Gary R., List: Thanks for your comments, with which I am almost entirely in agreement. Let me just offer a few important clarifications.
First, as I have acknowledged previously, semiosic synechism is *my own* hypothesis--recognizably *Peircean *as a direct application of his late topical conception of continuity, but not something that Peirce *himself *ever explicitly formulated. Second, as I have said over and over, I understand the *continuous *process of semiosis to be *real*--it is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it, not in any way observer-dependent. However, distinguishing any one *individual *sign is in my view an act of prescission, deliberately introducing artificial "boundaries" to mark it off from other signs *within *the semiosic continuum that are otherwise indefinite. Only *after *we have done this can we go on to identify *that *sign's dynamical object and *that *sign's final interpretant, with which it is in a *genuine *triadic relation, as well as any dynamical interpretants produced by its instances in *actual *events of semiosis. Third, accordingly, I would *not *say that semiosis *tends toward* the general and the continuous--that would be a bottom-up conception. Instead, I maintain that semiosis *always already is *general and continuous--this is a top-down conception. A *discrete *event where a dynamical object determines a sign token to determine a dynamical interpretant is a *degenerate *manifestation of it, just as those three correlates are in a *degenerate *triadic relation--one that is reducible to the dyadic relations that it involves. In this case, the dynamical object *determines *the sign token, which *determines *the dynamical interpretant. Fourth, nevertheless, a top-down conception is *not *in any way *deterministic*--it is primarily a matter of *final *causation, not *efficient *(or mechanical) causation. "Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final causation is that kind of causation whereby the whole calls out its parts" (CP 1.220, 1902). Moreover, "Rationality is being governed by final causes" (CP 2.66, 1902), and "Continuity is of a Rational nature" (LF 3/1:249n6, 1906). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 7:13 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I found your 'bullet point' post of considerable interest and personal > value as it virtually outlines the main points of Peirce's ideas regarding > triadic relations which, in our different ways, we have I think both been > trying to 'get across' by offering many Peirce quotations on the subject > which, in my view, clearly and consistently express Peirce's viewpoint > (this is unlike some other issues in his philosophy which are not > relatively so 'cut and dry'). Besides quoting Peirce, both of us > paraphrased and commented on his thoughts and words on what I consider the > very bedrock of his philosophy:* categorially triadic relations*. > > Recalling that Peirce's *as philosophy as cenoscopic * -- the philosophic > trichotomy of phenomenology; the regulative sciences of esthetics, ethics, > and logic as semeiotic; and metaphysics -- all these branches of philosophy > are considered science by Peirce: along with mathematics,* pure research > science.* > > In any event, your post was personally helpful to me as being both a > succinct outline not only of those points we both covered but, along with > the additional points you included, hint at a possible argumentation which > simultaneously invites dialogue. I'm interested! > > For this post I've copied your bullet points and added a short comment of > my own. > > JAS: We prescind each sign with its object and its interpretant from the > real and continuous process of semiosis, such that these are artifacts of > analysis. > GR: And that is virtually *all* that they are: potentially useful > artifacts which might aid us in our understanding of some semeiotic matter > or another. > > JAS: According to Peirce, any genuine triadic relation is not reducible to > the three dyadic relations that it involves, while any degenerate triadic > relation is so reducible. > GR: My favorite example of a degenerate triad relation is the one that > Peirce offers just after offering the 'giving/receiving a gift' is a > triadic relationship. The degenerate form of that gift giving and receiving > is as follows: (1st dyad), a person lays a package next to him on a bench, > later forgets about it and walks off; (2nd dyad); another person, a > stranger, passes by, sees it, and picks it up. > > JAS: The trichotomy for the sign's dyadic relation with its interpretant > in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is identical to the one for the sign's dyadic > relation with its final interpretant in his later taxonomies. > GR: This seems to be a significant point of contention between you and > Robert. > > JAS:The final interpretant is the ideal effect of the sign (would-be, > genuine 3ns), while a dynamical interpretant is any actual effect of the > sign (2ns of 3ns), and the immediate interpretant is its range of possible > effects (may-be, 1ns of 3ns). > GR: Perhaps a trikonic diagram of this would facilitate understanding of > this. > > *Interpretant* (3ns) > > 1ns: immediate interpretant, "range of possible effects of the sign," > may-be (1ns of 3ns) > |> 3ns: final interpretant, "the ideal effect of the sign," would-be > *if*. . . (3ns quasi-completed*) > 2ns: dynamical interpretant, "actual effect of the sign," is (exists) (2ns > of 3ns) > *Since "the ideal effect of the sign" would-be only asymptotically so > (acting as a regulative principle) > > > JAS: The final interpretant is "final" in the sense of a final cause > (telos), not the temporally last member of a series; we aim to conform all > our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, which is > why logic as semeiotic is a normative science. > GR: 3ns in the sense of reality *in futuro -- *"towards the future" seems > to me to be a prominent character of 3ns. Simply stated: All of a day's > "would-bes', *if* realized, *would be *realized in the future. > > JAS: Any individual event of semiosis consists in an individual dynamical > object determining an individual sign token to determine an individual > dynamical interpretant, and these are the three correlates of a degenerate > triadic relation. > GR: This suggests that genuine semiosis is not essentially about any > individual semiosis, that it tends towards the general, the continuous, > community, etc. Is that what you're saying? > > JAS: Such events are governed (not deterministically dictated) by the > genuine triadic relation whose three correlates are the sign itself (not > any one instance thereof), its dynamical object, and its final interpretant. > > GR: When semiotic models, ostensibly 'inspired' by Peirce, exclude the > interpretant’s mediating function, or reduce semiosis to mechanical > causation, in my view they cease to be authentically Peircean. Peirce’s > semiotic universe is one of open, triadic mediation, where meaning evolves > through interpretation, habit, and the continuity of thought which is a > process far richer than any deterministic or purely structural account can > capture. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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