Jon, List, Is it possible that any of these -- a unique (first time) hand signal, or a lightning flash, or a hiccup -- is an example of a token that is not an instance of a type?
Some Peirce scholars, including Joe Ransdell (but also Short, Liszka, and Parker), wondered about 'first-time' or 'natural' signs that at "first blush" (as Joe would say) look type-less. But, as I recall, these scholars, each and all, concluded that such (e.g., 'natural signs') function under *some* generality: a natural law, a habit, or an 'interpretive generalization', even if that interpretation were formed on the spot (and even, say, if that first time unique hand signal were misinterpreted to mean 'run' when the signaler meant 'hide'.) So my own answer to the question would be that there really isn't a sign-token that isn’t, in some way, an instance of a type. But then another question arises: how wide should we consider 'type' and 'law' to be in Peirce's semiotic? Best, Gary R On Wed, Nov 5, 2025 at 6:14 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Jack, List: > > I requested a concrete counterexample, not an unsubstantiated claim to > have an abstract formal demonstration. Besides, it seems to be grounded in > linguistics (not semeiotic) and textbook nominalism (not scholastic > realism)--general types are not real, only individual tokens, which we > arbitrarily but habitually use as common names for different things with > certain similarities. Needless to say, any such purported "proof" is a > non-starter from a Peircean standpoint. In accordance with his definitions > (e.g., CP 4.537, 1906), my question presupposes that *some *sign tokens > are instances of sign types, and asks whether in fact *all *sign tokens > are instances of sign types. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2025 at 12:16 PM Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, List. >> >> JAS: Is every sign *token *an instance of a sign *type*, as I have been >> maintaining for quite some time now? >> >> No. To be simple about it. I have a mathematical/logical method to prove >> that such cannot be true along Pavlovian lines and arbitrariness as well as >> what is "necessary" within symbolic and "other" meaning-making systems. It >> is habit, almost entirely, if not entirely, which makes such a thing as you >> have proposed: token/type distinctions. >> >> I don't see the necessity to it sans certain categorical symbolic >> distinctions which are not necessary but are very common and habitual. >> >> Best, >> Jack >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> on >> behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 5, 2025 6:08 PM >> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Categorial Involution, and >> Contemporary Peirce Scholarship >> >> List: >> >> Getting back to the thread topic, last Friday I posted several questions >> in the hope of prompting some further discussion ( >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-10/msg00145.html). Since no >> one else has taken up any of them yet, I am doing so myself, starting with >> the last two. >> >> >> JAS: Is every sign *token *an instance of a sign *type*, as I have been >> maintaining for quite some time now? >> >> >> Obviously, my current answer is "yes"; but as I have said before, all >> that it would take to justify answering "no" is a single >> counterexample--something that is incontrovertibly a sign token but >> *cannot* be understood as an instance of a sign type. Can anybody >> provide one? >> >> >> JAS: If so, then how do we account for the fact that every type is a >> *collective*, such that its dynamical object is *general*, while a token >> can be a *concretive*, such that its dynamical object is an *individual*? >> >> >> Here, I propose to apply Peirce's late topical conception of continuity >> to both a type as a general sign and its dynamical object, which is >> likewise general--each is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite >> possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). After all, "every >> general concept is, in reference to its individuals, strictly a continuum"; >> and thus, "in the light of the logic of relatives, the general is seen to >> be precisely the continuous" (NEM 4:358, 1893). "Continuity, as generality, >> is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general" (CP 6.204, 1898). >> >> >> Accordingly, in my view, a type as a *general* sign is a continuum of >> *potential* tokens, some of which are actualized as *individual* signs; >> its dynamical object is also general as a continuum of potential >> individuals, some of which are actualized; and those existents can then >> serve as the dynamical objects of tokens of that type. Hence, a token that >> is an instance of a type can denote either the same general object that the >> type denotes, such that it is a collective like the type itself, or an >> individual object that is an instantiation of that general, such that it is >> instead a concretive. For example, as a type, the word "triangle" refers >> to "a triangle in general, which is neither equilateral, isosceles, nor >> scalene" (CP 5.181, EP 2:227, 1903); but as a token, it can also refer to >> an individual triangle, which must be exactly one of these three kinds. >> >> >> I suggest that this is the sense in which a type *involves* and *governs* >> tokens as its instances, and in which a general (3ns) *involves* and >> *governs* individuals as its possible (1ns) and actual (2ns) >> instantiations--perhaps pointing toward the answer to one of my other >> questions. >> >> >> JAS: What exactly does it mean for 3ns to *govern* 1ns and 2ns? >> >> >> "That which is possible is in so far *general* and, as general, it >> ceases to be individual. Hence, ... the word 'potential' means *indeterminate >> yet capable of determination in any special case*" (CP 6.185, 1898). As >> I see it, in order to serve as an instance of a type, a token must be >> *determined* by that type (as the token's immediate object) to *conform* >> to that type (as "a definitely significant Form," CP 4.537, 1906), which is >> what enables the token to represent the type's dynamical object or any >> instantiation thereof; and in order to qualify as such an *actual* >> instantiation of a general object, an individual object must *conform* >> to one of its inexhaustibly many *possible* instantiations. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM > PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default > email account, then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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