List: JAS wrote:
> JAS: Is every sign token an instance of a sign type, as I have been > maintaining for quite some time now? I would disagree; this assertion operates only within deduction, where x re-presents X, ie, Thirdness and Secondness, and ignores the vital role of Abduction - where x is within the mode of Firstness and has no ’typology! Note- abduction is the process of FORMING a new habit/type..from an emerging population of new, unrelated-to-the-old instances. Common biological examples are speciation, where a species splits into two or more Types that can no longer interbreed [ because they each have different Habits-of-Formation [ Types]. This takes place over time, where the first ‘mutations’ as single entity appearances will gradually develop a new habit-of-formation [ Type] . Examples are the squirrel populations separated in space [ by the Grand Canyon] The London Underground Mosquito - which changed its habits [Type] due to a small population size in a different area. The green warbler in the Himalayas which changed its habits [Type] due to a different environment…And..apple maggot flies which changed by using different host plants..and..mutations..’cultivated wheat]. Socially, we must acknowledge the reality of different cultural habits - and the FACT that diversity is a reality within the universe, which obviously means that habit, which rule instantiations..change. We can see this in all facets of cultural differentiation..from dress code to societal norms to political and economic methods of organization. Don’t expect instant changes! The changes emerge among a few and then will spread to the larger population..whether this be dress code, the use of money, the concept of the nuclear family, the different types of religious beliefs..andn so on. But most certainly, a universe operating only within the cement of deduction and induction..won’t last. Because it has no capacity for change. Abduction,the emergence of new Types/habits..which enable the spread of new instantiations..is an important common base of the universe. [and I don’t ignore the fact that both Deduction and Induction, or Thirdness and Secondness, ae equally vital. The universe requires all three modes of organization of itself. Edwina > On Nov 5, 2025, at 1:16 PM, Jack Cody <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, List. > > JAS: Is every sign token an instance of a sign type, as I have been > maintaining for quite some time now? > > No. To be simple about it. I have a mathematical/logical method to prove that > such cannot be true along Pavlovian lines and arbitrariness as well as what > is "necessary" within symbolic and "other" meaning-making systems. It is > habit, almost entirely, if not entirely, which makes such a thing as you have > proposed: token/type distinctions. > > I don't see the necessity to it sans certain categorical symbolic > distinctions which are not necessary but are very common and habitual. > > Best, > Jack > From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf > of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > Sent: Wednesday, November 5, 2025 6:08 PM > To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Categorial Involution, and Contemporary > Peirce Scholarship > > List: > > Getting back to the thread topic, last Friday I posted several questions in > the hope of prompting some further discussion > (https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-10/msg00145.html). Since no one > else has taken up any of them yet, I am doing so myself, starting with the > last two. > > JAS: Is every sign token an instance of a sign type, as I have been > maintaining for quite some time now? > > Obviously, my current answer is "yes"; but as I have said before, all that it > would take to justify answering "no" is a single counterexample--something > that is incontrovertibly a sign token but cannot be understood as an instance > of a sign type. Can anybody provide one? > > JAS: If so, then how do we account for the fact that every type is a > collective, such that its dynamical object is general, while a token can be a > concretive, such that its dynamical object is an individual? > > Here, I propose to apply Peirce's late topical conception of continuity to > both a type as a general sign and its dynamical object, which is likewise > general--each is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities > (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). After all, "every general concept > is, in reference to its individuals, strictly a continuum"; and thus, "in the > light of the logic of relatives, the general is seen to be precisely the > continuous" (NEM 4:358, 1893). "Continuity, as generality, is inherent in > potentiality, which is essentially general" (CP 6.204, 1898). > > Accordingly, in my view, a type as a general sign is a continuum of potential > tokens, some of which are actualized as individual signs; its dynamical > object is also general as a continuum of potential individuals, some of which > are actualized; and those existents can then serve as the dynamical objects > of tokens of that type. Hence, a token that is an instance of a type can > denote either the same general object that the type denotes, such that it is > a collective like the type itself, or an individual object that is an > instantiation of that general, such that it is instead a concretive. For > example, as a type, the word "triangle" refers to "a triangle in general, > which is neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene" (CP 5.181, EP 2:227, > 1903); but as a token, it can also refer to an individual triangle, which > must be exactly one of these three kinds. > > I suggest that this is the sense in which a type involves and governs tokens > as its instances, and in which a general (3ns) involves and > governsindividuals as its possible (1ns) and actual (2ns) > instantiations--perhaps pointing toward the answer to one of my other > questions. > > JAS: What exactly does it mean for 3ns to govern 1ns and 2ns? > > "That which is possible is in so far general and, as general, it ceases to be > individual. Hence, ... the word 'potential' means indeterminate yet capable > of determination in any special case" (CP 6.185, 1898). As I see it, in order > to serve as an instance of a type, a token must bedetermined by that type (as > the token's immediate object) to conform to that type (as "a definitely > significant Form," CP 4.537, 1906), which is what enables the token to > represent the type's dynamical object or any instantiation thereof; and in > order to qualify as such an actualinstantiation of a general object, an > individual object must conform to one of its inexhaustibly many possible > instantiations. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . > ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> > . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, > then go to > https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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