Jon, List, I found your 'bullet point' post of considerable interest and personal value as it virtually outlines the main points of Peirce's ideas regarding triadic relations which, in our different ways, we have I think both been trying to 'get across' by offering many Peirce quotations on the subject which, in my view, clearly and consistently express Peirce's viewpoint (this is unlike some other issues in his philosophy which are not relatively so 'cut and dry'). Besides quoting Peirce, both of us paraphrased and commented on his thoughts and words on what I consider the very bedrock of his philosophy:* categorially triadic relations*.
Recalling that Peirce's *as philosophy as cenoscopic * -- the philosophic trichotomy of phenomenology; the regulative sciences of esthetics, ethics, and logic as semeiotic; and metaphysics -- all these branches of philosophy are considered science by Peirce: along with mathematics,* pure research science.* In any event, your post was personally helpful to me as being both a succinct outline not only of those points we both covered but, along with the additional points you included, hint at a possible argumentation which simultaneously invites dialogue. I'm interested! For this post I've copied your bullet points and added a short comment of my own. JAS: We prescind each sign with its object and its interpretant from the real and continuous process of semiosis, such that these are artifacts of analysis. GR: And that is virtually *all* that they are: potentially useful artifacts which might aid us in our understanding of some semeiotic matter or another. JAS: According to Peirce, any genuine triadic relation is not reducible to the three dyadic relations that it involves, while any degenerate triadic relation is so reducible. GR: My favorite example of a degenerate triad relation is the one that Peirce offers just after offering the 'giving/receiving a gift' is a triadic relationship. The degenerate form of that gift giving and receiving is as follows: (1st dyad), a person lays a package next to him on a bench, later forgets about it and walks off; (2nd dyad); another person, a stranger, passes by, sees it, and picks it up. JAS: The trichotomy for the sign's dyadic relation with its interpretant in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is identical to the one for the sign's dyadic relation with its final interpretant in his later taxonomies. GR: This seems to be a significant point of contention between you and Robert. JAS:The final interpretant is the ideal effect of the sign (would-be, genuine 3ns), while a dynamical interpretant is any actual effect of the sign (2ns of 3ns), and the immediate interpretant is its range of possible effects (may-be, 1ns of 3ns). GR: Perhaps a trikonic diagram of this would facilitate understanding of this. *Interpretant* (3ns) 1ns: immediate interpretant, "range of possible effects of the sign," may-be (1ns of 3ns) |> 3ns: final interpretant, "the ideal effect of the sign," would-be *if*. . . (3ns quasi-completed*) 2ns: dynamical interpretant, "actual effect of the sign," is (exists) (2ns of 3ns) *Since "the ideal effect of the sign" would-be only asymptotically so (acting as a regulative principle) JAS: The final interpretant is "final" in the sense of a final cause (telos), not the temporally last member of a series; we aim to conform all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, which is why logic as semeiotic is a normative science. GR: 3ns in the sense of reality *in futuro -- *"towards the future" seems to me to be a prominent character of 3ns. Simply stated: All of a day's "would-bes', *if* realized, *would be *realized in the future. JAS: Any individual event of semiosis consists in an individual dynamical object determining an individual sign token to determine an individual dynamical interpretant, and these are the three correlates of a degenerate triadic relation. GR: This suggests that genuine semiosis is not essentially about any individual semiosis, that it tends towards the general, the continuous, community, etc. Is that what you're saying? JAS: Such events are governed (not deterministically dictated) by the genuine triadic relation whose three correlates are the sign itself (not any one instance thereof), its dynamical object, and its final interpretant. GR: When semiotic models, ostensibly 'inspired' by Peirce, exclude the interpretant’s mediating function, or reduce semiosis to mechanical causation, in my view they cease to be authentically Peircean. Peirce’s semiotic universe is one of open, triadic mediation, where meaning evolves through interpretation, habit, and the continuity of thought which is a process far richer than any deterministic or purely structural account can capture. Best, Gary R On Mon, Oct 20, 2025 at 6:23 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I appreciate and agree with your additional comments in both posts today. > Summarizing my own understanding ... > > - We *prescind *each sign with *its *object and *its *interpretant > from the real and continuous process of semiosis, such that these are > artifacts of analysis. > - According to Peirce, any *genuine *triadic relation *is not* > reducible to the three dyadic relations that it involves, while any > *degenerate *triadic relation *is *so reducible. > - The trichotomy for the sign's dyadic relation with its interpretant > in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is identical to the one for the sign's dyadic > relation with its *final *interpretant in his later taxonomies. > - The final interpretant is the *ideal *effect of the sign (would-be, > genuine 3ns), while a dynamical interpretant is any *actual *effect of > the sign (2ns of 3ns), and the immediate interpretant is its range of > *possible *effects (may-be, 1ns of 3ns). > - The final interpretant is "final" in the sense of a final cause ( > *telos*), not the temporally last member of a series; we aim to *conform > *all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final > interpretants, which is why logic as semeiotic is a *normative * > science. > - Any *individual* event of semiosis consists in an individual > dynamical object determining an individual sign *token *to determine > an individual *dynamical *interpretant, and these are the three > correlates of a *degenerate *triadic relation. > - Such events are *governed *(not deterministically dictated) by the > *genuine *triadic relation whose three correlates are the sign itself > (not any one instance thereof), its dynamical object, and its *final * > interpretant. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Oct 20, 2025 at 3:03 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Helmut, Jon, List, >> >> Peirce offers this definition of 'trichotomic' in an unpublished three >> page type-script written just after "A Guess at the Riddle" in early 1888 >> (EP1: 280-284). Nathan Houser suggests that it was written "probably for >> oral presentation." >> >> TRICHOTOMIC is the art of making three-fold divisions. Such division >> depends on the conceptions of 1st, 2nd, 3rd [that is, 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, >> something which becomes obvious in the next three sentences GR]. First is >> the beginning, that which is fresh, original, spontaneous, free. Second is >> that which is determined, terminated, ended, correlative, object, >> necessitate, reading. Third is the medium, becoming, developing, bringing >> about. EP1: 280 >> >> >> But this is looking at each category separately and abstractly in terms >> of its individual 'character' or 'mode of being'. Once the three categories >> are involved in semiosis their co-relations take on a* vital character *(as >> Peirce elsewhere explains). >> >> Each category is not only a mode of being but also a way of relating or >> being related. To speak of *correlates* is to say that each category >> implies or involves a corresponding kind of relational structure. So, in >> semeiotics, and as Jon wrote: "they are *in *a genuine triadic relation >> with the sign, which *involves *their respective dyadic relations but is >> not reducible to them." >> >> Perhaps it would be helpful to look at semiosis in light of the vector of >> determination where 2ns determines 1ns which in turn determines 3ns (in >> Peirce logical sense of 'is constrained by',* not* 'determined by >> efficient causation'). So, the object determines the sign which determines >> the interpretant, that is, the sign's meaning. I think it was Tom Short who >> very helpfully said that the object gives the sign its* aboutness*, and >> the sign gives the interpretant sign its *meaning*. >> >> Compare this with Time which follows the same vector: the past determines >> the present which in turn determines the future (again 'determines' should >> not be interpreted as efficient causation). Now it is possible to prescind >> a tripartite moment from the flow of time. But, firstly, prescision is but >> a kind of abstraction and, secondly, lived time is not experienced as three >> discrete instants (the instant being but a mathematical abstraction >> according to Peirce). Nonetheless, we do have a vital sense of the recent >> past and an anticipation of the future. >> >> As with Time, we can prescind some discrete object -> sign -> >> interpretent from the semiosic flow for some analytical purpose just as we >> can prescind some single moment from the ongoing flow of time. But that >> again would only be for the purpose of a discrete analysis. For just as the >> present melds into the future, so does the sign meld into its interpretant >> sign (and the semiosis *continues* in much the same way as the flow of >> time does). >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
