Ulysses, List: As I understand it, Peirce's semeiotic requires collateral experience/observation for *identifying *the object of a sign; an interpreter must in some way already be acquainted with that object in order to understand any sign that refers to it. With that in mind, I can suggest at least two possible ways of accounting for different semiotic analyses of a particular sign token, such as a taxidermic specimen at a museum.
1. The *dynamical *object is the same in all cases, but the *immediate *object is different because the sign *type *is different in each case; and since different sign types have different immediate and final interpretants, it is not surprising that their sign tokens produce different dynamical interpretants. 2. The sign type is the same in all cases, such that its dynamical and immediate objects are also the same, along with its immediate and final interpretants; but the sign token determines different dynamical interpretants in different interpreting quasi-minds because the latter have been determined *previously *by different signs, resulting in different habits of interpretation. Personally, I lean toward #2, which matches the colloquial description and seems consistent with your hunch. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 25, 2026 at 5:34 PM Ulysses <[email protected]> wrote: > My understanding of a boundary object is something that means slightly > different but partially overlapping things for different communities and > thus can bring groups together but does not truly unite them. > > The example I am familiar with is a taxidermic specimen at a museum. For > biologists it might be a token exemplar of a species. For museum > administrators it might be valuable because of the relative rarity of > species and how it aligns with the museum’s mission. In this case it would > be sign of reputation or some social/normative value. For taxidermists > themselves, the very same specimen might be a sign of specific techniques > of animal preservation. > > I think examples like this bring about a few questions for Peircean > semiotics. While colloquially we say it is the same object, is the object > of the sign really the same in each of these cases? What is the sign in > each of these cases, and does it include what Peirce sometimes terms > collateral experience/collateral observation? For example do the different > rational communities bring different experiences to bear on the object > (based on their training) and form different composite signs (specimen + > collateral experience) which form the basis of different interpretants? > > It seems like each group is picking up on different iconic and indexical > qualities that coexist in the same object. Colloquially I would say they > form different interpretations of the same thing. The way I would normally > talk about it would include how individual acts of deliberation are > consciously choosing to focus on different aspects of the object. I am not > exactly sure how to square this with a language of interpretants where > interpretants are always the product of previous steps in process because > it seems like there are interpretative acts being made that single out what > qualities in the object are being attended to before the object is even > considered as a sign. > > My hunch would be that, through different training, people habituate their > individual minds to form different percepts when in contact with the same > object and this becomes the foundation of different perceptual judgements, > leading to different chains of semiosis. In this case it’s not that the > interpretant formed is reaching back in time and selecting the qualities in > the object but rather a long running chain of previous semiosis is already > forming different intermediate signs which become the inputs to the > different interpretants. >
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