List: Getting back to the thread topic, last Friday I posted several questions in the hope of prompting some further discussion ( https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-10/msg00145.html). Since no one else has taken up any of them yet, I am doing so myself, starting with the last two.
JAS: Is every sign *token *an instance of a sign *type*, as I have been maintaining for quite some time now? Obviously, my current answer is "yes"; but as I have said before, all that it would take to justify answering "no" is a single counterexample--something that is incontrovertibly a sign token but *cannot* be understood as an instance of a sign type. Can anybody provide one? JAS: If so, then how do we account for the fact that every type is a *collective*, such that its dynamical object is *general*, while a token can be a *concretive*, such that its dynamical object is an *individual*? Here, I propose to apply Peirce's late topical conception of continuity to both a type as a general sign and its dynamical object, which is likewise general--each is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). After all, "every general concept is, in reference to its individuals, strictly a continuum"; and thus, "in the light of the logic of relatives, the general is seen to be precisely the continuous" (NEM 4:358, 1893). "Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general" (CP 6.204, 1898). Accordingly, in my view, a type as a *general* sign is a continuum of *potential* tokens, some of which are actualized as *individual* signs; its dynamical object is also general as a continuum of potential individuals, some of which are actualized; and those existents can then serve as the dynamical objects of tokens of that type. Hence, a token that is an instance of a type can denote either the same general object that the type denotes, such that it is a collective like the type itself, or an individual object that is an instantiation of that general, such that it is instead a concretive. For example, as a type, the word "triangle" refers to "a triangle in general, which is neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene" (CP 5.181, EP 2:227, 1903); but as a token, it can also refer to an individual triangle, which must be exactly one of these three kinds. I suggest that this is the sense in which a type *involves* and *governs* tokens as its instances, and in which a general (3ns) *involves* and *governs* individuals as its possible (1ns) and actual (2ns) instantiations--perhaps pointing toward the answer to one of my other questions. JAS: What exactly does it mean for 3ns to *govern* 1ns and 2ns? "That which is possible is in so far *general* and, as general, it ceases to be individual. Hence, ... the word 'potential' means *indeterminate yet capable of determination in any special case*" (CP 6.185, 1898). As I see it, in order to serve as an instance of a type, a token must be *determined* by that type (as the token's immediate object) to *conform* to that type (as "a definitely significant Form," CP 4.537, 1906), which is what enables the token to represent the type's dynamical object or any instantiation thereof; and in order to qualify as such an *actual* instantiation of a general object, an individual object must *conform* to one of its inexhaustibly many *possible* instantiations. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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