Jeff Again - I am very impressed by your outline. I don’t know if any others have replied off list. I can see how your grant applications would go nowhere - the scope is far beyond the normal thought processes of review boards!
I’d say that the three categories are primal - not developmental ie, all are basic to the operation of the universe from the start - and the semiosic triad [ which enables both continuity and deviational adaptation]. That is - continuity is required for some forms of matter [ the most primal]. But not for other forms of matter [ the more complex]; and both processes must exist. Edwina > On Jan 11, 2026, at 3:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jeff- that’s a monumental project. I very much like your three volume > outline. > > You don’t refer in this abstract to the reason for this development of order > - which I suggest is the prevention of the entropic dissipation of the energy > of the universe - and the resultant development of a CAS [ complex adaptive > system] which keeps energy and matter in a ‘far-from-equilibrium state > [Prigogine]. > > See also Stuart Kauffman’s Book ’The Origins of Order: self-organization and > selection in Evolution Oxford Press 1993…[ which could almost be a 4th > volume!] > > But again - an impressive and well-articulated project… > > Edwina > >> On Jan 11, 2026, at 3:00 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Hello, >> >> I forgot to give my message a suitable subject heading, and I don't want to >> short circuit the ongoing conversation about AI. As such, I am resending the >> message under a new subject. If you are going to respond on-list, please >> respond in this thread. Let me add, however, that I am using AI resources, >> including LLMs, ML to advance this project in a number of ways. In the near >> future, I am hoping to gain access to Deep Mind and similar resources. >> For the last three decades I’ve been working—bit by bit—on a project to >> extend Peirce’s “Guess at the Riddle” and apply pragmatic methods to >> contemporary questions about the origins of physical order in the cosmos, >> the origins and evolution of life, and the origins and evolution of >> intelligent thought and action. Much of the time, it has been difficult for >> me to see the forest for the trees. In the last few years, however, I’ve >> made a concerted effort to tackle the first set of questions. An editor at >> Bloomsbury Academic has expressed interest in publishing the first volume as >> a monograph, so I'll be focused on turning the current sow's ear of a >> working draft into something more finished. >> A while back Terry Moore and I, with the help of others, attempted to >> develop a framework for collaborative research, both for (a) the >> transcription of Peirce’s manuscripts and scholarship and (b) the >> application of pragmatic methods to questions in metaphysics and the various >> sciences. Several members of the list wrote letters of support as a few of >> us wrote applications for grant funding. After some years of trying and a >> couple of decisions by the NSF that nearly went our way, we found it >> necessary to put the grant writing to the side. At the time, Doug Anderson >> provided some advice, which I now want to put to better effect. He suggested >> that, if the work was worth doing, then we ought to dig into the project and >> worry about the funding later. In the spirit of the SPIN and APERI projects, >> I’ve developed the following framework on the first of Peirce’s questions in >> “A Guess at the Riddle”: how did physical order first grow in the cosmos? >> Here is a very short overview of the research project—together with an offer >> to share working drafts with those who might want to work collaboratively on >> the questions. >> Aims: The Origins of Order in the Cosmos project is my attempt to tell a >> single, continuous story about how the universe became physically >> ordered—how law, time, space, and stable objects emerged from a potential >> field of extreme randomness and indeterminacy. The project is not written as >> an argument for or against any one orthodox cosmology. Rather, it is written >> as an invitation to inquiry: a structured attempt to make competing >> explanations comparable, to expose hidden assumptions, and to build models >> that can be criticized, repaired, and improved. I want colleagues and >> students—including philosophers, physicists, mathematicians, engineers, and >> interested lay people—to treat these drafts as working research instruments: >> something you can push against, test, and use to generate new questions. >> Methods and strategies: The trilogy is built around Peircean method, >> especially the cycle of inquiry involving iterative patterns of surprising >> observation and abductive, deductive, and inductive inference; the pragmatic >> maxim; and the principle of continuity. The methods are used to clarify and >> further develop three comparative families of hypotheses. H₁ treats >> fundamental physical laws as fixed and primordial; the early cosmos is a >> parameterized stage-play governed by timeless equations. H₃ treats early >> history as selection and quenching: many possibilities exist, but only >> certain channels survive, leaving fossils—suppressed remnants, noise floors, >> and relic constraints. H₂—the Peircean family I am especially keen to >> explore and develop—treats laws as the result of the growth of ordered >> habits: regularities strengthen as degrees of freedom reduce, as >> coarse-graining stabilizes, and as the very meaning of what is “measurable” >> sharpens. To sharpen the hypotheses in each family, the books insist on >> explicit interfaces, “glue rules,” and conceivable tests and predicted >> consequences that can shift comparative weights rather than merely decorate >> a narrative. >> Formal toolkit: We question the presupposition that early regimes are >> naturally point-like as rational values or fully metric. As such, we develop >> a modeling toolbox designed to respect structural uncertainty and changing >> “license conditions” for concepts. Phase and parameter space models are >> scaffolded with hypercomplex (Cayley–Dickson) and other composition algebras >> as a way to represent evolving degrees of freedom, compositional stability, >> and stabilization across epochs of cosmological evolution. We use surreal >> (non-Archimedean) and interval-valued bookkeeping when the regime does not >> justify rational-number determinacy, and to permit the natural inclusion of >> values for our variables that are infinitesimals and infinities. And we use >> multiple logics to match multiple regimes: probabilistic logic for >> randomness and inference; constructive logic when existence claims must be >> operationally witnessed; Peirce’s Gamma existential graphs for >> higher-order/modal structure; and categorical logic to build disciplined >> bridges between compositional algebras and between these logical systems and >> the more deterministic language of first-order theory. The ambition is to >> make our reasoning about physics more faithful to what the different regimes >> reasonably allow. >> Volume I: Origins of Order—Evolution of Law, Time and Space lays down the >> backbone: an “interface-first” cosmology in which topology, projective >> comparability, and metric structure are treated as rungs on a ladder rather >> than as givens. The core question is deceptively simple: How could a world >> that begins as high-dimensional, highly random potentiality ever become a >> world where stable quantities, stable geometry, and stable processes are >> possible? Here we introduce a strategy of non-retrojection—don’t talk as if >> clocks, particles, or equilibrium thermodynamics were primitive where they >> are not licensed—and we begin to articulate what would count as a “durable >> carrier”—something that persists under coarse-graining and can transport >> structure forward. Volume I is where the comparative posture leads the way: >> every claim is framed against H₁ and H₃, with H₂ defended by continuity and >> by its ability to reduce errors while still generating testable proxy >> profiles. >> In practice, Volume I builds toy models of order-growth: we start with toy >> models of weighted dice and urns, and work our way to variance collapse and >> attractor-like regularities; stabilization under repeated coarse-graining; >> and the emergence of ordered conditions from chaotic regimes that precede >> full metric time. The hypercomplex and surreal tools enter here as modeling >> strategies: they let us represent pre-metric regimes without pretending we >> already have real-number metrical geometry, and they allow us to treat >> “dimension” as something that can be effective, local, and historically >> stabilized rather than eternally fixed. The goal is to explain how the laws >> expressed as Einstein’s field equations (EFEs) might, under H₂ and H₃, have >> evolved in the first several epochs of cosmological history. The payoff is a >> framework that can be carried forward: a way of saying exactly what changes >> at each interface, what invariants are preserved, and what new operations >> are meaningful. This is the conceptual platform Volume II then uses to >> explore how the laws of quantum field theory and the Standard Model might >> have co-evolved with EFEs. >> Volume II: First Second of the Cosmos—Grand Metamorphosis takes the ladder >> and runs it through the most conceptually volatile terrain: the early epochs >> usually narrated as “the first second.” Here the main claim is not that the >> standard ΛCDM story is wrong—it’s that its presuppositions about the nature >> of “fixed” fundamental laws often outrun the observational supports. We >> reframe the origin talk as a Grand Metamorphosis: a sequence of regime >> interfaces in which degrees of freedom reduce, effective descriptions become >> legitimate, and particle/field/vacuum language becomes progressively more >> stable. Renormalization and effective field theory become central >> topological “glue rules” in H₂: repeated stabilization under coarse-graining >> is treated as the physical analogue of habit-formation. Through inflation >> and reheating to confinement and hadronization epochs, we keep asking: what >> is durable, what is evolving, what remains vague and interval-valued, and >> what proxy consequences constrain the story? >> Two landmarks organize the territory explored in the latter half of Volume >> II. First, matter asymmetry: the universe’s net matter is an important >> explanandum, so any plausible family of hypotheses must meet the minimal >> structural conditions. Second, confinement/hadronization is where “durable >> carriers” (e.g., protons and neutrons) become legitimate as stable letters >> in the material alphabet, making later composition of durable >> particles—nuclei and atoms—possible. The philosophical point follows from a >> demand for rigor: what is often called “emergence” of such particles is not >> magic if the interface operations and invariants are declared; but it is >> magic if one simply retrojects late-time ontology backward. >> Volume III: Cosmological Evolution: Laws as Nested Modalities (currently in >> the early drafting stage) aims to extend the same method beyond the “first >> second” into the long arc where physical and chemical order becomes richly >> layered: nucleosynthesis and the periodic table; recombination and the CMB >> as a memory ledger; stars as cyclic engines; galaxies as meso-scale >> stabilizations; black holes as interface stress tests; and vacuum energy and >> dark matter as an abductive frontier. The goal is to explain the evolution >> of the physical and chemical laws we take to be fundamental—starting from >> the work done on EFEs and QFT in Volumes I and II. The third volume is >> especially well-suited to comparing the strengths and weaknesses of H₃ and >> H₂: selection, quenching, and fossil constraints become vivid across >> structure formation, feedback, and the survival of specific channels under >> coarse-graining. The guiding idea is that “law” evolves from ordered habits >> as nested systems of modalities—possibility, actuality, >> necessity—implemented as operational postures for the development of each >> family of hypotheses that become sharper as carriers stabilize and as >> inference pipelines become robust. I’m eager for readers to engage these >> drafts as collaborators: to challenge the interfaces, sharpen the proxy >> suites, propose better toy models, and help evaluate where H₂ genuinely >> earns explanatory continuity—and where H₁ or H₃ may, in particular domains, >> deserve the stronger score. >> If you have questions about what collaborative inquiry concerning these >> questions might look like, let me know. I’d be happy to talk on or off list. >> For those interested in reading the introduction or a chapter or two, I'd be >> keen to have suggestions for revisions. If there is a small group of >> colleagues who are interested, I'd be willing to do a series of discussions >> as Zoom meetings, or something similar. >> Yours, >> Jeff >> >> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on >> behalf of Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2026 12:48 PM >> To: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] AI safety and semeiotic, was, Surdity, Feeling, and >> Consciousness, was, Truth and dyadic consciousnessg >> >> Colleagues, >> For the last three decades I’ve been working—bit by bit—on a project to >> extend Peirce’s “Guess at the Riddle” and apply pragmatic methods to >> contemporary questions about the origins of physical order in the cosmos, >> the origins and evolution of life, and the origins and evolution of >> intelligent thought and action. Much of the time, it has been difficult for >> me to see the forest for the trees. In the last few years, however, I’ve >> made a concerted effort to tackle the first set of questions. An editor at >> Bloomsbury Academic has expressed interest in publishing the first volume as >> a monograph, so I'll be focused on turning the current sow's ear of a >> working draft into something more finished. >> A while back, Terry Moore and I, with the help of others, attempted to >> develop a framework for collaborative research—both for (a) the >> transcription of Peirce’s manuscripts and scholarship and (b) for the >> application of pragmatic methods to questions in metaphysics and the various >> sciences. Several members of the list wrote letters of support as a few of >> us wrote applications for grant funding. After some years of trying and a >> couple of decisions by the NSF that nearly went our way, we found it >> necessary to put the grant writing to the side. At the time, Doug Anderson >> provided some advice, which I now want to put to better effect. He suggested >> that, if the work was worth doing, then we ought to dig into the project and >> worry about the funding later. In the spirit of the SPIN and APERI projects, >> I’ve developed the following framework on the first of Peirce’s questions in >> “A Guess at the Riddle”: how did physical order first grow in the cosmos? >> With that much said, here is a very short overview of the research >> project—together with an offer to share working drafts with those who might >> want to work collaboratively on the questions. >> Aims: The Origins of Order in the Cosmos project is my attempt to tell a >> single, continuous story about how the universe became physically >> ordered—how law, time, space, and stable objects emerged from a potential >> field of extreme randomness and indeterminacy. The project is not written as >> an argument for or against any one orthodox cosmology. Rather, it is written >> as an invitation to inquiry: a structured attempt to make competing >> explanations comparable, to expose hidden assumptions, and to build models >> that can be criticized, repaired, and improved. I want colleagues and >> students—including philosophers, physicists, mathematicians, engineers, and >> interested lay people—to treat these drafts as working research instruments: >> something you can push against, test, and use to generate new questions. >> Methods and strategies: The trilogy is built around Peircean method, >> especially the cycle of inquiry involving iterative patterns of surprising >> observation and abductive, deductive, and inductive inference; the pragmatic >> maxim; and the principle of continuity. The methods are used to clarify and >> further develop three comparative families of hypotheses. H₁ treats >> fundamental physical laws as fixed and primordial; the early cosmos is a >> parameterized stage-play governed by timeless equations. H₃ treats early >> history as selection and quenching: many possibilities exist, but only >> certain channels survive, leaving fossils—suppressed remnants, noise floors, >> and relic constraints. H₂—the Peircean family I am especially keen to >> explore and develop—treats laws as the result of the growth of ordered >> habits: regularities strengthen as degrees of freedom reduce, as >> coarse-graining stabilizes, and as the very meaning of what is “measurable” >> sharpens. To sharpen the hypotheses in each family, the books insist on >> explicit interfaces, “glue rules,” and conceivable tests and predicted >> consequences that can shift comparative weights rather than merely decorate >> a narrative. >> Formal toolkit: We question the presupposition that early regimes are >> naturally point-like as rational values or fully metric. As such, we develop >> a modeling toolbox designed to respect structural uncertainty and changing >> “license conditions” for concepts. Phase and parameter space models are >> scaffolded with hypercomplex (Cayley–Dickson) and other composition algebras >> as a way to represent evolving degrees of freedom, compositional stability, >> and stabilization across epochs of cosmological evolution. We use surreal >> (non-Archimedean) and interval-valued bookkeeping when the regime does not >> justify rational-number determinacy, and to permit the natural inclusion of >> values for our variables that are infinitesimals and infinities. And we use >> multiple logics to match multiple regimes: probabilistic logic for >> randomness and inference; constructive logic when existence claims must be >> operationally witnessed; Peirce’s Gamma existential graphs for >> higher-order/modal structure; and categorical logic to build disciplined >> bridges between compositional algebras and between these logical systems and >> the more deterministic language of first-order theory. The ambition is to >> make our reasoning about physics more faithful to what the different regimes >> reasonably allow. >> Volume I: Origins of Order—Evolution of Law, Time and Space lays down the >> backbone: an “interface-first” cosmology in which topology, projective >> comparability, and metric structure are treated as rungs on a ladder rather >> than as givens. The core question is deceptively simple: How could a world >> that begins as high-dimensional, highly random potentiality ever become a >> world where stable quantities, stable geometry, and stable processes are >> possible? Here we introduce a strategy of non-retrojection—don’t talk as if >> clocks, particles, or equilibrium thermodynamics were primitive where they >> are not licensed—and we begin to articulate what would count as a “durable >> carrier”—something that persists under coarse-graining and can transport >> structure forward. Volume I is where the comparative posture leads the way: >> every claim is framed against H₁ and H₃, with H₂ defended by continuity and >> by its ability to reduce errors while still generating testable proxy >> profiles. >> In practice, Volume I builds toy models of order-growth: we start with toy >> models of weighted dice and urns, and work our way to variance collapse and >> attractor-like regularities; stabilization under repeated coarse-graining; >> and the emergence of ordered conditions from chaotic regimes that precede >> full metric time. The hypercomplex and surreal tools enter here as modeling >> strategies: they let us represent pre-metric regimes without pretending we >> already have real-number metrical geometry, and they allow us to treat >> “dimension” as something that can be effective, local, and historically >> stabilized rather than eternally fixed. The goal is to explain how the laws >> expressed as Einstein’s field equations (EFEs) might, under H₂ and H₃, have >> evolved in the first several epochs of cosmological history. The payoff is a >> framework that can be carried forward: a way of saying exactly what changes >> at each interface, what invariants are preserved, and what new operations >> are meaningful. This is the conceptual platform Volume II then uses to >> explore how the laws of quantum field theory and the Standard Model might >> have co-evolved with EFEs. >> Volume II: First Second of the Cosmos—Grand Metamorphosis takes the ladder >> and runs it through the most conceptually volatile terrain: the early epochs >> usually narrated as “the first second.” Here the main claim is not that the >> standard ΛCDM story is wrong—it’s that its presuppositions about the nature >> of “fixed” fundamental laws often outrun the observational supports. We >> reframe the origin talk as a Grand Metamorphosis: a sequence of regime >> interfaces in which degrees of freedom reduce, effective descriptions become >> legitimate, and particle/field/vacuum language becomes progressively more >> stable. Renormalization and effective field theory become central >> topological “glue rules” in H₂: repeated stabilization under coarse-graining >> is treated as the physical analogue of habit-formation. Through inflation >> and reheating to confinement and hadronization epochs, we keep asking: what >> is durable, what is evolving, what remains vague and interval-valued, and >> what proxy consequences constrain the story? >> Two landmarks organize the territory explored in the latter half of Volume >> II. First, matter asymmetry: the universe’s net matter is an important >> explanandum, so any plausible family of hypotheses must meet the minimal >> structural conditions. Second, confinement/hadronization is where “durable >> carriers” (e.g., protons and neutrons) become legitimate as stable letters >> in the material alphabet, making later composition of durable >> particles—nuclei and atoms—possible. The philosophical point follows from a >> demand for rigor: what is often called “emergence” of such particles is not >> magic if the interface operations and invariants are declared; but it is >> magic if one simply retrojects late-time ontology backward. >> Volume III: Cosmological Evolution: Laws as Nested Modalities (currently in >> the early drafting stage) aims to extend the same method beyond the “first >> second” into the long arc where physical and chemical order becomes richly >> layered: nucleosynthesis and the periodic table; recombination and the CMB >> as a memory ledger; stars as cyclic engines; galaxies as meso-scale >> stabilizations; black holes as interface stress tests; and vacuum energy and >> dark matter as an abductive frontier. The goal is to explain the evolution >> of the physical and chemical laws we take to be fundamental—starting from >> the work done on EFEs and QFT in Volumes I and II. The third volume is >> especially well-suited to comparing the strengths and weaknesses of H₃ and >> H₂: selection, quenching, and fossil constraints become vivid across >> structure formation, feedback, and the survival of specific channels under >> coarse-graining. The guiding idea is that “law” evolves from ordered habits >> as nested systems of modalities—possibility, actuality, >> necessity—implemented as operational postures for the development of each >> family of hypotheses that become sharper as carriers stabilize and as >> inference pipelines become robust. I’m eager for readers to engage these >> drafts as collaborators: to challenge the interfaces, sharpen the proxy >> suites, propose better toy models, and help evaluate where H₂ genuinely >> earns explanatory continuity—and where H₁ or H₃ may, in particular domains, >> deserve the stronger score. >> If you have questions about what collaborative inquiry concerning these >> questions might look like, let me know. I’d be happy to talk on or off list. >> I'd be happy to have suggestions for improvement from those interested in >> reading the introduction or a chapter or two. If there is a small group of >> colleagues who are interested, I'd be willing to do a series of discussions >> as Zoom meetings, or something similar. >> Yours, >> Jeff >> >> >> >> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> on >> behalf of Gary Richmond <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Sent: Friday, January 9, 2026 8:39 PM >> To: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; Gary >> Fuhrman <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; Jon Alan Schmidt >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] AI safety and semeiotic, was, Surdity, Feeling, and >> Consciousness, was, Truth and dyadic consciousnessg >> >> Jon, Gary F, List, >> >> For me, this has been a most valuable discussion. While I had earlier come >> to the conclusion that Artificial Intelligence is not intelligent, the >> comments and quotes included in this exchange strongly suggest to me that it >> will never be, can never be because it misses the necessary features that >> characterize intelligence. >> >> As Jon concisely put it, "If genuine semiosis is truly continuous. . . then >> a digital computer, no matter how sophisticated, can only ever simulate >> it--just as the real numbers do not constitute a true continuum, but >> usefully approximate one for most practical purposes. After all, whenever we >> humans break up our own reasoning (arguments) into discrete steps--namely, >> "definitely formulated premisses" and conclusions (argumentations. . .) --we >> are always doing so artificially and retrospectively, after the real and >> continuous inferential process has already run its course." >> >> Yet, to the extent that AI may prove dangerous, I continue to think that it >> behooves us -- to the extent to which it is possible -- to move AI systems >> toward Peircean theoretical rhetoric within the communities of inquiry in >> which each of us may be engaged. >> >> Nevertheless, Gary F's warning shouldn't be ignored: "If present experience >> is any guide. . . , clearly AI systems are going to align with the values of >> the billionaire owners of those systems (and to a lesser extent the >> programmers who work for them), which is certainly no cause for optimism. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> On Fri, Jan 9, 2026 at 12:30 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Gary R., Gary F., List: >> >> GF: Having read the fine print at the end of the paper, it’s clear that >> Manheim’s article was co-written with several LLM chatbots, and I wonder if >> some of the optimism comes from them (or some of them) rather than from the >> human side. >> >> I noticed that, too, with the result that it is more difficult for me to >> take the article seriously. In a 1999 paper >> <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320779>, "Peirce's Inkstand as an External >> Embodiment of Mind," Peter Skagestad quotes CP 7.366 (1902) and points out >> that Peirce "is not only making the point that without ink he would not be >> able to express his thoughts, but rather the point that thoughts come to him >> in and through the act of writing, so that having writing implements is a >> condition for having certain thoughts" (p. 551). I know firsthand that the >> act of writing facilitates my own thinking, and I cannot help wondering if >> Manheim's choice to delegate so much of the effort for drafting his article >> to LLMs precluded him from carefully thinking through everything that it >> ended up saying. >> >> GF: Successful "alignment" is supposed to be between a super "intelligent" >> system and human values. One problem with this is that human values vary >> widely between different groups of humans, so which values is future AI >> supposed to align with? >> >> If an artificial system were really intelligent, then it seems to me that it >> would be capable of choosing its own values instead of having a particular >> set of human values imposed on it. In a 2013 paper >> <https://www.academia.edu/9898586/C_S_Peirce_and_Artificial_Intelligence_Historical_Heritage_and_New_Theoretical_Stakes>, >> "C. S. Peirce and Artificial Intelligence: Historical Heritage and (New) >> Theoretical Stakes," Pierre Steiner observes that according to Peirce ... >> >> PS: [H]uman reasoning is notably special (and, in that sense only, genuine) >> in virtue of the high degrees of self-control and self-correctiveness it can >> exercise on conduct: control on control, self-criticism on control, and >> control on control on the basis of (revisable and self-endorsed) norms and >> principles and, ultimately, aesthetic and moral ideals. ... The fact that >> reasoning human agents have purposes is crucial here: it is on the basis of >> purposes that they are ready to endorse, change or criticize specific >> methods of reasoning (inductive, formal, empirical, ...), but also to revise >> and reject previous purposes. Contrary to machines, humans do not only have >> specified purposes. Their purposes are often vague and general. In other >> passages, Peirce suggests that this ability for (higher-order and purposive) >> self-control is closely related to the fact that human agents are living, >> and especiallygrowing, systems. (p. 272) >> >> I suspect that much of the worry about "AI safety/alignment," as reflected >> by common fictional storylines in popular culture, is a tacit admission of >> this. What would prevent a sufficiently intelligent artificial system, >> provided that such a thing is even possible, from rejecting human values and >> instead adopting norms, principles, ideals, and purposes that we would find >> objectionable, perhaps even abhorrent? More on the living/growing aspect of >> intelligent systems below. >> >> GF: LLMs have to be artificially supplied with a giant database of thousands >> or millions of symbolic texts, and it takes them months or years to build up >> the level of language competence that a human toddler has; and even then is >> is doubtful whether theyunderstand any of it. >> >> As with intelligence, I am unconvinced that it is accurate to ascribe >> "language competence" to LLMs, especially given the well-founded doubt about >> "whether they understand any of it." John Searle's famous "Chinese room" >> thought experiment seems relevant here, e.g., as discussed by John Fetzer in >> his online Commens Encyclopedia article >> <http://www.commens.org/encyclopedia/article/fetzer-james-peirce-and-philosophy-artificial-intelligence>, >> "Peirce and the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence." Again, in my view, >> LLMs do not actually use natural languages, they only simulate using natural >> languages. >> >> GF: I can’t help thinking that all this has a bearing on the perennial >> question of whether semiosis requires life or not. >> >> In light of the following passage, Peirce's answer is evidently that genuine >> semiosis requires life, given that it requires genuine triadic relations; >> but he also seems to define "life" in this context much more broadly than >> what we associate with the special science of biology. >> >> CSP: For forty years, that is, since the beginning of the year 1867, I have >> been constantly on the alert to find a genuine triadic relation--that is, >> one that does not consist in a mere collocation of dyadic relations, or the >> negative of such, etc. (I prefer not to attempt a perfectly definite >> definition)--which is not either an intellectual relation or a relation >> concerned with the less comprehensible phenomena of life. I have not met >> with one which could not reasonably be supposed to belong to one or other of >> these two classes. ... In short, the problem of how genuine triadic >> relationships first arose in the world is a better, because more definite, >> formulation of the problem of how life first came about; and no explanation >> has ever been offered except that of pure chance, which we must suspect to >> be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure chance may itself be a >> vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the physiological sense would be due >> to life in the metaphysical sense. (CP 6.322, 1907) >> >> Elsewhere, Peirce maintains >> <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00044.html> that a >> continuum is defined by a genuine triadic relation, so his remarks here are >> consistent with my sense that what fundamentally precludes digital computers >> from ever being truly intelligent is the discreteness of their operations. >> As I said before, LLMs are surely quasi-minds whose individual >> determinations are dynamical interpretants of sign tokens; but those >> correlates are involved in degenerate triadic relations, which are reducible >> to their constituent dyadic relations. In my view >> <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00056.html>, the genuine >> triadic relation involves the final interpretant and the sign itself, which >> is general <https://list.iu.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2025-11/msg00019.html> >> and therefore a continuum of potential tokens that is not reducible to the >> actual tokens that individually embody it. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> On Thu, Jan 8, 2026 at 11:17 AM <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> List, I’d like to add a few comments to those already posted by Jon and Gary >> R about the Manheim paper — difficult as it is to focus on these issues >> given the awareness of what’s happening in Minnesota, Venezuela, Washington >> etc. (I may come back to that later.) >> >> Except for the odd usage of the term “interpretant” which Jon has already >> mentioned, I think Manheim’s simplified account of Peircean semiotics is >> cogent enough. But his paper seems to get increasingly muddled in the latter >> half of it. For instance, the “optimism” about future AI that Jon sees in it >> seems quite equivocal to me. Having read the fine print at the end of the >> paper, it’s clear that Manheim’s article was co-written with several LLM >> chatbots, and I wonder if some of the optimism comes from them (or some of >> them) rather than from the human side. >> >> Also, the paper makes a distinction between AI safety and the alignment >> problem, but then seems to gloss over the differences. Succesful “alignment” >> is supposed to be between a super”intelligent” system and human values. One >> problem with this is that human values vary widely between different groups >> of humans, so which values is future AI supposed to align with? If present >> experience is any guide (and it better be!), clearly AI systems are going to >> align with the values of the billionaire owners of those systems (and to a >> lesser extent the programmers who work for them), which is certainly no >> cause for optimism. >> >> I think Stanislas Dehaene’s 2020 book How We Learn deals with the deeper >> context of these issues better than Manheim and his chatbot co-authors. Its >> subtitle is Why Brains Learn Better Than Any Machine … for Now. Reducing >> this to simplest terms, it’s because brains learn from experience — “the >> total cognitive result of living,” as Peirce said* — and they do so by a >> scientific method (an algorithm, as Dehaene calls it) which is part of the >> genetic inheritance supplied by biological evolution. An absolute >> requirement of this method is what Peirce called abduction (or >> retroduction). >> >> For instance, human babies begin learning the language they are exposed to >> from birth, or even before — syntax, semantics, pragmatics and all — almost >> entirely without instruction, by a trial-and-error method. It enables them >> to pick up and remember the meaning and use of a new word from one or two >> encounters with it. LLMs have to be artificially supplied with a giant >> database of thousands or millions of symbolic texts, and it takes them >> months or years to build up the level of language competence that a human >> toddler has; and even then is is doubtful whether they understand any of it. >> LLM learning is entirely bottom-up and therefore works much slower than the >> holistic learning-from-experience of a living bodymind, even though the >> processing speed of a computer is much faster than a brain’s. (That’s why it >> is so much more energy-hungry than brains are.) >> >> I can’t help thinking that all this has a bearing on the perennial question >> of whether semiosis requires life or not. I can’t help thinking that >> experience requires life, and that is what a “scientific intelligence” has >> to learn from — including whatever values it learns. It has to be embodied, >> and providing it with sensors to gather data from the external world is not >> enough if that embodiment does not have a whole world within it in >> continuous dialogue with the world without — an internal model, as I (and >> Dehaene and others) call it. But I’d better stop there, as this is getting >> too long already. >> >> *The context of the Peirce quote above is here: Turning Signs 7: Experience >> and Experiment <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#lgcsmtc> >> Love, gary f >> >> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg >> >> >> From: Gary Richmond <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Sent: 8-Jan-26 04:03 >> To: Peirce List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; Gary >> Fuhrman <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>; Jon Alan Schmidt >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Subject: AI safety and semeiotic, was, Surdity, Feeling, and Consciousness, >> was, Truth and dyadic consciousnessg >> >> Gary F, Jon, List, >> >> In the discussion of Manheim's paper I think it's important to remember that >> his concern is primarily with AI safety. Anything that would contribute to >> that safely I would wholeheartedly support. In my view, Peircean semeiotic >> might prove to be of some value in the matter, but perhaps not exactly in >> the way that Manheim is thinking of it. >> >> Manheim remarks that his paper does not try to settle philosophical >> questions about whether LLMs genuinely reason or only simulate thought, and >> that resolving those debates isn’t necessary for building safer general AI. >> I won't take up that claim now, but suffice it to say that I don't fully >> agree with it, especially as I continue to agree with your argument, Jon, >> that AI is not 'intelligent'. Can it every be? >> What Mannheim claims is necessary re: AI safety is to move AI systems toward >> Peircean semiosis in the sense of their becoming 'participants' in >> interpretive processes. He holds that this is achievable through engineering >> and 'capability' advances rather than "philosophical breakthroughs;" though >> he also says that those advances remain insufficient on their own for >> safety. Remaining "insufficient on its own for full safety" sounds to me >> somewhat self-contradictory. But I think that more importantly, he is saying >> that if there are things -- including Peircean 'things' -- that we can begin >> to do now in consideration of AI safety, then we ought to consider them, do >> them! >> Manheim claims that AI safety depends on deliberately designing systems for >> what he calls 'grounded meaning', 'persistence across interactions' and >> 'shared semiotic communities' rather than 'isolated agents'. I would tend to >> strongly agree. In addition, AI safety requires goals that are explicitly >> defined but also open to ongoing discussion rather than quasi-emerging >> implicitly from methods likeReinforcement Learning from Human Feedback >> (RLHF) . Manheim seems to be saying that companies developing advanced AI >> should take steps in system design and goal setting -- including those >> mentioned above -- if safety is taken seriously. The choice, he says, is >> between ignoring the implications of Peircean semeiotic and continuing >> merely to refine current systems despite their deficiency vis-a-vis safety; >> OR to embrace Peircean semiosis (whatever that means) and intentionally >> build AI as genuine 'semiotic partners'. But,I haven't a clear notion of >> what he means by 'semeiotic partners', nor a method for implementing >> whatever he does have in mind. >> I think Manheim off-handedly and rather summarily unfortunately dismisses >> RLHF -- which is, falsely he argues, claimed as a way of 'aligning' models >> with human values. From what I've read it has not yet really been developed >> much in that direction. As far as I can tell, and this may relate to the >> reason why Manheim seems to reject RLHF in toto, it appears to be more a >> 'reward proxy' trained on human rankings of outputs which are then fed back >> through some kind of loop to strongly influence future responses. Human >> judgment enters only in the 'training'', not as something that a complex >> system can engage with and debate with or, possibly, revise understandings >> over time. In Manheim's view, RLHF is not 'bridging' human goals and >> machine behavior (as it claims) but merely facilitating machine outputs to >> fit learned preferences. >> Still, whatever else RLHF is doing that is geared specifically toward AI >> safety, it would likely be augmented by an understanding of Peircean >> cenoscopic science including semeiotic. I would suggest that the semeiotic >> ideas that it might most benefit from occur in the third branch of Logic as >> Semeiotic, namely methodology (methodeutic) , perhaps in the present context >> representing, almost to a T, Peirce's alternative title, speculative >> rhetoric. It's in this branch of semeiotic that pragmatism (pragmaticism) is >> analyzed. There is of course much more to be said on methodology and >> theoretical rhetoric. >> For now, I would tweak Manheim's idea a bit and would suggest that we might >> try to move AI systems toward Peircean semeiotic rhetoric within communities >> of inquiry. >> Best, >> Gary R >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>">UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, >> if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go >> to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> . >> ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM >> PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default >> email account, then go to >> https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► <a href="mailto:[email protected]";>UNSUBSCRIBE FROM PEIRCE-L</a> . But, if your subscribed email account is not your default email account, then go to https://list.iu.edu/sympa/signoff/peirce-l . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
