Frank, Gary, list Since I raised the question about misrepresentation and misinterpretation "en passant", without going into further analysis, I might indeed have instilled more doubts than clearing the mist (as Deely would put). As I first say, my opinion that misrepresentation is lack of information on the extension (breadth) of a term, while misinterpretation is lack of information on the comprehension (depth) is based on the following reasoning, which I will try to keep as much as possible to level of a non-technical discussion. Peirce does not draw this distinction so clearly, but i think it is implicit in his semeiotic.
The received view about logical extension and comprehension when Peirce began his doctrine of signs was that they were a commutative and reversible operation like breadth x depth. The term "man" when at its maximum extension would cover human being (be it living, death at yet to be born). Its comprehension would then be at its minimum: rational. So whenever someone says "is rational" to something, he would be signifying something that is a "man". And whenever someone would point at something and say "man", he would be denoting something that is "rational". If you zoom in and cover less extension, what we get is that you also increase the comprehension. So I say "Brazilian man", I restricted the extension and now get a comprehension that also includes "a male human born in Brazil, Latin American, Portuguese speaker and son on). We have then something like a rubber band. If you stretch it, it covers more Area but gets thinner (less depth). If you contract it, it covers less Area, but you get a thicker depth. Peirce found out that semeiosis implies growth, learning, development. This is information. But he also found out that only symbols grow. Symbols are concepts (grounded by ideas), words, but also propositions, assertions, books, a library and, if we get serious, the whole universe. Whatever is growing, becoming more complex, is also internalizing information. Information implies symmetry breaking, non-commutative processes, arrow-directness, finious process, final causation, purpose, teleology, association of ideas in the mind. So instead of a rubber band, now you have a protoplasm band. It feels, it generalizes feeling, it produces sensations (new predicates), it breaks old habits and acquire new ones. That is information: an increase of either comprehension or extension without the diminishing of the other. So you get a thicker band, or a larger area, without having to lose on the other side. All living beings produce information, which also means that there is a sense in which the whole universe is a living being - at least a semeiotic living being. The question is: how is information produced? By perception, for sure, because perception is the only door for novelty, freshness, pure chance, tychism. Symbols, when they get to their maximum extension, tend to become exhausted, the habit they carry is stiff, almost a rule of thumb, stereotypes, prejudices. They need a new injection of perceptual judgments to shake their souls. That's what percepts do: they are firstness and reactions among firstess. No symbolic content. In the perceptual judgement, novelty enters the mind, curious facts are perceived and call for new hypothesis which will transform our old concepts into more developed ones. Symbols grow when you expose them to real life. In a contextual situation, hic et nunc, a concept you have about "man" (for instance) receives the indexical shock of a perceptual presence of a man that was not part of you conception yet. Let's say you meet an Australian aborigene for the first time. It's presence is indexical, but brings along with it all sorts of new qualities: color of skin, dust covering the body, a particular smell, accent, body tatoos etc. So both extension and comprehension were augmented. That is a new cognition. An index and a symbol are attached. It is like putting a quantifier in a logical symbol to denote a specific element of a kind. New cognitions are always inferential, and must always begin with hypotheses (the perceptual judgment). The symbol we are talking about now is an argument, moved by purpose, capable of self-control and retroduction for continuous corrections and production of new hypothesis. That all above being said, we can now talk about misrepresentation and misinterpretation. Misrepresentation is false information on the side of extension (the subsumption of the object under a concept). Let's suppose that the Australian aborigine was fake. Actually, it was a Brazilian man dressed for carnival. The indexical element was real (perceptually existent), but the icon was fake (the perceived qualities were not genuine). Nevertheless, the interpretation was not wrong. It would not be fair to condemn the interpreter that was fooled by a false index. The interpreter did his job as he should have done. Perceptual judgements are fallible, an so are our cognitions. That's the core of Peirce's fallibilism. When taken to a judge, you would swear that the mistake was not your fault. You just could not help it. The blame is to be put in whoever set up to falsely represent the real. You misrepresented the real, but your interpretation was correct. Misinterpretation is false information on the side of comprehension (the knowledge that allows a community to recognize the unique characters of a member of a class). Now let's suppose that Australian aborigine was real. The sign then indicates with true information (the index and the icon are both real), but the interpreter now thinks that it is someone dressing a phantasy, that it's a practical joke, it's someone having fun in carnival. That might put him in trouble. You avoid misrepresentation when you can correctly denote (indicate) if an object of your perception belongs or not to a the extension of the concept. For instance, had you arrived earlier on the scene, you would have observed the Brazilian man dressing up as the aborigene, and misrepresentation was eliminated. You avoid misinterpretation if you correctly signify its real characters (comprehension), but now perception must be a collective endeavor. It must be part of the commens, the sum of all synthetical propositions gathered during inquiry by a community of interpreters. So you ask the person who he is. Or ask people around you to check if your interpretation is backed with other people's. Different sensations must be gathered and united. These differences may seem just logical quibbles for some, but they are actually crucial when you have to deal, for instance, with bioethical issues. A medical mistake might be caused by misrepresentation (some medical apparatus was not working properly but the conduct was taken correctly in a particular state of information). Or the apparatus was fine but there was not sufficient knowledge about the case, even if a group of doctors gathered to discuss it trying to avoid mistakes. On the second case, an ethical committee usually deliberate about the whole situation. This distinction has clearly pragmatic effects, an I propose that it should be adopted. We know that even a broken clock is "right" twice a day. If it stopped at 6, and someone ask you what time it is and you happen to look at the broken clock showing 6 precisely when, by pure chance, is really 6 pm, then was it a misrepresentation or a misinterpretation of the real time? The same about the weathervane. Vinicius 2014-03-31 13:22 GMT-04:00 Frank Ransom <[email protected]>: > Gary F., List, > > Thank you for the effort, Gary. Actually, since you mentioned that > understanding the motivation of my questions is somewhat difficult, perhaps > it would prove helpful to present that motivation more clearly. > > In the early theory of information, we have a fairly clear account of what > information is: information is the information of a symbol, expressed in > the quantity of interpretant, itself understand in terms of whether the > symbol is used as subject or predicate in synthetic propositions. So > information is the product of synthetic depth and breadth. I can consider > any given symbol, consider the characters and things which inform it, and > thereby understand what the symbol means -- how it is to be interpreted in > terms of its characters and things. I can also clearly understand that the > symbol changes according to changes in its information, while still being > the same symbol. These changes would be understood as occurring through > inferences, always through either induction or abduction; even though one > or two of the kinds of inductions and abductions seem very similar to > deductions because of verbal changes involved. > > I'm not entirely sure what's going on with the later theory of abduction, > though it was the topic in Peirce's philosophy that interested me most > during my master's studies. If I understand rightly, what would have been > called abduction in the early theory is later subsumed under induction, in > particular induction of qualities, so I am no longer certain how inference > works in the later theory of information. This should serve as an > indication that something is different about the later theory in more than > a minor way. > > All the more so when we consider the later classifications of signs. We > know the dicisign will convey information in the later theory, but a > proposition can only be the dicisign that is also a symbol and legisign. > Since there are also now dicisigns that are indices and sinsigns or indices > and legisigns, we now have something besides syntethic propositions to deal > with (though a proposition will be instantiated in a sinsign). > > We also know that icons and indices will determine the information of the > dicisign, as we might have expected in the early theory as communicating > characters and things to which the symbol applies. But in the later theory > icons and indices have become a good bit more complicated, being > distinguished in a number of ways. It may be doubted whether depth and > breadth are any longer so easily characterized as referring to characters > and things, so that the analysis of a proposition's information, not to > mention of the other dicisigns, will now require something more of an > elaborate analysis than the breaking it down into characters and things to > which the terms (and now, in the later theory, the propositions and > arguments) apply. > > So when I see that comprehension/depth is associated with interpretants > and their misinterpretation, I would like a good bit more to be said about > how this is to be understood. When I think of the interpretants now, I > typically think of them in terms of the trichotomy of > immediate-dynamic-final. But for one thing, the dicisign is not, classified > as such, an interpretant, but the relation of sign to interpretant. So when > the misinterpretation occurs, is it in this relation, or is it in the > interpretants themselves? "Lack of information on the side of interpretant" > makes it look as though it must be with the interpretants. But which > interpretant? The immediate, the dynamic, or the final, or two of the > three, or all three? And, when we consider comprehension/depth, is this > going to be a more robust understanding of comprehension/depth than we find > in the early theory relating to the quantity of characters informing the > symbol? I am somewhat clueless here, so I'm seeking to be better informed > about what is going on with misinterpretation. > > If I my motivation doesn't seem to be showing itself yet in this line of > thinking, I will put it more explicitly: Information, in the early theory, > has to do with the meanings of terms and how inductive and abductive > inferences increase the state of information, reflecting, ideally, an > increase in knowledge. Information, in the later theory, does not seem > quite so clear cut; everything is a lot more complicated now, making it > quite difficult to pull off one clear example of information change or > growth. In the early theory, I had simply to take a term, consider its > known characters and things to which it applied, and then develop ideas > about how it might be expanded through abduction and put them to the test > through induction. In the later theory, I am rather clueless where to > begin. I'm not saying this is a bad thing; in some respects I have thought > the early theory leaning nominalistic, whereas the later theory looks more > adequate to the challenge of natural classification, i.e. the > classification of forms operating as final causes in nature. But it's > always been, from my point of view, unwieldy, and I would like to achieve a > much improved understanding of it and, with hope, learn to become > proficient in informational analysis through the later theory -- > informational analysis, of course, in what would be Peirce's sense of that > term if he had used it. > > I am actually quite glad that Vinicius brought up his point about > information missing from Kees' book. Then again, since I know of no > genuinely clear account of how to proceed through an analysis with the > later theory's developments, perhaps it was better that Kees left it out. > In any case, I was really more hopeful than anything that I could get a > clearer account from Vinicius of his fourth point, the one regarding > information, because if he thinks it should have been included, then > perhaps he has a much superior grasp of the workings of the later theory > and knows how it ought to have been presented in Kees' book; and I would > like to, if I might, get some good hints about those workings. Hence my > questions, which are somewhat searching, but also have to do with my > heuristics and information at this point regarding Peirce's semiotic(s), > which heuristics and information would appear in some way to conflict with > Vinicius' statement of his own point of view. > > Well I hope this helps to understand the motivation behind my inquiry. Now > I'm going to go check out what Jon Awbrey has offered of his own > understanding, and will likely reply to him late tonight or tomorrow, > depending on how long it takes me to get through his readings. > > -- Franklin > > > On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 9:58 AM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi Franklin, >> >> >> >> Just to let you know, I did have a go at answering your questions, but >> made no progress; I'm not up to the task this morning. Somebody who better >> understands their motivation will have to take over ... >> >> >> >> gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Frank Ransom [mailto:[email protected]] >> *Sent:* 30-Mar-14 11:18 PM >> *To:* [email protected] 1 >> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or the >> doctrine of signs >> >> >> >> Gary, Vinicius, List, >> >> >> >> After following the link and reading "Rehabilitating Information," I >> think I have something of what I was looking for; but yes, I am especially >> interested in the trichotomies of interpretants. >> >> >> >> There are two ideas that I took away from the article that somewhat >> change my perspective: first, that Peirce later extends the concept of >> information to apply not only to terms but also propositions and arguments; >> second, in general I was impressed by the way information (or as Peirce's >> concept is uniquely identified in the article, Information) is shown to be >> important to the whole of the triadic relation and to semiosis, which >> perhaps should be taken to show that information no longer has at all do >> with the quantity of the interpretant. If I remember correctly, I read this >> paper before (or perhaps something similar?) a long while ago, but it was >> good to read it again and recall. >> >> >> >> Still, I found my questions unanswered, such as the one regarding the >> immediate-dynamic-final trichotomy; should we expect comprehension to be of >> three kinds now, and how do these relate to the characters of the object? >> Also, is it really the case that extension or breadth no longer has to do >> with the quantity of interpretant, but now to do with the object of the >> sign instead? >> >> >> >> I should say that I have resolved one of my concerns stated before, "Since >> misrepresentation has to do with the lack of information on the extension >> of a term, and misinterpretation with the lack of information on the >> comprehension of a term, how is it that the iconic is what is significant >> with respect to the possibility of misinterpretation, rather than, say, the >> symbolic? Partly I realized I made a mistake in my first post, saying "Also, >> I would like to point out that in these readings, he says icons are >> necessary for comprehension, while indices are necessary for extension." When >> looking for an appropriate passage, I realized I had actually received this >> idea by reading through André's essay from the following line in particular >> from "Peirce's Logic of Information": "Peirce's elaborate discussion of >> dicisigns or propositions in the Syllabus of 1903 (EP2: 275-85, 294-99) and >> in "New Elements" (EP2: 308-24) demonstrates clearly how such propositions >> always involve iconic and indexical elements--elements of depth and >> breadth--without which they could not inform." Here I suppose, understanding >> the terms as given respectively, that iconic and depth are to be understood >> as representing the same elements. >> >> >> >> But if this is true, and if misinterpretation is both "the lack of >> information on the side of intepretant (and interpreters)" and "lack of >> information on the comprehension of a term" then this suggests that >> iconic elements are associated with the interpretant and that >> misinterpretation has to do with iconic elements, which casts doubt on the >> example of the weathervane Vinicius used in showing the problem with the >> iconic element to result in misrepresentation rather than >> misinterpretation. In relating what André says about icons and depth with >> what Vinicius had to say about misinterpretation and lack of information >> with respect to interpretants and comprehension, and the connection I draw >> between the iconic, comprehension, and the interpretant, we do find Peirce >> saying in "Sundry Logical Conceptions" (EP2, pp.276-277) that "The part >> which is represented to represent a part of the Dicisign, is represented as >> at once part of the Interpretant and part of the Object. It must, >> therefore, be represented as such a sort of Representamen (or to represent >> such a sort) as can have its Object and its Interpretant the same. Now, a >> Symbol cannot even have itself as its Object...An Index can very well >> represent itself...But it is impossible for an Index to be its own >> Interpretant...An Icon, however, is strictly a possibility, involving a >> possibility, and thus the possibility of its being represented as a >> possibility is the possibility of the involved possibility. In this kind of >> Representamen alone, then, the Interpretant may be the Object. >> Consequently, that constituent of the Dicisign which is represented in the >> Interpretant as being a part of the Object, must be represented by an Icon >> or by a Representamen of an Icon." Since Peirce here has explained how the >> iconic is connected with the interpretant, I no longer have a concern with >> how this is possible. >> >> >> >> But I would like to know how a broken weathervane, which would normally >> be understood to point in the direction of the wind, can be broken such >> that, not indexically, but iconically, it fails to represent the wind. For >> indexically, we might expect that a broken weathervane would simply fail to >> point at all, because no longer physically affected by the wind, and thus >> fail to represent the wind; but if the problem is iconic, we might >> expect a broken weathervane to still be pointing, but bent in such a way as >> to misdirect the interpreter's attention -- which, I should think, means a >> misinterpretation by the interpreter, not a misrepresentation; for surely >> the bent weathervane is still moved by the wind and thus physically >> affected to be in its current facing, thus still representing the wind. Or >> perhaps, because the icon is at once part of the Object and part of the >> Interpretant, it might somehow be said to be both misrepresentation and >> misinterpretation? I don't think this can be right though; the weathervane >> still looks well enough iconically to be understood as a weathervane, >> albeit bent up or broken in some such way that the interpreter has not yet >> figured out how to reinterpret it to understand the direction of the wind. >> The only other possibility I can suppose, when considering the possibility >> of iconic misrepresentation, is that the broken weathervane not only does >> not look like a weathervane, it also has no longer a physical connection >> with the wind. In this case, I'm not so sure that it's right to say that >> there is any misrepresentation at all. There's simply no representation at >> all anymore to act as a bad representation or misrepresentation. And, while >> it would take too much searching to find the appropriate quote from Peirce, >> I was fairly certain he thought that technically, any quality can represent >> anything whatsoever, everything having a likeness, even in the vaguest >> possible way, to everything else; it is merely uneconomical (perhaps a >> gross understatement) for inquiry to follow certain qualities rather than >> others when working to discover the truth of a sign. >> >> >> >> Well, perhaps I am horribly mistaken somewhere, but I'm not sure where it >> would be. If an example could be brought up about how the lack of >> comprehension of a term is possible in the weathervane case that does not >> involve the possibility which is at once also its very capacity for iconic >> representation, I might be satisfied with being wrong in my assessment of >> the broken weathervane example. >> >> >> >> As an additional note, I also wonder if "misinterpretation is lack of >> information on the comprehension of a term" can't be quite right, since >> Peirce extended information to propositions and arguments. Quoting from >> Gary's paper: >> >> >> "Peirce later added supplementary notes to his paper in 1870 (W2:504-12) >> and 1893 (CP 2.391-430 and notes). One of the latter includes this >> explanation (CP 2.407 Fn P1): >> >> 'I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first >> written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and >> depth was equally applicable to propositions and to arguments. The breadth >> of a proposition is the aggregate of possible states of things in which it >> is true; the breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible cases to >> which it applies. The depth of a proposition is the total of fact which it >> asserts of the state of things to which it is applied; the depth of an >> argument is the importance of the conclusions which it draws.'" >> >> >> >> I don't think I'm capable of drawing out the implications for >> misrepresentation and misinterpretation, if there even are any, but I think >> it's good food for thought. >> >> >> >> -- Franklin >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > > -- Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D. Professor of Communication Studies School of Communications and Arts University of Sao Paulo, Brazil www.minutesemeiotic.org www.semeiosis.com.br Skype:vinicius_romanini
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