Jeff -’I’d be interested in the questions you have about the Lambda CDM account of the emergence of the universe. I think the nature of dark energy [lambda] [1ns? 3-1?]and dark matter [CDM][3-2?].and the relation to ’so-called ordinary matter [2ns] is fascinating.
What is EFE? [I understand QFT- quantum field theory] Edwina > On Jan 14, 2026, at 6:20 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hello, > > For those, like Gary R and Edwina, willing to share suggestions and ideas, > Thanks! > > The short description I provided in the prior email of the Origins of Order > in the Cosmos project is only meant to convey they aims and main strategies > of each of the three volumes. > > In response to Edwina, I've been taken by Prigogine's work on entropy and > dissipative systems for many years and by the concept of autopoesis developed > by Maturana and Varela. In response to Gary R., the central aim of my project > is to extend Peirce's metaphysical hypothses by building models, guided by > the principle of continuity, and then drawing out conceivable tests and > predicted consequences, guided by the pragmatic maxim. In doing so, I'm > trying to show practicing cosmologists and students of physics that the > standard Lambda CDM account leaves a lot of questions unanswered and > generates explanations about what happened in the "first second" of the > cosmos that seem implausible, at least to me. That sets up a comparison > between three competing families of hypotheses which I try to carry through > from the the origins of the cosmos to the present—pointing out the strengths > and weaknesses of the three families. > > As such, my aim is not scholarship of Peirce's texts. Rather, I'm in the > pursuit of truth about the real nature of cosmological evolution and am keen > to explore how ordered habits and laws might evolve from randomness. I've > discovered it is something of a to give a rigorous explanation of that growth > of order that can also explain how the order that did evolve in the early > cosmos gave rise to sorts of laws expressed in the EFEs and QFT, or something > like them. > > In response to Gary F., intellectual modesty will get you nowhere, at least > not with me. I know better. > > Cheers, > > Jeff > > From: Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2026 8:10 AM > To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Jeffrey Brian Downard > <[email protected]> > Cc: Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Origins of Order in the Cosmos: invitation to > collaborate > > Jeff > > Again - I am very impressed by your outline. I don’t know if any others have > replied off list. I can see how your grant applications would go nowhere - > the scope is far beyond the normal thought processes of review boards! > > I’d say that the three categories are primal - not developmental ie, all are > basic to the operation of the universe from the start - and the semiosic > triad [ which enables both continuity and deviational adaptation]. That is - > continuity is required for some forms of matter [ the most primal]. But not > for other forms of matter [ the more complex]; and both processes must exist. > > Edwina > > > > > >> On Jan 11, 2026, at 3:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Jeff- that’s a monumental project. I very much like your three volume >> outline. >> >> You don’t refer in this abstract to the reason for this development of order >> - which I suggest is the prevention of the entropic dissipation of the >> energy of the universe - and the resultant development of a CAS [ complex >> adaptive system] which keeps energy and matter in a ‘far-from-equilibrium >> state [Prigogine]. >> >> See also Stuart Kauffman’s Book ’The Origins of Order: self-organization and >> selection in Evolution Oxford Press 1993…[ which could almost be a 4th >> volume!] >> >> But again - an impressive and well-articulated project… >> >> Edwina >> >>> On Jan 11, 2026, at 3:00 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Hello, >>> >>> I forgot to give my message a suitable subject heading, and I don't want to >>> short circuit the ongoing conversation about AI. As such, I am resending >>> the message under a new subject. If you are going to respond on-list, >>> please respond in this thread. Let me add, however, that I am using AI >>> resources, including LLMs, ML to advance this project in a number of ways. >>> In the near future, I am hoping to gain access to Deep Mind and similar >>> resources. >>> For the last three decades I’ve been working—bit by bit—on a project to >>> extend Peirce’s “Guess at the Riddle” and apply pragmatic methods to >>> contemporary questions about the origins of physical order in the cosmos, >>> the origins and evolution of life, and the origins and evolution of >>> intelligent thought and action. Much of the time, it has been difficult for >>> me to see the forest for the trees. In the last few years, however, I’ve >>> made a concerted effort to tackle the first set of questions. An editor at >>> Bloomsbury Academic has expressed interest in publishing the first volume >>> as a monograph, so I'll be focused on turning the current sow's ear of a >>> working draft into something more finished. >>> A while back Terry Moore and I, with the help of others, attempted to >>> develop a framework for collaborative research, both for (a) the >>> transcription of Peirce’s manuscripts and scholarship and (b) the >>> application of pragmatic methods to questions in metaphysics and the >>> various sciences. Several members of the list wrote letters of support as a >>> few of us wrote applications for grant funding. After some years of trying >>> and a couple of decisions by the NSF that nearly went our way, we found it >>> necessary to put the grant writing to the side. At the time, Doug Anderson >>> provided some advice, which I now want to put to better effect. He >>> suggested that, if the work was worth doing, then we ought to dig into the >>> project and worry about the funding later. In the spirit of the SPIN and >>> APERI projects, I’ve developed the following framework on the first of >>> Peirce’s questions in “A Guess at the Riddle”: how did physical order first >>> grow in the cosmos? >>> Here is a very short overview of the research project—together with an >>> offer to share working drafts with those who might want to work >>> collaboratively on the questions. >>> Aims: The Origins of Order in the Cosmos project is my attempt to tell a >>> single, continuous story about how the universe became physically >>> ordered—how law, time, space, and stable objects emerged from a potential >>> field of extreme randomness and indeterminacy. The project is not written >>> as an argument for or against any one orthodox cosmology. Rather, it is >>> written as an invitation to inquiry: a structured attempt to make competing >>> explanations comparable, to expose hidden assumptions, and to build models >>> that can be criticized, repaired, and improved. I want colleagues and >>> students—including philosophers, physicists, mathematicians, engineers, and >>> interested lay people—to treat these drafts as working research >>> instruments: something you can push against, test, and use to generate new >>> questions. >>> Methods and strategies: The trilogy is built around Peircean method, >>> especially the cycle of inquiry involving iterative patterns of surprising >>> observation and abductive, deductive, and inductive inference; the >>> pragmatic maxim; and the principle of continuity. The methods are used to >>> clarify and further develop three comparative families of hypotheses. H₁ >>> treats fundamental physical laws as fixed and primordial; the early cosmos >>> is a parameterized stage-play governed by timeless equations. H₃ treats >>> early history as selection and quenching: many possibilities exist, but >>> only certain channels survive, leaving fossils—suppressed remnants, noise >>> floors, and relic constraints. H₂—the Peircean family I am especially keen >>> to explore and develop—treats laws as the result of the growth of ordered >>> habits: regularities strengthen as degrees of freedom reduce, as >>> coarse-graining stabilizes, and as the very meaning of what is “measurable” >>> sharpens. To sharpen the hypotheses in each family, the books insist on >>> explicit interfaces, “glue rules,” and conceivable tests and predicted >>> consequences that can shift comparative weights rather than merely decorate >>> a narrative. >>> Formal toolkit: We question the presupposition that early regimes are >>> naturally point-like as rational values or fully metric. As such, we >>> develop a modeling toolbox designed to respect structural uncertainty and >>> changing “license conditions” for concepts. Phase and parameter space >>> models are scaffolded with hypercomplex (Cayley–Dickson) and other >>> composition algebras as a way to represent evolving degrees of freedom, >>> compositional stability, and stabilization across epochs of cosmological >>> evolution. We use surreal (non-Archimedean) and interval-valued bookkeeping >>> when the regime does not justify rational-number determinacy, and to permit >>> the natural inclusion of values for our variables that are infinitesimals >>> and infinities. And we use multiple logics to match multiple regimes: >>> probabilistic logic for randomness and inference; constructive logic when >>> existence claims must be operationally witnessed; Peirce’s Gamma >>> existential graphs for higher-order/modal structure; and categorical logic >>> to build disciplined bridges between compositional algebras and between >>> these logical systems and the more deterministic language of first-order >>> theory. The ambition is to make our reasoning about physics more faithful >>> to what the different regimes reasonably allow. >>> Volume I: Origins of Order—Evolution of Law, Time and Space lays down the >>> backbone: an “interface-first” cosmology in which topology, projective >>> comparability, and metric structure are treated as rungs on a ladder rather >>> than as givens. The core question is deceptively simple: How could a world >>> that begins as high-dimensional, highly random potentiality ever become a >>> world where stable quantities, stable geometry, and stable processes are >>> possible? Here we introduce a strategy of non-retrojection—don’t talk as if >>> clocks, particles, or equilibrium thermodynamics were primitive where they >>> are not licensed—and we begin to articulate what would count as a “durable >>> carrier”—something that persists under coarse-graining and can transport >>> structure forward. Volume I is where the comparative posture leads the way: >>> every claim is framed against H₁ and H₃, with H₂ defended by continuity and >>> by its ability to reduce errors while still generating testable proxy >>> profiles. >>> In practice, Volume I builds toy models of order-growth: we start with toy >>> models of weighted dice and urns, and work our way to variance collapse and >>> attractor-like regularities; stabilization under repeated coarse-graining; >>> and the emergence of ordered conditions from chaotic regimes that precede >>> full metric time. The hypercomplex and surreal tools enter here as modeling >>> strategies: they let us represent pre-metric regimes without pretending we >>> already have real-number metrical geometry, and they allow us to treat >>> “dimension” as something that can be effective, local, and historically >>> stabilized rather than eternally fixed. The goal is to explain how the laws >>> expressed as Einstein’s field equations (EFEs) might, under H₂ and H₃, have >>> evolved in the first several epochs of cosmological history. The payoff is >>> a framework that can be carried forward: a way of saying exactly what >>> changes at each interface, what invariants are preserved, and what new >>> operations are meaningful. This is the conceptual platform Volume II then >>> uses to explore how the laws of quantum field theory and the Standard Model >>> might have co-evolved with EFEs. >>> Volume II: First Second of the Cosmos—Grand Metamorphosis takes the ladder >>> and runs it through the most conceptually volatile terrain: the early >>> epochs usually narrated as “the first second.” Here the main claim is not >>> that the standard ΛCDM story is wrong—it’s that its presuppositions about >>> the nature of “fixed” fundamental laws often outrun the observational >>> supports. We reframe the origin talk as a Grand Metamorphosis: a sequence >>> of regime interfaces in which degrees of freedom reduce, effective >>> descriptions become legitimate, and particle/field/vacuum language becomes >>> progressively more stable. Renormalization and effective field theory >>> become central topological “glue rules” in H₂: repeated stabilization under >>> coarse-graining is treated as the physical analogue of habit-formation. >>> Through inflation and reheating to confinement and hadronization epochs, we >>> keep asking: what is durable, what is evolving, what remains vague and >>> interval-valued, and what proxy consequences constrain the story? >>> Two landmarks organize the territory explored in the latter half of Volume >>> II. First, matter asymmetry: the universe’s net matter is an important >>> explanandum, so any plausible family of hypotheses must meet the minimal >>> structural conditions. Second, confinement/hadronization is where “durable >>> carriers” (e.g., protons and neutrons) become legitimate as stable letters >>> in the material alphabet, making later composition of durable >>> particles—nuclei and atoms—possible. The philosophical point follows from a >>> demand for rigor: what is often called “emergence” of such particles is not >>> magic if the interface operations and invariants are declared; but it is >>> magic if one simply retrojects late-time ontology backward. >>> Volume III: Cosmological Evolution: Laws as Nested Modalities (currently in >>> the early drafting stage) aims to extend the same method beyond the “first >>> second” into the long arc where physical and chemical order becomes richly >>> layered: nucleosynthesis and the periodic table; recombination and the CMB >>> as a memory ledger; stars as cyclic engines; galaxies as meso-scale >>> stabilizations; black holes as interface stress tests; and vacuum energy >>> and dark matter as an abductive frontier. The goal is to explain the >>> evolution of the physical and chemical laws we take to be >>> fundamental—starting from the work done on EFEs and QFT in Volumes I and >>> II. The third volume is especially well-suited to comparing the strengths >>> and weaknesses of H₃ and H₂: selection, quenching, and fossil constraints >>> become vivid across structure formation, feedback, and the survival of >>> specific channels under coarse-graining. The guiding idea is that “law” >>> evolves from ordered habits as nested systems of modalities—possibility, >>> actuality, necessity—implemented as operational postures for the >>> development of each family of hypotheses that become sharper as carriers >>> stabilize and as inference pipelines become robust. I’m eager for readers >>> to engage these drafts as collaborators: to challenge the interfaces, >>> sharpen the proxy suites, propose better toy models, and help evaluate >>> where H₂ genuinely earns explanatory continuity—and where H₁ or H₃ may, in >>> particular domains, deserve the stronger score. >>> If you have questions about what collaborative inquiry concerning these >>> questions might look like, let me know. I’d be happy to talk on or off >>> list. For those interested in reading the introduction or a chapter or two, >>> I'd be keen to have suggestions for revisions. If there is a small group of >>> colleagues who are interested, I'd be willing to do a series of discussions >>> as Zoom meetings, or something similar. >>> Yours, >>> Jeff >>> >>> >>> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on >>> behalf of Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2026 12:48 PM >>> To: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] AI safety and semeiotic, was, Surdity, Feeling, and >>> Consciousness, was, Truth and dyadic consciousnessg >>> >>> Colleagues, >>> For the last three decades I’ve been working—bit by bit—on a project to >>> extend Peirce’s “Guess at the Riddle” and apply pragmatic methods to >>> contemporary questions about the origins of physical order in the cosmos, >>> the origins and evolution of life, and the origins and evolution of >>> intelligent thought and action. Much of the time, it has been difficult for >>> me to see the forest for the trees. In the last few years, however, I’ve >>> made a concerted effort to tackle the first set of questions. An editor at >>> Bloomsbury Academic has expressed interest in publishing the first volume >>> as a monograph, so I'll be focused on turning the current sow's ear of a >>> working draft into something more finished. >>> A while back, Terry Moore and I, with the help of others, attempted to >>> develop a framework for collaborative research—both for (a) the >>> transcription of Peirce’s manuscripts and scholarship and (b) for the >>> application of pragmatic methods to questions in metaphysics and the >>> various sciences. Several members of the list wrote letters of support as a >>> few of us wrote applications for grant funding. After some years of trying >>> and a couple of decisions by the NSF that nearly went our way, we found it >>> necessary to put the grant writing to the side. At the time, Doug Anderson >>> provided some advice, which I now want to put to better effect. He >>> suggested that, if the work was worth doing, then we ought to dig into the >>> project and worry about the funding later. In the spirit of the SPIN and >>> APERI projects, I’ve developed the following framework on the first of >>> Peirce’s questions in “A Guess at the Riddle”: how did physical order first >>> grow in the cosmos? >>> With that much said, here is a very short overview of the research >>> project—together with an offer to share working drafts with those who might >>> want to work collaboratively on the questions. >>> Aims: The Origins of Order in the Cosmos project is my attempt to tell a >>> single, continuous story about how the universe became physically >>> ordered—how law, time, space, and stable objects emerged from a potential >>> field of extreme randomness and indeterminacy. The project is not written >>> as an argument for or against any one orthodox cosmology. Rather, it is >>> written as an invitation to inquiry: a structured attempt to make competing >>> explanations comparable, to expose hidden assumptions, and to build models >>> that can be criticized, repaired, and improved. I want colleagues and >>> students—including philosophers, physicists, mathematicians, engineers, and >>> interested lay people—to treat these drafts as working research >>> instruments: something you can push against, test, and use to generate new >>> questions. >>> Methods and strategies: The trilogy is built around Peircean method, >>> especially the cycle of inquiry involving iterative patterns of surprising >>> observation and abductive, deductive, and inductive inference; the >>> pragmatic maxim; and the principle of continuity. The methods are used to >>> clarify and further develop three comparative families of hypotheses. H₁ >>> treats fundamental physical laws as fixed and primordial; the early cosmos >>> is a parameterized stage-play governed by timeless equations. H₃ treats >>> early history as selection and quenching: many possibilities exist, but >>> only certain channels survive, leaving fossils—suppressed remnants, noise >>> floors, and relic constraints. H₂—the Peircean family I am especially keen >>> to explore and develop—treats laws as the result of the growth of ordered >>> habits: regularities strengthen as degrees of freedom reduce, as >>> coarse-graining stabilizes, and as the very meaning of what is “measurable” >>> sharpens. To sharpen the hypotheses in each family, the books insist on >>> explicit interfaces, “glue rules,” and conceivable tests and predicted >>> consequences that can shift comparative weights rather than merely decorate >>> a narrative. >>> Formal toolkit: We question the presupposition that early regimes are >>> naturally point-like as rational values or fully metric. As such, we >>> develop a modeling toolbox designed to respect structural uncertainty and >>> changing “license conditions” for concepts. Phase and parameter space >>> models are scaffolded with hypercomplex (Cayley–Dickson) and other >>> composition algebras as a way to represent evolving degrees of freedom, >>> compositional stability, and stabilization across epochs of cosmological >>> evolution. We use surreal (non-Archimedean) and interval-valued bookkeeping >>> when the regime does not justify rational-number determinacy, and to permit >>> the natural inclusion of values for our variables that are infinitesimals >>> and infinities. And we use multiple logics to match multiple regimes: >>> probabilistic logic for randomness and inference; constructive logic when >>> existence claims must be operationally witnessed; Peirce’s Gamma >>> existential graphs for higher-order/modal structure; and categorical logic >>> to build disciplined bridges between compositional algebras and between >>> these logical systems and the more deterministic language of first-order >>> theory. The ambition is to make our reasoning about physics more faithful >>> to what the different regimes reasonably allow. >>> Volume I: Origins of Order—Evolution of Law, Time and Space lays down the >>> backbone: an “interface-first” cosmology in which topology, projective >>> comparability, and metric structure are treated as rungs on a ladder rather >>> than as givens. The core question is deceptively simple: How could a world >>> that begins as high-dimensional, highly random potentiality ever become a >>> world where stable quantities, stable geometry, and stable processes are >>> possible? Here we introduce a strategy of non-retrojection—don’t talk as if >>> clocks, particles, or equilibrium thermodynamics were primitive where they >>> are not licensed—and we begin to articulate what would count as a “durable >>> carrier”—something that persists under coarse-graining and can transport >>> structure forward. Volume I is where the comparative posture leads the way: >>> every claim is framed against H₁ and H₃, with H₂ defended by continuity and >>> by its ability to reduce errors while still generating testable proxy >>> profiles. >>> In practice, Volume I builds toy models of order-growth: we start with toy >>> models of weighted dice and urns, and work our way to variance collapse and >>> attractor-like regularities; stabilization under repeated coarse-graining; >>> and the emergence of ordered conditions from chaotic regimes that precede >>> full metric time. The hypercomplex and surreal tools enter here as modeling >>> strategies: they let us represent pre-metric regimes without pretending we >>> already have real-number metrical geometry, and they allow us to treat >>> “dimension” as something that can be effective, local, and historically >>> stabilized rather than eternally fixed. The goal is to explain how the laws >>> expressed as Einstein’s field equations (EFEs) might, under H₂ and H₃, have >>> evolved in the first several epochs of cosmological history. The payoff is >>> a framework that can be carried forward: a way of saying exactly what >>> changes at each interface, what invariants are preserved, and what new >>> operations are meaningful. This is the conceptual platform Volume II then >>> uses to explore how the laws of quantum field theory and the Standard Model >>> might have co-evolved with EFEs. >>> Volume II: First Second of the Cosmos—Grand Metamorphosis takes the ladder >>> and runs it through the most conceptually volatile terrain: the early >>> epochs usually narrated as “the first second.” Here the main claim is not >>> that the standard ΛCDM story is wrong—it’s that its presuppositions about >>> the nature of “fixed” fundamental laws often outrun the observational >>> supports. We reframe the origin talk as a Grand Metamorphosis: a sequence >>> of regime interfaces in which degrees of freedom reduce, effective >>> descriptions become legitimate, and particle/field/vacuum language becomes >>> progressively more stable. Renormalization and effective field theory >>> become central topological “glue rules” in H₂: repeated stabilization under >>> coarse-graining is treated as the physical analogue of habit-formation. >>> Through inflation and reheating to confinement and hadronization epochs, we >>> keep asking: what is durable, what is evolving, what remains vague and >>> interval-valued, and what proxy consequences constrain the story? >>> Two landmarks organize the territory explored in the latter half of Volume >>> II. First, matter asymmetry: the universe’s net matter is an important >>> explanandum, so any plausible family of hypotheses must meet the minimal >>> structural conditions. Second, confinement/hadronization is where “durable >>> carriers” (e.g., protons and neutrons) become legitimate as stable letters >>> in the material alphabet, making later composition of durable >>> particles—nuclei and atoms—possible. The philosophical point follows from a >>> demand for rigor: what is often called “emergence” of such particles is not >>> magic if the interface operations and invariants are declared; but it is >>> magic if one simply retrojects late-time ontology backward. >>> Volume III: Cosmological Evolution: Laws as Nested Modalities (currently in >>> the early drafting stage) aims to extend the same method beyond the “first >>> second” into the long arc where physical and chemical order becomes richly >>> layered: nucleosynthesis and the periodic table; recombination and the CMB >>> as a memory ledger; stars as cyclic engines; galaxies as meso-scale >>> stabilizations; black holes as interface stress tests; and vacuum energy >>> and dark matter as an abductive frontier. The goal is to explain the >>> evolution of the physical and chemical laws we take to be >>> fundamental—starting from the work done on EFEs and QFT in Volumes I and >>> II. The third volume is especially well-suited to comparing the strengths >>> and weaknesses of H₃ and H₂: selection, quenching, and fossil constraints >>> become vivid across structure formation, feedback, and the survival of >>> specific channels under coarse-graining. The guiding idea is that “law” >>> evolves from ordered habits as nested systems of modalities—possibility, >>> actuality, necessity—implemented as operational postures for the >>> development of each family of hypotheses that become sharper as carriers >>> stabilize and as inference pipelines become robust. I’m eager for readers >>> to engage these drafts as collaborators: to challenge the interfaces, >>> sharpen the proxy suites, propose better toy models, and help evaluate >>> where H₂ genuinely earns explanatory continuity—and where H₁ or H₃ may, in >>> particular domains, deserve the stronger score. >>> If you have questions about what collaborative inquiry concerning these >>> questions might look like, let me know. I’d be happy to talk on or off >>> list. I'd be happy to have suggestions for improvement from those >>> interested in reading the introduction or a chapter or two. If there is a >>> small group of colleagues who are interested, I'd be willing to do a series >>> of discussions as Zoom meetings, or something similar. >>> Yours, >>> Jeff >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on >>> behalf of Gary Richmond <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> Sent: Friday, January 9, 2026 8:39 PM >>> To: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; Gary >>> Fuhrman <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; Jon Alan Schmidt >>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] AI safety and semeiotic, was, Surdity, Feeling, and >>> Consciousness, was, Truth and dyadic consciousnessg >>> >>> Jon, Gary F, List, >>> >>> For me, this has been a most valuable discussion. While I had earlier come >>> to the conclusion that Artificial Intelligence is not intelligent, the >>> comments and quotes included in this exchange strongly suggest to me that >>> it will never be, can never be because it misses the necessary features >>> that characterize intelligence. >>> >>> As Jon concisely put it, "If genuine semiosis is truly continuous. . . then >>> a digital computer, no matter how sophisticated, can only ever simulate >>> it--just as the real numbers do not constitute a true continuum, but >>> usefully approximate one for most practical purposes. After all, whenever >>> we humans break up our own reasoning (arguments) into discrete >>> steps--namely, "definitely formulated premisses" and conclusions >>> (argumentations. . .) --we are always doing so artificially and >>> retrospectively, after the real and continuous inferential process has >>> already run its course." >>> >>> Yet, to the extent that AI may prove dangerous, I continue to think that it >>> behooves us -- to the extent to which it is possible -- to move AI systems >>> toward Peircean theoretical rhetoric within the communities of inquiry in >>> which each of us may be engaged. >>> >>> Nevertheless, Gary F's warning shouldn't be ignored: "If present experience >>> is any guide. . . , clearly AI systems are going to align with the values >>> of the billionaire owners of those systems (and to a lesser extent the >>> programmers who work for them), which is certainly no cause for optimism. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 9, 2026 at 12:30 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Gary R., Gary F., List: >>> >>> GF: Having read the fine print at the end of the paper, it’s clear that >>> Manheim’s article was co-written with several LLM chatbots, and I wonder if >>> some of the optimism comes from them (or some of them) rather than from the >>> human side. >>> >>> I noticed that, too, with the result that it is more difficult for me to >>> take the article seriously. In a 1999 paper >>> <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320779>, "Peirce's Inkstand as an External >>> Embodiment of Mind," Peter Skagestad quotes CP 7.366 (1902) and points out >>> that Peirce "is not only making the point that without ink he would not be >>> able to express his thoughts, but rather the point that thoughts come to >>> him in and through the act of writing, so that having writing implements is >>> a condition for having certain thoughts" (p. 551). I know firsthand that >>> the act of writing facilitates my own thinking, and I cannot help wondering >>> if Manheim's choice to delegate so much of the effort for drafting his >>> article to LLMs precluded him from carefully thinking through everything >>> that it ended up saying. >>> >>> GF: Successful "alignment" is supposed to be between a super "intelligent" >>> system and human values. One problem with this is that human values vary >>> widely between different groups of humans, so which values is future AI >>> supposed to align with? >>> >>> If an artificial system were really intelligent, then it seems to me that >>> it would be capable of choosing its own values instead of having a >>> particular set of human values imposed on it. In a 2013 paper >>> <https://www.academia.edu/9898586/C_S_Peirce_and_Artificial_Intelligence_Historical_Heritage_and_New_Theoretical_Stakes>, >>> "C. S. Peirce and Artificial Intelligence: Historical Heritage and (New) >>> Theoretical Stakes," Pierre Steiner observes that according to Peirce ... >>> >>> PS: [H]uman reasoning is notably special (and, in that sense only, genuine) >>> in virtue of the high degrees of self-control and self-correctiveness it >>> can exercise on conduct: control on control, self-criticism on control, and >>> control on control on the basis of (revisable and self-endorsed) norms and >>> principles and, ultimately, aesthetic and moral ideals. ... The fact that >>> reasoning human agents have purposes is crucial here: it is on the basis of >>> purposes that they are ready to endorse, change or criticize specific >>> methods of reasoning (inductive, formal, empirical, ...), but also to >>> revise and reject previous purposes. Contrary to machines, humans do not >>> only have specified purposes. Their purposes are often vague and general. >>> In other passages, Peirce suggests that this ability for (higher-order and >>> purposive) self-control is closely related to the fact that human agents >>> are living, and especiallygrowing, systems. (p. 272) >>> >>> I suspect that much of the worry about "AI safety/alignment," as reflected >>> by common fictional storylines in popular culture, is a tacit admission of >>> this. What would prevent a sufficiently intelligent artificial system, >>> provided that such a thing is even possible, from rejecting human values >>> and instead adopting norms, principles, ideals, and purposes that we would >>> find objectionable, perhaps even abhorrent? More on the living/growing >>> aspect of intelligent systems below. >>> >>> GF: LLMs have to be artificially supplied with a giant database of >>> thousands or millions of symbolic texts, and it takes them months or years >>> to build up the level of language competence that a human toddler has; and >>> even then is is doubtful whether theyunderstand any of it. >>> >>> As with intelligence, I am unconvinced that it is accurate to ascribe >>> "language competence" to LLMs, especially given the well-founded doubt >>> about "whether they understand any of it." John Searle's famous "Chinese >>> room" thought experiment seems relevant here, e.g., as discussed by John >>> Fetzer in his online Commens Encyclopedia article >>> <http://www.commens.org/encyclopedia/article/fetzer-james-peirce-and-philosophy-artificial-intelligence>, >>> "Peirce and the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence." Again, in my view, >>> LLMs do not actually use natural languages, they only simulate using >>> natural languages. >>> >>> GF: I can’t help thinking that all this has a bearing on the perennial >>> question of whether semiosis requires life or not. >>> >>> In light of the following passage, Peirce's answer is evidently that >>> genuine semiosis requires life, given that it requires genuine triadic >>> relations; but he also seems to define "life" in this context much more >>> broadly than what we associate with the special science of biology. >>> >>> CSP: For forty years, that is, since the beginning of the year 1867, I have >>> been constantly on the alert to find a genuine triadic relation--that is, >>> one that does not consist in a mere collocation of dyadic relations, or the >>> negative of such, etc. (I prefer not to attempt a perfectly definite >>> definition)--which is not either an intellectual relation or a relation >>> concerned with the less comprehensible phenomena of life. I have not met >>> with one which could not reasonably be supposed to belong to one or other >>> of these two classes. ... In short, the problem of how genuine triadic >>> relationships first arose in the world is a better, because more definite, >>> formulation of the problem of how life first came about; and no explanation >>> has ever been offered except that of pure chance, which we must suspect to >>> be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure chance may itself be a >>> vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the physiological sense would be >>> due to life in the metaphysical sense. (CP 6.322, 1907) >>> >>> Elsewhere, Peirce maintains >>> <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00044.html> that a >>> continuum is defined by a genuine triadic relation, so his remarks here are >>> consistent with my sense that what fundamentally precludes digital >>> computers from ever being truly intelligent is the discreteness of their >>> operations. As I said before, LLMs are surely quasi-minds whose individual >>> determinations are dynamical interpretants of sign tokens; but those >>> correlates are involved in degenerate triadic relations, which are >>> reducible to their constituent dyadic relations. In my view >>> <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00056.html>, the genuine >>> triadic relation involves the final interpretant and the sign itself, which >>> is general <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00019.html> >>> and therefore a continuum of potential tokens that is not reducible to the >>> actual tokens that individually embody it. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >>> On Thu, Jan 8, 2026 at 11:17 AM <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> List, I’d like to add a few comments to those already posted by Jon and >>> Gary R about the Manheim paper — difficult as it is to focus on these >>> issues given the awareness of what’s happening in Minnesota, Venezuela, >>> Washington etc. (I may come back to that later.) >>> >>> Except for the odd usage of the term “interpretant” which Jon has already >>> mentioned, I think Manheim’s simplified account of Peircean semiotics is >>> cogent enough. But his paper seems to get increasingly muddled in the >>> latter half of it. For instance, the “optimism” about future AI that Jon >>> sees in it seems quite equivocal to me. Having read the fine print at the >>> end of the paper, it’s clear that Manheim’s article was co-written with >>> several LLM chatbots, and I wonder if some of the optimism comes from them >>> (or some of them) rather than from the human side. >>> >>> Also, the paper makes a distinction between AI safety and the alignment >>> problem, but then seems to gloss over the differences. Succesful >>> “alignment” is supposed to be between a super”intelligent” system and human >>> values. One problem with this is that human values vary widely between >>> different groups of humans, so which values is future AI supposed to align >>> with? If present experience is any guide (and it better be!), clearly AI >>> systems are going to align with the values of the billionaire owners of >>> those systems (and to a lesser extent the programmers who work for them), >>> which is certainly no cause for optimism. >>> >>> I think Stanislas Dehaene’s 2020 book How We Learn deals with the deeper >>> context of these issues better than Manheim and his chatbot co-authors. Its >>> subtitle is Why Brains Learn Better Than Any Machine … for Now. Reducing >>> this to simplest terms, it’s because brains learn from experience — “the >>> total cognitive result of living,” as Peirce said* — and they do so by a >>> scientific method (an algorithm, as Dehaene calls it) which is part of the >>> genetic inheritance supplied by biological evolution. An absolute >>> requirement of this method is what Peirce called abduction (or >>> retroduction). >>> >>> For instance, human babies begin learning the language they are exposed to >>> from birth, or even before — syntax, semantics, pragmatics and all — almost >>> entirely without instruction, by a trial-and-error method. It enables them >>> to pick up and remember the meaning and use of a new word from one or two >>> encounters with it. LLMs have to be artificially supplied with a giant >>> database of thousands or millions of symbolic texts, and it takes them >>> months or years to build up the level of language competence that a human >>> toddler has; and even then is is doubtful whether they understand any of >>> it. LLM learning is entirely bottom-up and therefore works much slower than >>> the holistic learning-from-experience of a living bodymind, even though the >>> processing speed of a computer is much faster than a brain’s. (That’s why >>> it is so much more energy-hungry than brains are.) >>> >>> I can’t help thinking that all this has a bearing on the perennial question >>> of whether semiosis requires life or not. I can’t help thinking that >>> experience requires life, and that is what a “scientific intelligence” has >>> to learn from — including whatever values it learns. It has to be embodied, >>> and providing it with sensors to gather data from the external world is not >>> enough if that embodiment does not have a whole world within it in >>> continuous dialogue with the world without — an internal model, as I (and >>> Dehaene and others) call it. But I’d better stop there, as this is getting >>> too long already. >>> >>> *The context of the Peirce quote above is here: Turning Signs 7: Experience >>> and Experiment <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#lgcsmtc> >>> Love, gary f >>> >>> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >>> >>> >>> From: Gary Richmond <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> Sent: 8-Jan-26 04:03 >>> To: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; Gary >>> Fuhrman <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; Jon Alan Schmidt >>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> Subject: AI safety and semeiotic, was, Surdity, Feeling, and Consciousness, >>> was, Truth and dyadic consciousnessg >>> >>> Gary F, Jon, List, >>> >>> In the discussion of Manheim's paper I think it's important to remember >>> that his concern is primarily with AI safety. Anything that would >>> contribute to that safely I would wholeheartedly support. In my view, >>> Peircean semeiotic might prove to be of some value in the matter, but >>> perhaps not exactly in the way that Manheim is thinking of it. >>> >>> Manheim remarks that his paper does not try to settle philosophical >>> questions about whether LLMs genuinely reason or only simulate thought, and >>> that resolving those debates isn’t necessary for building safer general AI. >>> I won't take up that claim now, but suffice it to say that I don't fully >>> agree with it, especially as I continue to agree with your argument, Jon, >>> that AI is not 'intelligent'. Can it every be? >>> What Mannheim claims is necessary re: AI safety is to move AI systems >>> toward Peircean semiosis in the sense of their becoming 'participants' in >>> interpretive processes. He holds that this is achievable through >>> engineering and 'capability' advances rather than "philosophical >>> breakthroughs;" though he also says that those advances remain insufficient >>> on their own for safety. Remaining "insufficient on its own for full >>> safety" sounds to me somewhat self-contradictory. But I think that more >>> importantly, he is saying that if there are things -- including Peircean >>> 'things' -- that we can begin to do now in consideration of AI safety, then >>> we ought to consider them, do them! >>> Manheim claims that AI safety depends on deliberately designing systems for >>> what he calls 'grounded meaning', 'persistence across interactions' and >>> 'shared semiotic communities' rather than 'isolated agents'. I would tend >>> to strongly agree. In addition, AI safety requires goals that are >>> explicitly defined but also open to ongoing discussion rather than >>> quasi-emerging implicitly from methods likeReinforcement Learning from >>> Human Feedback (RLHF) . Manheim seems to be saying that companies >>> developing advanced AI should take steps in system design and goal setting >>> -- including those mentioned above -- if safety is taken seriously. The >>> choice, he says, is between ignoring the implications of Peircean semeiotic >>> and continuing merely to refine current systems despite their deficiency >>> vis-a-vis safety; OR to embrace Peircean semiosis (whatever that means) and >>> intentionally build AI as genuine 'semiotic partners'. But,I haven't a >>> clear notion of what he means by 'semeiotic partners', nor a method for >>> implementing whatever he does have in mind. >>> I think Manheim off-handedly and rather summarily unfortunately dismisses >>> RLHF -- which is, falsely he argues, claimed as a way of 'aligning' models >>> with human values. From what I've read it has not yet really been developed >>> much in that direction. As far as I can tell, and this may relate to the >>> reason why Manheim seems to reject RLHF in toto, it appears to be more a >>> 'reward proxy' trained on human rankings of outputs which are then fed back >>> through some kind of loop to strongly influence future responses. Human >>> judgment enters only in the 'training'', not as something that a complex >>> system can engage with and debate with or, possibly, revise understandings >>> over time. In Manheim's view, RLHF is not 'bridging' human goals and >>> machine behavior (as it claims) but merely facilitating machine outputs to >>> fit learned preferences. >>> Still, whatever else RLHF is doing that is geared specifically toward AI >>> safety, it would likely be augmented by an understanding of Peircean >>> cenoscopic science including semeiotic. I would suggest that the semeiotic >>> ideas that it might most benefit from occur in the third branch of Logic as >>> Semeiotic, namely methodology (methodeutic) , perhaps in the present >>> context representing, almost to a T, Peirce's alternative title, >>> speculative rhetoric. It's in this branch of semeiotic that pragmatism >>> (pragmaticism) is analyzed. There is of course much more to be said on >>> methodology and theoretical rhetoric. >>> For now, I would tweak Manheim's idea a bit and would suggest that we might >>> try to move AI systems toward Peircean semeiotic rhetoric within >>> communities of inquiry. >>> Best, >>> Gary R >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]> . >>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, >>> if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go >>> to >>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]> . >>> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >>> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >>> email account, then go to >>> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
