Robert, Ben, List: RM: Jon disagrees. Except that he disagrees with something I absolutely did not write
I disagree with the statements that I quoted in my post on Monday (see below). It is not at all obvious that signs without types exist--only sign tokens (sinsigns) *exist*, and the whole question being discussed here is whether there are *any *sign tokens (sinsigns) that are *not *instances (replicas) of sign types (legisigns). I pointed out that concepts are general (types), not individual (tokens), because that includes all the new concepts that accompany new technologies and significant advances in all sciences; so, neither of those qualifies as a counterexample. RM: Indeed, if something is a token, it is a token of a type, and therefore it is not singular; and if something is singular, then it has no corresponding type and therefore it is not a token. This is exactly what I have been saying, but just to be clear--as Ben already noted, in Peirce's later writings, "token" replaces "sinsign," not "replica"; and again, what replaces "replica" is "instance" (CP 4.537, 1906). My claim is that every token is an instance of a type, i.e., every sinsign is a replica of a legisign; there are no singular tokens, i.e., there no singular sinsigns. Do we agree on that after all? If not, then I am still looking for a specific token that is *not *an instance of a type, i.e., a specific sinsign that is *not *a replica of a legisign. RM: He [the chemist] discovers a fact, not a law (type). The law remains to be created and is the result of a process within the scientific community that begins by verifying that the fact is not linked to the singularity of the circumstances of the discovery (for example, the experimental setup) or to that of the chemist himself. Then, and only then, does the fact become the token of a type. Again, I disagree--my answer to Ben's question, "Does the legisign or type need a human interpreter in order to be real?" is emphatically no; after all, to be *real *is to be such as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it. Scientific laws are *discovered *by humans, not *created *by humans; they were real and operative long before anyone observed certain surprising facts, proposed hypotheses to explain those facts, and conducted additional experiments to corroborate or falsify those hypotheses. The underlying assumption of the entire scientific enterprise is that *every *fact is an instantiation of a law, an individual instance of a general type; a fact does not *become *an instantiation of a law only when humans finally *recognize *their connection. As Peirce says, "in the light of the logic of relatives, the general is seen to be precisely the continuous. Thus, the doctrine of the reality of continuity coincides with that opinion the schoolmen called realism; and ... in another dress it is the doctrine of all modern science" (NEM 4:358, 1893). RM: On the debate between replica and instance, I remain determined to use "replica" in semiotics, as it is established in practice; it is a question of synonymy. Everyone is free to use either term. I already acknowledged that not much is at stake here since the meaning of "replica" in this context is well-established. Nevertheless, I personally prefer to comply with Peirce's own decision to abandon representamen, qualisign/sinsign/legisign, and replica in favor of sign, tone/token/type, and instance. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Nov 11, 2025 at 1:31 PM Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > I've reviewed the quotes, all from 1903 or later, from Peirce on replicas > and instances at the Commens Dictoinary, and it's apparent that in none of > them does Peirce allow one symbol to be a replica of another - I've found > it only in Kaina Stoicheia (1901). So my point about replicas is moot. > > Peirce used tone, token, type as other names for qualisign, sinsign, > legisign. He said the "sin" is taken from "simplex", "semel" etc. and, in > various texts, that it is an existent individual thing or individual event, > that is a sign. See quotes at the Commens Dictionary via Internet Archive: > > https://web.archive.org/web/20240625183550/http://commens.org/dictionary/term/sinsign > > It's true that when a person newly learns of a fact, or learns of a > new-born fact (like what number won an office lottery), it's not always > obvious what type it may instance. Various and even conflicting various > rules expressible as types, legisigns. One doesn't always know just > yet. Does the legisign or type need a human interpreter in order to be > real (not actually existent but still real)? > > Peirce allowed of the abduction, the tentative discovery, of a rule from > particulars only once that I know of. In his 1903 Syllabus of his Lowell > lecture series Some Topics of Logic, he wrote (Essential Peirce 2, 287, > in 1st paragraph and 2nd paragraphs. > https://books.google.com/books?id=sSPlBeBlcaIC&pg=PA287&lpg=PA287&dq=%22either+in+the+hypothesis+itself,+or+in+the+pre-known%22 > > Feynman gave a whole lecture "Seeking New Laws," 11/19/1964 and said, > "First, we guess it." That's the lecture in which he lays out the method: > 1. guess the law, 2. compute the implications, 3. test the prediction > against experiment or experience. > 1 minute clip: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b240PGCMwV0 > whole lecture: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8N_zBehVi-U > > Best, Ben > > On 11/11/2025 8:40 AM, robert marty wrote: > > Ben, Gary R., List: > > Jon disagrees. Except that he disagrees with something I absolutely did > not write, namely: “*Concepts are general, not individual*”! Did I write > such an enormity? If anyone on this list thinks so, I would be very > grateful if they would explain it to me, and if they convince me, I will > stop writing and devote myself to watering the few flowers on my balcony. > Everyone will appreciate Jon's comment, and I will stay on topic without > introducing any personal aspects. > > The logical consequence of this absurdity would be that there are "*singular > tokens*," an oxymoron conveniently coined by JAS. Indeed, if something is > a token, it is a token of a type, and therefore it is not singular; and if > something is singular, then it has no corresponding type and therefore it > is not a token. I am not trapped in this circularity as JAS would like to > believe. For I wrote "*new facts*" (token does not appear in the > quotation) and the chemist's example suits me very well. He discovers a > fact, not a law (type). The law remains to be created and is the result of > a process within the scientific community that begins by verifying that the > fact is not linked to the singularity of the circumstances of the discovery > (for example, the experimental setup) or to that of the chemist himself. > Then, and only then, does the fact become the token of a type. This is a > commonplace of the scientific approach. > > There are countless examples. I will mention just one in the field of > biotechnology. In 1869, DNA was isolated by Swiss chemist Friedrich > Miescher. He named it nuclein; it would later be renamed DNA. This was an > event without type, and it would remain so until 1944, when experiments > conducted by Oswald Avery, Colin MacLeod, and Maclyn McCarty demonstrated > that DNA is the genetic material responsible for the transmission of > hereditary characteristics. DNA became a token of the law adopted by the > biochemistry community according to its specific standards. As for the > double helix that reveals its structure, it was discovered by James Watson > and Francis Crick in 1953. If you want a list of the new concepts in > genetic engineering that have been forged since then, ask your favorite AI. > > On the debate between replica and instance, I remain determined to use > "replica" in semiotics, as it is established in practice; it is a question > of synonymy. Everyone is free to use either term. > > Regards, > > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ > > Le lun. 10 nov. 2025 à 20:09, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > a écrit : > > Robert, Ben, Gary R., List: > > RM > <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00040/pdfRF4_UwTQNX.pdf>: > As for signs without a type, it is obvious that they exist. The example of > new technologies, with all the new concepts that accompany them, has given > rise to new facts that we never suspected could exist. This is true, > moreover, for all significant advances in all sciences. > > I disagree. Concepts are general, not individual; new technologies and > significant advances in all sciences create or discover previously unknown > *types*, which have tokens as their instances--not *singular* tokens, > which *cannot* be understood as instances of types. In fact, technology > production and scientific experimentation rely entirely on this > *repeatability* of types in tokens as their instances. For example, "The > chemist contents himself with a single experiment to establish any > qualitative fact ... because he knows that there is such a uniformity in > the behavior of chemical bodies that another experiment would be a mere > repetition of the first in every respect" (CP 5.580, EP 2:45, 1898). > >
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