Robert, Ben, Gary R., List: RM <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00040/pdfRF4_UwTQNX.pdf>: As for signs without a type, it is obvious that they exist. The example of new technologies, with all the new concepts that accompany them, has given rise to new facts that we never suspected could exist. This is true, moreover, for all significant advances in all sciences.
I disagree. Concepts are general, not individual; new technologies and significant advances in all sciences create or discover previously unknown *types*, which have tokens as their instances--not *singular* tokens, which *cannot *be understood as instances of types. In fact, technology production and scientific experimentation rely entirely on this *repeatability* of types in tokens as their instances. For example, "The chemist contents himself with a single experiment to establish any qualitative fact ... because he knows that there is such a uniformity in the behavior of chemical bodies that another experiment would be a mere repetition of the first in every respect" (CP 5.580, EP 2:45, 1898). BU: What I liked about the term "replica" is that a symbol could be a replica of a more general symbol. For example, a sentence - not an individual token but a type - in a particular human language could be a replica of a proposition conceived as a kind of meaning, apart from any particular human language. I agree that this is an important concept, but it can be expressed just as accurately with "instance" as Peirce's terminological replacement for "replica." It is why I often distinguish a sign *itself* from a sign *type*--the same sign can have different types in different languages and other sign systems, which is why those types can be translated in both directions. As Peirce says ... CSP: Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903) "Man" in English and "homme" in French are different tokens of different types of the same sign. Moreover, according to Peirce, this does not pertain only to *symbolic* signs--actual diagrams and pictures are *iconic* tokens, while physical signs and symptoms are *indexical* tokens, but they can likewise be different instances of the same sign. In fact, he often presents weathercocks as paradigmatic examples of indexical tokens, and yet he implies here that they are all instances of the same sign; and a few years later, he explicitly states, "I speak of the weathercock,--the type, not the single instance" (EP 2:406, 1907). GR: What I am proposing is that in consideration of EGs that we should accept Peirce's changed terminology of "instance" (for the very good reason related to his ethics of terminology), but retain it in his general semeiotic. Admittedly, not much is at stake here since the meaning of "replica" in this context is well-established. Nevertheless, Peirce *consistently *prefers "instance" after 1904--not only when discussing EGs, but also when discussing his general semeiotic. He even presents the very same example of "the" in several later texts, *always *using "instance" and *never *using "replica" (e.g., CP 4.537, 1906; LF 3/1:275, 1906; LF 1:567&579, 1911). For him, "instance" evidently conveys the thought of all occurrences of the word better than "replica." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Nov 9, 2025 at 4:01 AM robert marty <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary, Ben, List > > Regarding Jon's comment, I have nothing further to add, as Gary has since > responded in a much more appropriate and detailed manner than I could have > done myself. > > Regarding Ben's message: > > Indeed, referring to section b.4.3 of my response yesterday, we can see in > the final sub-diagram, “Varieties of Dicent Sinsigns,” that Peirce makes > the distinction mentioned by Ben. The replicas of dicent symbols > incorporated into arguments are distinguished by the classification of > those that belong to propositions that do not appear in an argument at the > time of speech. > > Ben's quotation from /317/ Kaîna Stoïchea clearly shows that an isolated > proposition can only express a desire (and, I would add, make a simple > observation), which cannot in any way influence real facts, i.e., have > practical effects. This is an obvious link to pragmatism, which highlights > the theoretical importance of semiotics in Peirce's intellectual > construction.. > > Regards, > > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* > > Le dim. 9 nov. 2025 à 09:18, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> a > écrit : > >> Ben, Jon, List, >> >> I would like to propose that the term 'replica' may still have a l >> legitimate use in Peirce's semeiotic despite its being abandoned by >> Peirce for existential graphs specifically. >> >> CSP: An individual existing embodiment of such a type is called a >> graph-instance, or a[n] instance of a graph. I formerly called it a >> replica, forgetting that Mr. Kempe, in his Memoir on Mathematical Forms, >> §170, had already preempted this word as a technical term relating to >> graphs, and that in a highly appropriate sense, while my sense was not at >> all appropriate. I therefore am glad to abandon this term. (LF 2/1:171, >> 1904) >> >> >> Peirce seems to have rejected 'replica' in EGs because "Kempe. . . had >> already preempted this word as a technical term relating to graphs, and >> that in a highly appropriate sense." Here one sees Peirce's following >> through on a principle of his Ethics of Terminology, that one should not >> use a word which another has already appropriated to express a certain >> meaning. See the whole discussion in "The Ethics of Terminology," (CP >> 2.219–2.226). >> >> Peirce makes this principle explicit: >> >> ". . . whoever first has occasion to employ a name for that [new] >> conception must invent a suitable one; and others ought to follow him; but >> that whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense >> than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits >> a shameful offence against the inventor of the symbol and against science, >> and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and >> indignation. Peirce: CP 2.224 >> >> >> In the following famous passage discussing legisigns, sinsigns, and >> replicas, Peirce remarks that "Each single instance of [a legisign] is a >> Replica." One notices in this snippet that he uses both the word >> "instance" and "replica" so that in this broadly semeiotic sense they would >> appear to be synonymous. >> >> A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by >> men. Every conventional sign is a legisign [but not conversely]. It is not >> a single object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be >> significant. Every legisign signifies through an instance of its >> application, which may be termed a Replica of it. *Thus, the word "the" >> will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in >> all these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each single >> instance of it is a Replica. The Replica is a Sinsign. *Thus, every >> Legisign requires Sinsigns. But these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as >> are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as significant. Nor would the >> Replica be significant if it were not for the law which renders it so. CP >> 2.246 (Emphasis added). >> >> >> What I am proposing is that in consideration of EGs that we should accept >> Peirce's changed terminology of "instance" (for the very good reason >> related to his ethics of terminology), but retain it in his general >> semeiotic. >> >> For a preliminary 'test' of this notion, try reading the quotation just >> above replacing each occurrence of 'Replica' with 'instance'. For me, >> 'replica' seems to convey the thought of all occurrences of the word 'the' >> better than 'instance'. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> On Sat, Nov 8, 2025 at 6:26 AM Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> What I liked about the term "replica" is that a symbol could be a >>> replica of a more general symbol. For example, a sentence - not an >>> individual token but a type - in a particular human language could be a >>> replica of a proposition conceived as a kind of meaning, apart from any >>> particular human language. Below is my footnote about it from the >>> Wikipedia article now titled "Semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce" >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_theory_of_Charles_Sanders_Peirce >>> >>> "New Elements (Kaina Stoicheia)" MS 517 (1904); EP 2:300-324, Arisbe >>> Eprint >>> https://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/stoicheia/stoicheia.htm , >>> scroll down to 317, then first new paragraph. >>> >>> On 11/7/2025 7:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >>> >>> Just to clarify, Robert's linked paper is not about *all *tokens >>> (sinsigns), it is specifically about "replicas"--a term that Peirce >>> discarded in favor of "instances" as his speculative grammar continued to >>> develop after 1903, just like he discarded "representamen" in favor of >>> "sign." >>> >>>
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