Jon, Helmut, List, For me this was a helpful post in explaining some of the difficult to grasp relations in Peirce's semeiotic grammar, especially some of those in his later work, some of which are only beginning to be explored (for example, by you). I also find your abduction at the end of your post most interesting and seemingly sound. It is useful to have this facet of semeiotic grammar laid out succinctly. All of it will take some rereading and study by me, but I think I am grasping most of it. For now, I'll only comment on the conclusion of your post beginning with your third and last bullet point:
Jon: * The degenerate (immediate) object and relatively qualitative (immediate) interpretant are involved in *degenerate *dyadic relations with a sign token, which is why there are no separate trichotomies for those *internal *relations. So the 'basics' as I understand them, seem to look something like this (my highlighted study guide version): A sign *type* is *a general form *-- a *symbol, habit *or *law* -- while a *token* is* a concrete occurrence of that form*; further, *every type must be embodied in some token to function at all.* So far I would think that everyone would be in agreement. Jon: I suggest that *the type is the **immediate object of the token, and that this is why the token has the same dynamical **object as the type*. Moreover, again for *any *iconic sign, "If it conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information" (ibid.). Hence, *the token has the same * *immediate **interpretant as the type, which in the specific case of a word is its verbal definition* (emphasis added by GR). So, the* token represents its **type** iconically* in resembling it in some qualitative aspect(s). *This resemblance marks a degenerate dyadic relation between token and type**.* *T**he type acts as the immediate object of the token*, both sharing the same dynamical object and the same immediate interpretant. In that manner meaning flows through a chain of *likeness* and *embodiment* rather than mechanical transformation. Even in abstract semeiotic grammar *the life of the sign *is apparent! Further, you remark that such degenerate semiosis (icons and tokens) remains part of the broader triadic continuum. Now this is where I get a bit uncertain. You say that genuine triads govern mediation and growth while degenerate dyads provide the qualitative(?) 'link' which allows a type to appear in the world as a token. It would be helpful to flesh that out a bit. How does the genuine triad govern its correlates? And what is the 'link' (if that's the right word) that allows a type to appear as a token? What exactly is it that connects them? But the big 'take-away' for me is that Peirce’s involution of categories means that if 3ns (continuity, habit, etc.) contains, constrains, and rules the 2ns and 1ns 'within' it, then even the simplest token-type pair presupposes the* living law of semiosis* connecting them. Now how would one describe that 'living law'. Best, Gary R On Fri, Oct 31, 2025 at 12:15 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > This is brilliant! Extraordinarily concise logic. It seems to me to sum up > in the abstract the development of object - sign - interpretant for > semeiotic grammar. I have already begun studying. Thank you. > > I wonder if the inclusion of diagrams -- not exclusively EGs -- to > visually show these seemingly complex relations (with their changed > vocabularies, etc.) Of course you know I must have some ideas > about diagrams! > > Anyhow, once again, for those with eyes to see, you have few peers in > Peirce studies. And it only takes a miniature, like this post, to reveal it > (at least to me). > > Cheers, > > Gary > > On Thu, Oct 30, 2025 at 2:12 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R., Helmut, List: >> >> Picking up where I left off in my post yesterday, Peirce concisely >> summarizes how categorial involution manifests in triadic relations as >> follows. >> >> >> CSP: Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic relationships and >> three monadic characters; just as every dyadic action involves two monadic >> characters. A monadic character involves nothing dyadic or triadic; nor >> does a dyadic action involve anything triadic. But a triad always involves >> three dyads and three monads; and a dyad involves two monads. (CP 6.331, >> 1907) >> >> >> >> Here, "monadic characters" or "monads" correspond to what he calls >> "correlates" in 1903--a sign is a monad that is *involved *in a triad, >> not *itself *a triad. The triadic relation in which a sign *represents *its >> object for its interpretant or (more generally) *mediates *between its >> object and interpretant (O-S-I) involves three dyadic relations (O-S, S-I, >> O-I), each of which involves two of the three monadic characters that are >> involved in the triadic relation (S, O, I). Again, Peirce states in 1903 >> that the trichotomies for those three correlates/monads *themselves *can >> be used to obtain ten classes of *triadic relations* (CP 2.238, EP >> 2:290), while the well-known ten classes of *signs *are instead derived >> from the trichotomies for just one such monadic character (S) and the >> two *dyadic relations *that involve it (O-S and S-I; CP 2.243, EP >> 2:291). As I have noted before, even in Peirce's later taxonomies, there is >> no separate trichotomy for the dyadic O-I relation because it is the same >> as the dyadic O-S relation--"the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in >> a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to >> it as the Representamen itself does" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273). >> >> >> That brings me to Helmut's post below. >> >> >> HR: The three interpretants, as I think now, differently from before, are >> a triad, and the two objects a dyad. >> >> >> On the contrary, the three interpretants are *not *a triad because they >> are *not *the three correlates/monads that are involved in a triadic >> *relation*; instead, they are a trichotomy--a threefold *division *of >> the interpretant into "a relatively genuine 3ns, a relatively reactional >> 3ns ... and a relatively qualitative 3ns" (CP 5.72, EP 2:162). "A sign >> ... has three Interpretants, the *immediate*, to which it is primarily >> Tertian, the *dynamic*, to which it is secundally Tertian, the *rational*, >> to which it is genuinely Tertian" (R 339:247r >> <https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$467i>, 1905 >> Jul 7). Likewise, the two objects are *not *a dyad because they are *not >> *the two correlates/monads that are involved in a dyadic *relation*; >> instead, they are a dichotomy--a twofold *division *of the object into a >> genuine 2ns and a degenerate 2ns. "A sign ... has two Objects, the >> *immediate*, to which it is *degenerately *Secundan, the *dynamic*, to >> which it is *genuinely *Secundan" (ibid.). Unlike the trichotomies >> mentioned above, these phaneroscopic divisions obviously do not identify >> different classes of signs; instead, they reveal a total of six >> correlates/monads, each of which has *its own* trichotomy for >> classifying signs in Peirce's late taxonomies. >> >> >> Putting it all together, the following is my current understanding. >> >> - The genuine (dynamical) object and relatively genuine (final) >> interpretant are involved in a *genuine *triadic relation with the >> sign *itself *(Od-S-If), which *is not* reducible to their *genuine >> *dyadic >> relations with that sign (Od-S and S-If). >> - The genuine (dynamical) object and relatively reactional >> (dynamical) interpretant are involved in a *degenerate *triadic >> relation with a sign *token *(Od-S-Id), which *is *reducible to their >> *genuine >> *dyadic relations with that token as an *instance *of the sign (Od-S >> and S-Id). >> - The degenerate (immediate) object and relatively qualitative >> (immediate) interpretant are involved in *degenerate *dyadic >> relations with a sign token, which is why there are no separate >> trichotomies for those *internal *relations. >> >> Elaborating on the last bullet, a sign type is "a definitely significant >> Form," and "In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a >> Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type >> signifies" (CP 4.537, 1906). But *how *does a token represent the >> corresponding type? "We have to distinguish *Symbols*, which are not >> themselves existent things from *Instances *of them, which are Icons of >> them" (NEM 3:877, 1908 Dec 5). The token is an *iconic *sign of the >> type, recognizable as such only by virtue of its *qualities*, so they >> are the two correlates/monads involved in a *degenerate *dyadic >> relation--for *any *iconic sign, "the dual relation between the sign and >> its object is degenerate" (CP 3.362, 1885), and "The relation to its object >> is a degenerate relation" (NEM 4:242, EP 2:306, 1901). Accordingly, I >> suggest that the type is the *immediate *object of the token, and that >> this is why the token has the same *dynamical *object as the type. >> Moreover, again for *any *iconic sign, "If it conveys information, it is >> only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent may be >> said to convey information" (ibid.). Hence, the token has the same *immediate >> *interpretant as the type, which in the specific case of a word is its >> verbal definition. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Wed, Oct 29, 2025 at 11:44 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jon, Gary, List, >>> >>> Involution, if I´m right, appears in trichotomies, and correlation in >>> triads. The three interpretants, as I think now, differently from before, >>> are a triad, and the two objects a dyad. Not a tricho- resp. dichotomy! All >>> categories come together, so how can there be a dyad? Because it is only >>> prescinded. To me it makes sense to say, that in reality all categories >>> always appear together. And that even a sign triad with a qualisign has >>> three correlates, and the full hexad too. Even if the sign is >>> "possibility". Just then all three resp. six elements pretty much look the >>> same like each other. The meaning of the word "possibility" implies >>> anticipation. If it is only possibility, what is the object? Everything, >>> that determines this possibility. The interpretant is everything, that is >>> possible. As long, as everything, that determines the possibility, is >>> everything, it is pure possibiliy, and nothing happens. Only, when the >>> possibility is restricted, something happens, and then the object isn´t >>> anymore everything, but a subset of everything: Something. And an >>> interpretant is determined, which is different from pure possibility. The >>> interpretant then delivers a new sign, and so on. So, pure possibility is >>> an unstable thing, it just needs a little haphazard restriction, then >>> things start, and unfold. Sounds a bit like the beginning of "Science of >>> Logic" by Hegel, but I don´t like him. Anyway, my point in this post was, >>> that I think, that in reality (other than in prescinded parts) all >>> categories always come together, and degeneracy does not mean there, that >>> any elements are missing, but that some of them look quite similar to each >>> other. >>> >>> Best, Helmut >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
