List I realize this is a ‘go nowhere ’discussion, since JAS and I [ and others] have different interpretations of the semiotic process. But I think the list should be made aware that there ARE different interpretations!
JAS posits a ‘genuine triadic relation [ I’m unaware of a genuine vs degenerate one]which he writes consists of “the sign itself, its dynamical object and its final interpretant”. Indeed, he posits that the final interpretant is equivalent to Peirce’s normal term of ‘interpretant’. I disagree with JAS’s outline of the genuine triadic relation as consisting of the DO-S/R-FI, which means that he is privileging the Final Interpretant - which puts it, to me, in almost a teleological and deterministic role. I consider that the FI is located at the ‘end of the triad of interpretants [ not first as JAS positions it] - and as Peirce notes, the FI is “the effect the sign would produce upon any mind “ [1909 SS110-1] and also 1910 ILS 285 ’The third sense in which we may properly speak of the Interpretant is that in which I speak of the Final Interpretant meaning that Habit in the production of which the function of the Sign,as such, is exhausted”. Those two quotes from Peirce tell us that the FI is a collective conclusion, not an individual one, and, one most probably in the mode of Thirdness. But JAS has told us that the Interpretant refers to the Object. Fine. But his Object is the Dynamic Object.and his Interpretant is the Final Interpretant. But- within the semiosic process the DO is an Individual experience, not a collective one. And the FI, as Peirce told us, is a collective experience not an individual one. So?? How does one get from the individual to the collective within one semiotic interaction? Edwina > On Oct 20, 2025, at 1:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Helmut, List: > > A correlate cannot be a relation, a correlate is in a relation. A dyadic > relation has two correlates, while a triadic relation has three correlates > and involves three dyadic relations between the different pairs of those > three correlates; a genuine triadic relation is not reducible to those three > dyadic relations. For the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more > generally) mediating, there is no separate trichotomy for the object's dyadic > relation with the interpretant, since it is always the same as the sign's > dyadic relation with the interpretant. The interpretant itself is thus a > correlate, not a relation--it is the meaning of the sign, not "a relation of > a sign and a meaning"--and again, the sign's relation with its interpretant > is dyadic, not triadic. > > Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of > representing/mediating reveals that every one sign has two objects and three > interpretants, for a total of six correlates. Its genuine correlates are the > sign itself, its dynamical object, and its final interpretant--what Peirce > simply calls the sign, its object, and its interpretant in 1903. In addition, > a dynamical interpretant is any actual effect of a sign token in an > individual event of semiosis, so there is a separate trichotomy for that > external dyadic relation; however, there is no separate trichotomy for the > degenerate triadic relation of the sign token with its dynamical object and > dynamical interpretant, since it is reducible to the dyadic relations that it > involves. The immediate object and immediate interpretant are both internal > to the sign, which is why there are no separate trichotomies for their > degenerate dyadic relations. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Mon, Oct 20, 2025 at 10:15 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Jon, List, >> >> thank you for clarifying "trichotomy". So "S-O-I" is not one (it is >> compositional). My other point was: I think, regarding e.g. the interpretant >> for a correlate is not prescinding it from its relation-nature, because a >> correlate can be a relation. I think (right? false?) that the interpretant >> is a relation of a sign and a meaning, and the relation is, that it is the >> sign´s meaning. The relation between the interpretant and the sign is a >> triadic relation (sign, sign, meaning), that equals the dyad (sign, >> meaning), which again is the interpretant. But I dont know. if this is >> mathematically correct: (A,A,B) = (A,B)? When I have a relation with another >> man, which is the fact, that I owe him ten dollars, then the relation >> between me and this fact is again the fact, that I owe him ten dollars. >> >> Best, Helmut >> 19. Oktober 2025 um 02:50 >> "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> Helmut, List: >> >> I will answer your second question first, then come back to your first >> question. >> >> HR: What is a trichotomy? Is it both about specification/classification, and >> composition? >> >> In Peirce's semeiotic, a trichotomy is for classification, not composition. >> As used for classifying signs, it is a division according to whether a >> specific correlate or relation falls under the category of 1ns/2ns/3ns >> (1903) or belongs in the corresponding 1st/2nd/3rd universe whose >> constituents are possibles/existents/necessitants (1908). >> >> HR: why is there so much emphasis put on the distinction between a correlate >> (object, interpretant) and the relation between the sign and each of both? >> >> Because when classifying signs, there are different trichotomies for the >> correlates and their relations. A sign is a qualisign/sinsign/legisign >> (later tone/token/type) according to the mode of apprehension of the sign >> itself (S). It is an abstractive/concretive/collective according to the mode >> of being of the dynamical object itself (Od), but an icon/index/symbol >> according to its dyadic relation with its dynamical object (Od-S). It is a >> gratific/actuous/temperative according to the purpose of the final >> interpretant itself (If), but a rheme/dicisign/argument (later >> seme/pheme/delome) according to its dyadic relation with its final >> interpretant (S-If). When arranging the trichotomies in the proper logical >> order, Peirce places the Od-S trichotomy after the S trichotomy (1903), but >> the Od trichotomy before the S trichotomy (1908). He also places the S-If >> trichotomy after the Od-S trichotomy (1903), and the If trichotomy after the >> S trichotomy (1908). >> >> HR: I think, the object and the interpretant are already relations with the >> sign: The object (at least the immediate, but I think, both parts) doesn't >> exist, if it isn't denoted by, and determines the sign. The interpretant is >> already determined by the sign, and without an anticipated interpretant, the >> sign would not exist. >> >> The object and interpretant are correlates, not relations; they are in a >> genuine triadic relation with the sign, which involves their respective >> dyadic relations but is not reducible to them. As I have said many times >> before, I understand semiosis to be a continuous process; so when we pick >> out any individual sign, we are prescinding it from that flow, and we must >> also then identify its object and its interpretant. In that sense, you are >> correct that something does not serve as a dynamical object apart from the >> signs that it determines. Moreover, a sign might not have any actual >> (dynamical) interpretants, but it always has possible (immediate) and ideal >> (final) interpretants. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> On Sat, Oct 18, 2025 at 2:47 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Jon, Robert, List, >>> >>> I have two questions, the first is, why is there so much emphasis put on >>> the distinction between a correlate (object, interpretant) and the relation >>> between the sign and each of both? I think, the object and the interpretant >>> are already relations with the sign: The object (at least the immediate, >>> but I think, both parts) doesn´t exist, if it isn´t denoted by, and >>> determines the sign. The interpretant is already determined by the sign, >>> and without an anticipated interpretant, the sign would not exist. This >>> could be explained this more explicitly, by mentioning the two parts of the >>> object, and the three of the interpretant, but my point works anyway >>> already so, I think. >>> My second question is: What is a trichotomy? Is it both about >>> specification/classification, and composition? From the word root (to cut >>> something into three pieces) I would say, it only is about composition, >>> e.g. for sign, object, interpretant. But not for classification, like >>> rheme, dicent, argument. Because there it is not about parts of something, >>> but about "either-or" classes. "Either-or" means, these items already are >>> apart, you cannot cut something into three pieces here. Ok, you can do this >>> with your mind, but then you don´t cut the real -or imagined- thing apart, >>> not even prescindingly, but virtually e.g. a sheet of paper, on which >>> classes are written. Then you have a trichotomy of paper, but not of the >>> interpretant (aka(?) its relation with the sign). >>> >>> Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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