Gary R
1] I certainly agree with categorical involution in the operation of the world- ie- that 3ns involves 2ns involves 1ns. But that’s not the same thing as the emergence of these categories. At the same time – I consider that, post universe existence, 3ns, for example, is not dominant over 1ns; it can set up and control the perimeters of 2ns, it can even prevent some incidents of 1ns – but- it can’t remove the reality of chance, freedom, pure deviation from the universe. Nor can it remove the reality of the effects in 2ns of this freedom. 2] Before I go further - a word about your misuse of my phrase ‘outside the text’. I do not mean outside of Peirce’s thought. I mean using different terms than used within Peirce’s texts. For example – the outrage I am sometimes met with on this list when I use such terms as ‘input and output, and ‘function’. I firmly believe that we can find the Peircean framework in other areas of scientific thought – and that we should acknowledge and explore this. 3] As for your ‘ad populum’ and ‘ad authoritatem’ argumentation – it’s not valid as you know. I could equally come up with lists of scholars who focus on the emergence of the cosmos within the laws of physics. And others who claim that the pure original state was ‘Firstness’! 4] I do not say that the categories are ‘nested vs parallel’ in this emergence. I simply follow Peirce’s outline of the emergence-in 1.412, and it does indeed outline the categories as emerging, following the laws of physics, with the least energy content mode of Firstness appearing first, then, the more organized energy mode of Secondness, and finally, the most complex energy organized mode of Thirdness. And I acknowledge Peirce’s emphasis on the original ‘Nothing’. And also, his reference to The Triad in Metaphysics 1.373, with the ‘first’ as indeterminate’ potentiality. And his comment that ‘explaining the variety of the world by non-variety’ [ ie by generality] was “quite absurd’. As he says: “How is variety to come out of the womb of homogeneity,; only by a principle of spontaneity, which is just that virtual variety that is the first” 1.373. This emergence of the categories, according to the laws of physics, is NOT the same as the post-emergence operation of the categories where all three are existential. 5] With regard to Peirce’s outline of the ‘initial condition’ before the universe existed 6.215 – was “a state of just nothing at all not even a state of emptiness”. This ‘nothing’ is “the state of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no law….absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility” 6.217. But once the categories emerged, this boundless potentiality “became potentiality of this or that sort – that is, of some quality” 6.220. That is – restrictions have developed. 6] With regard to the black board analysis – my view is that this is post emergence. I don’t agree with your ‘ur-continuity’ which inserts a different outline than I see in Peirce. What is its origin? I don’t see that Peirce, ever, sets up any of the categories as privileged or dominant. Most certainly, this ‘original vague potentiality ‘ is not Thirdness! Thirdness is inherent in ”the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality” 6.204. … but so is Firstness and Secondness. So- my conclusion is that we will have to differ in our interpretations of Peirce’s cosmology. And leave it at that. I don’t think, frankly, we are, either of us, in any position to assert that either of us ‘has Peirce right’. Edwina > On Oct 28, 2025, at 1:50 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > List, > > Over the years many scholars -- including Joseph Ransdell, creator, > moderator, and manager of both Arisbe and Peirce-L until his death in > December, 2010 -- have argued for Peirce's idea of categorial involution > (Ransdell's affirmation of three-category involution as opposed to giving > priority to 1ns is remarkable given that his philosophical speciality was > iconicity which, of course, is rooted in 1ns). > > Categorial involution simply holds that 3ns involves 2ns and 1ns, and 2ns > involves only 1ns (which category is incapable of generating anything given > its essential character as lacking, in itself, both law and matter). > > CSP: 2ns is an essential part of 3ns though not of 1ns, and 1ns is an > essential element of both 2ns and 3ns. (CP 1.530, 1903) > > From the cosmological perspective of the 1898 lectures the categories are > always-already in place -- or virtually so. But note that the categories > appear upon that ur-continuity (represented by a clean blackboard) in that > metaphysical 'time before time' 'before' this universe was. > > Jon Alan Schmidt has suggested that it's certainly conceivable that the > general substrate (3ns) and the other categories appear virtually > simultaneously. Yet even if that were so, still continuity (3ns) must be 1st > in order that the other categories have a substrate upon which to appear. Of > course 1ns and 2ns are necessary for generality to have 'material' upon which > a cosmos might be evolved. The principal point here is that once a universe > has come into being and there is semiosis, the categories never appear except > together. > > I am certainly not alone in finding that Peirce's Blackboard argument in the > 1898 (so called "cosmic lectures") makes more sense -- in my view, is more > logical -- than thinking that something -- a cosmos -- can come out of > nothing, or out of 1ns. In fact, 1ns is no 'thing' at all! 1ns is but the > mere possibility of a quality or character being manifest. And it has been > noted by Jon and others that Peirce didn't abandon his early cosmological > view. Rather, he came to see that if there were to be a Universe with an > existential order of 1ns -> 2ns -> 3ns, then there must be a ground upon > which it might come into being, an ur-continuity; an aboriginal generality. > IN my view, that would appear to be the theme of the last lectures in the > 1898 series. > > Perhaps the subtlest point regarding involution in all its expressions (not > just the cosmic) is that involution does not prioritize 3ns -- that is, it > doesn't make it "fundamental" or "basic" (all three are 'basic'). Rather, > 3ns, as generality and continuity, is necessary for categorial and semiosic > appearance and expression to occur at all. Involution merely describes how > the categories are related to each other, nested like the famous Russian toy > dolls. > > Many -- I would suggest most -- scholars agree with Peirce’s claim that the > categories are “nested” and not parallel.. Here are just a few 21st century > examples. > > P. M. Borges -- “Indeterminacy and final causation in the process of sign > determination,” Cognitio – Revista de Filosofia (2022) “This corresponds to > what occurs in the logic of the categories in which thirdness involves > secondness and firstness, just as secondness involves firstness.” > Scott Metzger -- Peirce’s Semeiotic Realism ( McMaster, 2024) “The > categories are like Russian dolls: Thirdness involves Secondness and > Firstness, Secondness involves Firstness, and Firstness is as it is apart > from any Second or Third.” Dinda L. Gorlée -- “A sketch of Peirce’s Firstness > and its significance to art” (2009) Secondness integrates Firstness … > Thirdness must integrate Secondness and Firstness > Winfried Nöth -- “Evolution of Peircean Key Terms and Topics,” Transactions > of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47(4), 2011 “Whereas a sign or > representation is a matter of genuine thirdness, its embodiment in a replica > is a matter of ‘Secondness involved in Thirdness’ (cf. CP 1.530) …” > > I have also been keenly interested in the work of a number of scholars who > have explored and creatively worked to go beyond the text*** in the interest > of applying Peircean principles and methods in developing fresh resources in > various domains. > [***A Peirce text, say a quotation, is interpretively not mine, not theirs, > not yours, but Peirce's. In my opinion, even one writing a paraphrase of an > excerpt ought to strive to represent the 'meaning' of that selected text as > accurately and fully and richly -- optimally -- as a very good translator of, > say, a poem from Italian to English would attempt to do.] > > I have drastically shortened the following list to include only scholars I've > known personally (that is, as a colleague/friend), and a few others whose > work I know well and with whom I've at least had discussions at conferences > and workshops or via email. Here are some "beyond the text" scholars, in my > view all being relatively true to Peirce's expressed meaning in his writings, > and whether or not they agree with him on particular matters or not. The > description of their work is in each case wholly inadequate at suggesting the > depth and breath of their interests and scholarship. > > Eliseo Fernández -- semiotic constraints and habit-formation in technical des > Fernando Zalamea -- Peirce’s logic of continuity applied within modern > mathematics; > Vinicius Romanini -- biosemiotics and the semiotic basis of life processes; > Jon Alan Schmidt -- engineering ethics informed, in part, by Peirce's ethics > of inquiry; > Terrence Deacon -- teleodynamics and emergent mind-like processes in > nature; > Gary Fuhrman -- Turning Signs, which book discusses natural and cultural > semiosis; > Michael Shapiro -- Contributions to Peircean linguistics and semiotic > phonology; > Joseph Dauben -- applications of Peircean ideas in mathematics; > John Deely -- the role of signs in animal behavior and the broader > semiosphere; > Simon Polovina -- inter-enterprise architecture using existential graphs > and triadic logic. > > In my view, the folk above "got Peirce right" -- that is, they interpreted > what he said correctly (to some considerable degree then tend to agree with > each other on Peircean principles and methods), while they also tend to speak > the same Peircean conceptual language (more or less). > > For me, the essential thing -- the first thing, the most important thing -- > is to grasp Peirce's ideas clearly, even if -- perhaps especially if -- one > strongly disagrees with some aspect of his philosophy. Only then will the > real world application of his philosophy be adequately grounded and further > developed. > > Best, > > Gary R > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
