Gary R., List: I have fixed the subject line to put this back in the original thread.
My only quibble with your summary below is that a sign type (legisign in 1903) is not necessarily a *symbol*--in all of Peirce's taxonomies, there are also *iconic *types and *indexical *types. On the other hand, your statement that "meaning flows through a chain of *likeness* and *embodiment* rather than mechanical transformation" strikes me as spot-on and worthy of further contemplation. As for the rest, to be honest, I have not yet figured out all the details of my previous post's last paragraph; it indeed raises a number of questions that likewise warrant additional consideration and (hopefully) discussion. What is the connection between a true continuum and a triadic relation? What exactly does it mean for 3ns to *govern* 1ns and 2ns? How does this apply to the *genuine *triadic relation of mediating, i.e., how exactly does that relation *govern *the degenerate triadic relation, the involved dyadic relations, and the involved monadic characters? Is every sign *token *an instance of a sign *type*, as I have been maintaining for quite some time now? If so, then how do we account for the fact that every type is a *collective*, such that its dynamical object is *general*, while a token can be a *concretive*, such that its dynamical object is an *individual*? I suspect that at least some of the answers here will have to do with the reality of *final *causation, which Peirce repeatedly affirms and explains as *not *synonymous with a conscious *purpose*. In fact, he explicitly views evolution as *demonstrating *the reality of final causes. CSP: [I]t may be that some reader, even at this day, remains imbued with the old notion that there are no final causes in nature; in which case, natural selection, and every form of evolution, would be false. For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite end. A final cause may be conceived to operate without having been the purpose of any mind: that supposed phenomenon goes by the name of *fate*. The doctrine of evolution refrains from pronouncing whether forms are simply fated or whether they are providential; but that definite ends are worked out none of us today any longer deny. ... It is, as I was saying, a widespread error to think that a "final cause" is necessarily a purpose. A purpose is merely that form of final cause which is most familiar to our experience. ... we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts about according to which a general description of result is made to come about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way ... Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to be brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain general character. Efficient causation, on the other hand, is a compulsion determined by the particular condition of things, and is a compulsion acting to make that situation begin to change in a perfectly determinate way ... (CP 1.204&211-2, 1902) In short, *denying *the reality of final causation inevitably leads to embracing *determinism*, which Peirce usually calls "necessitarianism." Accordingly, the non-deterministic nature of semiosis--something else on which I believe everyone would be in agreement--*requires *the reality of final causation, which corresponds to 3ns; efficient and material causation correspond to 2ns, and formal causation corresponds to 1ns. Hence, another manifestation of how nominalism pervades modern thought--especially in philosophy and science--is the widespread emphasis on material and efficient causes, often to the exclusion of formal and final causes. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Oct 31, 2025 at 6:27 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Helmut, List, > > For me this was a helpful post in explaining some of the > difficult to grasp relations in Peirce's semeiotic grammar, especially some > of those in his later work, some of which are only beginning to be explored > (for example, by you). I also find your abduction at the end of your post > most interesting and seemingly sound. It is useful to have this facet of > semeiotic grammar laid out succinctly. All of it will take some rereading and > study by me, but I think I am grasping most of it. For now, I'll only > comment on the conclusion of your post beginning with your third and last > bullet point: > > Jon: * The degenerate (immediate) object and relatively qualitative > (immediate) interpretant are involved in *degenerate *dyadic relations > with a sign token, which is why there are no separate trichotomies for > those *internal *relations. > > > So the 'basics' as I understand them, seem to look something like this (my > highlighted study guide version): A sign *type* is *a general form *-- a > *symbol, > habit *or *law* -- while a *token* is* a concrete occurrence of that form*; > further, *every type must be embodied in some token to function at all.* So > far I would think that everyone would be in agreement. > > Jon: I suggest that *the type is the **immediate object of the token, > and that this is why the token has the same dynamical **object as the > type*. Moreover, again for *any *iconic sign, "If it conveys information, > it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent > may be said to convey information" (ibid.). Hence, *the token has the > same **immediate **interpretant as the type, which in the specific case > of a word is its verbal definition* (emphasis added by GR). > > > So, the* token represents its **type** iconically* in resembling it in some > qualitative aspect(s). *This resemblance marks a degenerate dyadic > relation between token and type**.* *T**he type acts as the immediate > object of the token*, both sharing the same dynamical object and the same > immediate interpretant. In that manner meaning flows through a chain of > *likeness* and *embodiment* rather than mechanical transformation. Even > in abstract semeiotic grammar *the life of the sign *is apparent! > > Further, you remark that such degenerate semiosis (icons and tokens) remains > part of the broader triadic continuum. Now this is where I get a bit > uncertain. You say that genuine triads govern mediation and growth while > degenerate dyads provide the qualitative(?) 'link' which allows a type to > appear in the world as a token. It would be helpful to flesh that out a > bit. How does the genuine triad govern its correlates? And what is the > 'link' (if that's the right word) that allows a type to appear as a token? > What exactly is it that connects them? > > But the big 'take-away' for me is that Peirce’s involution of categories > means that if 3ns (continuity, habit, etc.) contains, constrains, and > rules the 2ns and 1ns 'within' it, then even the simplest token-type pair > presupposes > the* living law of semiosis* connecting them. Now how would one > describe that 'living law'. > > Best, > > Gary R >
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