Jon, List,
by introducing other terms I don´t want to create a new theory, it´s just, that something about some terms bothers me: Sometimes the same term (trichotomy) is used for different things, and sometimes I feel, that different terms are used for the same thing. The trichotomiy S-O-I is such, that a dyadic relation, e,g. S-O, or a monad, may be prescinded from it, but can not exist, because the triad is irreducible. Same with primisense, altersense, medisense. With the trichotomy rheme-dicent-argument it is different: Dicents (propositions) exist, rhemes too.
About primi-, alter- medisense, one might argue: "But a plant does not think". But I´d say, the medisense there is not in the individual, but in the species.
To your distinction between determination and involution: Isn´t both the same, just "determination" is top-dpwn-speak, and "involution" bottom-up? Just an idea (please don´t be false again, idea!). E.g. my property is both: Something involved by my extended self, and also something, from which I have constrained all possibilities away, which would prevent it from being mine.
Best, Helmut
23. Oktober 2025 um 23:49
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
wrote:Helmut, List:
I agree that legisigns (types) involve sinsigns (tokens), which involve qualisigns (tones); symbols involve indices, which involve icons; and arguments (delomes) involve dicisigns (phemes), which involve rhemes (semes). However, a sign does not involve its relation with its object, nor its relation with its interpretant; involution (not involvation) is the relation within a trichotomy of 3ns to 2ns and 1ns, and of 2ns to 1ns. Instead, a sign determines its relation with its (dynamical) object, which determines its relation with its (final) interpretant, where "determines" means "logically constrains" as Gary R. explained earlier in this thread (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-10/msg00097.html).
I do not believe that it is accurate to describe the sign, object, and interpretant as composing the irreducible triadic relation of representing/mediating; as far as I know, Peirce never does so. I also disagree with your earlier suggestion that "the three interpretants ... together make the interpretant," such that "every interpretant consists of these three parts"; the interpretant is not built up from the immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants, nor is any one of the three interpretants built up from one or both of the others. Instead, according to Peirce, the final interpretant of a sign is its genuine interpretant; and I maintain that in some sense, it governs the dynamical interpretants that its replicas (instances) actually produce in individual events of semiosis, while its immediate interpretant is what renders those embodiments as tokens capable of producing those effects.
Peirce does not give only a single definition of a trichotomy in his voluminous writings, and the one pertaining to his architectonic classification of the sciences that Robert quoted is very specific to that application of his categories. More generally, as Gary R. pointed out earlier in this thread (same link as above), Peirce defines "trichotomic" as "the art of making three-fold divisions," each of which "depends on the conceptions of 1st, 2nd, 3rd," which he goes on to align with the categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns including degenerate 2ns and two orders of degeneracy for 3ns (EP 1:280-1, 1888). He reiterates this 15 years later, in the more extensive definition that I have quoted previously--"Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is 3ns ... the self-development of that essential idea ... results in a trichotomy giving rise to three subclasses, or genera, involving respectively a relatively genuine 3ns, a relatively reactional 3ns or 3ns of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a relatively qualitative 3ns or 3ns of the last degeneracy" (CP 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903). By 1908, his trichotomies for classifying signs are divisions into three universes of possibles, existents, and necessitants that correspond respectively to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.
Providing this kind of textual support for one's positions on Peirce's thought is never a matter of mathematical proof, which is why readers must always evaluate the evidence for themselves when there are disputes. Some List members seem to treat "literalism" as a pejorative label, but if we sincerely want to apply his many brilliant insights faithfully, then the first step is making sure that we carefully digest and accurately understand his actual words. As Gary Fuhrman helpfully put it almost a decade ago (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-09/msg00179.html), "I read [Peirce] on the working assumption that he means what he says, and says what he means. If I read on the assumption that he means what I say, or says what I mean--or skim through a text looking for bits that I can conveniently lift out of their own context and insert into my own prior 'interpretation'--I’m not likely to find any challenges to my already-fixed beliefs in that text." That is why it is important to distinguish our further developments of his ideas from his original expressions of them.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Thu, Oct 23, 2025 at 1:57 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
Robert, List,Thank you for the challenge! As I have understood Gary, I may post this second post of today, because it is an answer. I hope, this is so?First: I finally have accepted, that e.g. the object is a correlate, and the sign´s relation with it is a relation, and both are different things. Thanks to you and Jon. I´m a bit ashamed I had been reluctant to see this before.Now to my so-called trichotomy (composition, involvation, classification). At the very end there may be a little bug in it, and there also are some questions (see the question marks). Now it only is about the classification of signs (signs table, ten classes):The classification of signs involves two kinds of involvation, by looking at the signs table: The vertical and the horizontal kind. The vertical involvement comes from the fact, that a legisign involves sin-, which then involve qualisigns, a symbol involves indices, then icons, an argument involves dicents, then rhemes (I use the plural, without claiming, just guessing, that it is more than one, otherwise the text gets too long). Now, if the sign is e.g. a rhematic indexical legisign, it should involve (some? all? How many of each?) signs, that may be built of the elements involved (above the sign in the table): Rhematic indexical sinsign, rhematic iconical sinsign, (rhematic iconical) qualisign.Horizontal involvation comes from the fact, that a sign involves a relation with its object, and a relation with its interpretant. This is involvation, not composition, linguistically adressed by adjectives (the "...tic" or "....al" of e.g. "rhematic" or "indexical").So, this was, how classification involves involvation. Now, how does involvation involve composition? The fact, that a sign always involves its relation with an object and with an interpretant, means, that there is an irreducible correlation between sign, object, and interpretant. This correlation is a composition: Sign, object, and interpretant make the irreducible sign triad. As I wrote, there may be a little bug here: I have called a conclusion an involvation,, not really knowing, if that is ok.What also may be argued, is, that composition might be seen as a kind of involvation, then there would not be a categorial distinction. That is a problem, I don´t know yet, whether it is terminological or conceptual.Best, Helmut23. Oktober 2025 um 16:54"robert marty" <[email protected]>wrote:Helmut, List,
You asked the question “What is a trichotomy?” a few days ago on another thread; I replied on October 21, 2025, at 10:22 a.m., giving you Peirce's precise definition when he trichotomizes the sciences in order to classify them; here it is:
It turns out that in most cases the divisions are trichotomic; the First of the three members relating to universal elements or laws, the Second arranging classes of forms and seeking to bring them under universal laws, the Third going into the utmost detail, describing individual phenomena and endeavoring to explain them. (An Outline Classification of the Sciences, CP 1.180; EP2: 258)Note: First, Second, and Third are ordinals!
So, a formal definition, applicable in all circumstances, would be something like:
A trichotomy is a tripartite division of a phaneron into three parts defined by the natures of the elements it contains, each of which is characterized by one of the three classes: Thirdness, Secondness, and Firstness. It follows that, since these categories are interdependent and verify relations of involvement a priori, then the elements with which each part is associated (which, for convenience, I call, as Peirce was, the fact, respectively, Tertians, Secondans, and Primans) must be such that Tertians govern Secondans, whose existence is by definition presupposed, and also Primans, which, by their definition, only exist when incarnated in Secondans.
Consequently, if you claim that a triad of concepts is a trichotomy, you must show that they meet these conditions. The three classes must be included, and the elements contained in each must be related by involvement. Your opinion is not enough, and you cannot leave it to your readers to verify this. It is up to you to prove it...
Best regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD PhilosophyLe jeu. 23 oct. 2025 à 12:21, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> a écrit :Jon, Robert, List,to me, the relations between categorial entities become clearer by classifying them with the trichotomy "composition, involvement, classification" (Maybe this trichotomy is better than "composition, determination, classification", I had proposed before, or maybe involvement is a kind of determination). With composition I mean a complete and irreducible one. Classification may also be called specification or subsumption (Salthe).The triad "sign, object, interpretant" is a composition. "immediate object, dynamical object" is a composition, these two make the object. The trichotomy "rheme, dicent, argument" is a classification. A dicent involves rhemes, but is not composed of them, because they donot make it. For having a dicent, their order too is necessary, which information is in the dicent. Same with argument: Peirces example with the beans in a bag shows, that according to the order of dicents (propositions) in the argument, you have either an abduction, an induction, or a deduction (or nonsense, if the order is weird).A symbol involves indexes, which involve icons, a legisign involves sinsigns, which involve qualisigns.I think, that the three interpretants too are a composition, they together make the interpretant. But then I´d have to claim, that every interpretant consists of these three parts. The final inerpretant may be vague or an anticipation for a long time, but should exist from the beginning in some way.Best, Helmut
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