Jon, List,
JAS: "there are no singular tokens, i.e., there no singular sinsigns."
JAS:"there are no singular tokens",
YES! It's a tautology, since it's a token, it's a replica of a type.
Do we agree on that after all ?
JAS: "i.e., there no singular sinsigns"
NO !
Peirce: CP 2.254: First: A Qualisign …is any quality … a quality can only
denote *an*
* Object* ..
CP 2.255: Second: An Iconic Sinsign [*e.g., *an individual
diagram]… it determine the idea of *an object* …
CP 2.256: Third: A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign …it directs
attention to *an Object* …
CP 2.257: Fourth: A Dicent Sinsign … affords information concerning *its
Objec*t … *The only information it can afford is of actual fact *…
CP 2.265: In the course of the above descriptions of the classes, certain
subdivisions of some of them have been directly or indirectly referred to.
Namely, beside the *normal varieties of Sinsigns*, Indices, and Dicisigns,
there are others which are *Replicas of Legisigns*, Symbols, and Arguments,
*respectively.*
RM: That is to say, among the *normal varieties* *of Sinsigns* there are
*replicas* *of Legisigns*; among *the normal varieties* *of Indices* there
are *replicas* *of Symbols*; among *the normal varieties of Dicisigns*
there are *replicas of* *Arguments* …
*Conclusion:* *the normal varieties of Sinsigns that are not replicas of
Legisigns are singular signs that are not tokens.*
*Example by Peirce*: by CP 2.255 an *individual diagram*, is an Iconic
Sinsign and by CP 2.258, a diagram, *apart from its factual individuality*
is any general law *or type* named Iconic Legisign … In other words, an
individual diagram retains its singularity until an expert identifies it as
a token of a type, which can take a very long time (this was the case for
DNA). How many diagrams drawn by bricoleurs in their articles will retain
this status forever ? Indeed:
*It was necessary for me to determine what I should call one science. For
this purpose I have united under one science studies such as the same man,
in the present state of science, might very well pursue. I have been guided
in determining this by noting how scientists associate themselves into
societies, and what contributions are commonly admitted into one journal:
being on my guard against the survival of traditions from bygone states of
science. *(NEM IV: 15, 1902, List of Proposed Memoirs on Logic, No. 1. *On
the Classification of the Theoretic Sciences of Research*)
*QED*
Do we agree on that after all ?
Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
Le jeu. 13 nov. 2025 à 00:09, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> a
écrit :
> Robert, Ben, List:
>
> RM: Jon disagrees. Except that he disagrees with something I absolutely
> did not write
>
>
> I disagree with the statements that I quoted in my post on Monday (see
> below). It is not at all obvious that signs without types exist--only sign
> tokens (sinsigns) *exist*, and the whole question being discussed here is
> whether there are *any *sign tokens (sinsigns) that are *not *instances
> (replicas) of sign types (legisigns). I pointed out that concepts are
> general (types), not individual (tokens), because that includes all the new
> concepts that accompany new technologies and significant advances in all
> sciences; so, neither of those qualifies as a counterexample.
>
> RM: Indeed, if something is a token, it is a token of a type, and
> therefore it is not singular; and if something is singular, then it has no
> corresponding type and therefore it is not a token.
>
>
> This is exactly what I have been saying, but just to be clear--as Ben
> already noted, in Peirce's later writings, "token" replaces "sinsign," not
> "replica"; and again, what replaces "replica" is "instance" (CP 4.537,
> 1906). My claim is that every token is an instance of a type, i.e., every
> sinsign is a replica of a legisign; there are no singular tokens, i.e.,
> there no singular sinsigns. Do we agree on that after all? If not, then I
> am still looking for a specific token that is *not *an instance of a
> type, i.e., a specific sinsign that is *not *a replica of a legisign.
>
> RM: He [the chemist] discovers a fact, not a law (type). The law remains
> to be created and is the result of a process within the scientific
> community that begins by verifying that the fact is not linked to the
> singularity of the circumstances of the discovery (for example, the
> experimental setup) or to that of the chemist himself. Then, and only then,
> does the fact become the token of a type.
>
>
> Again, I disagree--my answer to Ben's question, "Does the legisign or type
> need a human interpreter in order to be real?" is emphatically no; after
> all, to be *real *is to be such as it is regardless of what anyone thinks
> about it. Scientific laws are *discovered *by humans, not *created *by
> humans; they were real and operative long before anyone observed certain
> surprising facts, proposed hypotheses to explain those facts, and conducted
> additional experiments to corroborate or falsify those hypotheses. The
> underlying assumption of the entire scientific enterprise is that *every *fact
> is an instantiation of a law, an individual instance of a general type; a
> fact does not *become *an instantiation of a law only when humans finally
> *recognize *their connection. As Peirce says, "in the light of the logic
> of relatives, the general is seen to be precisely the continuous. Thus, the
> doctrine of the reality of continuity coincides with that opinion the
> schoolmen called realism; and ... in another dress it is the doctrine of
> all modern science" (NEM 4:358, 1893).
>
> RM: On the debate between replica and instance, I remain determined to use
> "replica" in semiotics, as it is established in practice; it is a question
> of synonymy. Everyone is free to use either term.
>
>
> I already acknowledged that not much is at stake here since the meaning of
> "replica" in this context is well-established. Nevertheless, I personally
> prefer to comply with Peirce's own decision to abandon representamen,
> qualisign/sinsign/legisign, and replica in favor of sign, tone/token/type,
> and instance.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Nov 11, 2025 at 1:31 PM Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> I've reviewed the quotes, all from 1903 or later, from Peirce on replicas
>> and instances at the Commens Dictoinary, and it's apparent that in none of
>> them does Peirce allow one symbol to be a replica of another - I've found
>> it only in Kaina Stoicheia (1901). So my point about replicas is moot.
>>
>> Peirce used tone, token, type as other names for qualisign, sinsign,
>> legisign. He said the "sin" is taken from "simplex", "semel" etc. and, in
>> various texts, that it is an existent individual thing or individual event,
>> that is a sign. See quotes at the Commens Dictionary via Internet Archive:
>>
>> https://web.archive.org/web/20240625183550/http://commens.org/dictionary/term/sinsign
>>
>> It's true that when a person newly learns of a fact, or learns of a
>> new-born fact (like what number won an office lottery), it's not always
>> obvious what type it may instance. Various and even conflicting various
>> rules expressible as types, legisigns. One doesn't always know just
>> yet. Does the legisign or type need a human interpreter in order to be
>> real (not actually existent but still real)?
>>
>> Peirce allowed of the abduction, the tentative discovery, of a rule from
>> particulars only once that I know of. In his 1903 Syllabus of his Lowell
>> lecture series Some Topics of Logic, he wrote (Essential Peirce 2, 287,
>> in 1st paragraph and 2nd paragraphs.
>> https://books.google.com/books?id=sSPlBeBlcaIC&pg=PA287&lpg=PA287&dq=%22either+in+the+hypothesis+itself,+or+in+the+pre-known%22
>>
>> Feynman gave a whole lecture "Seeking New Laws," 11/19/1964 and said,
>> "First, we guess it." That's the lecture in which he lays out the method:
>> 1. guess the law, 2. compute the implications, 3. test the prediction
>> against experiment or experience.
>> 1 minute clip: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b240PGCMwV0
>> whole lecture: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8N_zBehVi-U
>>
>> Best, Ben
>>
>> On 11/11/2025 8:40 AM, robert marty wrote:
>>
>> Ben, Gary R., List:
>>
>> Jon disagrees. Except that he disagrees with something I absolutely did
>> not write, namely: “*Concepts are general, not individual*”! Did I write
>> such an enormity? If anyone on this list thinks so, I would be very
>> grateful if they would explain it to me, and if they convince me, I will
>> stop writing and devote myself to watering the few flowers on my balcony.
>> Everyone will appreciate Jon's comment, and I will stay on topic without
>> introducing any personal aspects.
>>
>> The logical consequence of this absurdity would be that there are "*singular
>> tokens*," an oxymoron conveniently coined by JAS. Indeed, if something
>> is a token, it is a token of a type, and therefore it is not singular; and
>> if something is singular, then it has no corresponding type and therefore
>> it is not a token. I am not trapped in this circularity as JAS would like
>> to believe. For I wrote "*new facts*" (token does not appear in the
>> quotation) and the chemist's example suits me very well. He discovers a
>> fact, not a law (type). The law remains to be created and is the result of
>> a process within the scientific community that begins by verifying that the
>> fact is not linked to the singularity of the circumstances of the discovery
>> (for example, the experimental setup) or to that of the chemist himself.
>> Then, and only then, does the fact become the token of a type. This is a
>> commonplace of the scientific approach.
>>
>> There are countless examples. I will mention just one in the field of
>> biotechnology. In 1869, DNA was isolated by Swiss chemist Friedrich
>> Miescher. He named it nuclein; it would later be renamed DNA. This was an
>> event without type, and it would remain so until 1944, when experiments
>> conducted by Oswald Avery, Colin MacLeod, and Maclyn McCarty demonstrated
>> that DNA is the genetic material responsible for the transmission of
>> hereditary characteristics. DNA became a token of the law adopted by the
>> biochemistry community according to its specific standards. As for the
>> double helix that reveals its structure, it was discovered by James Watson
>> and Francis Crick in 1953. If you want a list of the new concepts in
>> genetic engineering that have been forged since then, ask your favorite AI.
>>
>> On the debate between replica and instance, I remain determined to use
>> "replica" in semiotics, as it is established in practice; it is a question
>> of synonymy. Everyone is free to use either term.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Robert Marty
>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
>> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
>>
>> Le lun. 10 nov. 2025 à 20:09, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
>> a écrit :
>>
>> Robert, Ben, Gary R., List:
>>
>> RM
>> <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00040/pdfRF4_UwTQNX.pdf>:
>> As for signs without a type, it is obvious that they exist. The example of
>> new technologies, with all the new concepts that accompany them, has given
>> rise to new facts that we never suspected could exist. This is true,
>> moreover, for all significant advances in all sciences.
>>
>> I disagree. Concepts are general, not individual; new technologies and
>> significant advances in all sciences create or discover previously unknown
>> *types*, which have tokens as their instances--not *singular* tokens,
>> which *cannot* be understood as instances of types. In fact, technology
>> production and scientific experimentation rely entirely on this
>> *repeatability* of types in tokens as their instances. For example, "The
>> chemist contents himself with a single experiment to establish any
>> qualitative fact ... because he knows that there is such a uniformity in
>> the behavior of chemical bodies that another experiment would be a mere
>> repetition of the first in every respect" (CP 5.580, EP 2:45, 1898).
>>
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]
> .
> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM
> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default
> email account, then go to
> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> .
But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then
go to
https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
