously these definitions of Thirdness are aspects of scholastic realism not
nominalism – but it is important to note both ultimate agency – Nature vs god
and correlations.
4] I note – and I think this is vital - Peirce emphasizes the role of
Secondness in actualizing Thirdness, ie, Thirdness does not function alone but
as correlated with Secondness and Firstness enabling it to existentially
function as that rule of law, to function as a predictive force of
morphological formation. Where, Thirdness in the ‘first degree of degeneracy’
1903. 5.70, in ‘irrational plurality, where the rule of law enables multiple
individuals all aspects of that rule of law”…
The key connective triadic sign is the Symbolic Indexical, [Thirdness as
Secondness] which has been recently discussed and is one of the key Signs in
Peircean semiosis.
5] I note that this insistence on the indexical actuality of Thridness moves
Peirce into an analysis where these rules can change! Because of that
connection with Secondness! These changing rules are not as concepts
articulated by man but, in themselves. This is not nominalism but moves into
the self-organized realm of CAS [ complex adaptive systems] which are a later
development in the scientific world – and is most certainly a concept rejected
by those who subscribed to the invincibility of these rules - ie- that
Secondness or actuality had no effect on them. .
Most certainly Peirce rejected predetermined Thirdness, with his support of
the ‘symbols grow’ ; the fact that Thirdness rules evolve, adapt and change –
due both to chance [ Firstness] Tychasm] and Agapasm or a feeling of
connectness to the data.
But he also rejected the vagaries of nominalism which sees a world without the
realities of non-human Thirdness, ie, without the reality of rules and laws
which are objectively real and not ‘figments of the mind’. Nominalism can move
into pure idealism, where the rules can be considered human ideas - and these
can lead to totalitarianism.
6] If we continue with the societal context – we can then ask – why does one or
the other theory become dominant? The theory of nominalism, which empowers man
to make-and-change-the rules of life; vs the theory of realism which inserts a
non-human agency as the source of the laws {Nature,god]. And – furthermore – an
additional concept that these laws are immutable and cannot change or be
changed vs that the laws can self-organize and change. I think these are two
basic mindsets which will always be with us – and we cannot ignore the societal
modes in which they operate.
Edwina
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